


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Technical Note
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December 1974

PART I — Background Studies

**GREAT POWER INTERESTS AND CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN—MIDDLE EAST—PERSIAN GULF REGION**

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
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PART I - Background Studies

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
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This volume contains a collection of background papers prepared by recognized experts on subjects pertinent to the Middle East situation; these papers were utilized, among many other sources, for appropriate inputs of information and analytical interpretation into the main study, Great Power Interests and Conflicting Objectives in the Mediterranean-Middle East-Persian Gulf Region, SSC-TN-3115-2.



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CONTRACTUAL TASK

This Technical Note is in partial fulfillment of Task Order 74-1, under Contract DAAG39-74-C-0082.

FOREWORD

This volume of background papers on various key aspects of the Middle East situation is an element of the WY74 program for the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS), Department of the Army. It is one of two supplementary volumes to the summary report on Great Power Interests and Conflicting Objectives in the Mediterranean-Middle East-Persian Gulf Region, SCC-TN-3115-2 (Task Order 74-1).

The overall task order was prepared under the supervision of Mr. Richard B. Foster, Director of the Strategic Studies Center, Mr. M. Mark Earle, Jr., and Mr. Hamilton A. Twitchell, Assistant Directors, and Dr. Wynfred Joshua, formerly an assistant director. Co-leaders of the project were William M. Carpenter and Stephen P. Gibert.

Contributors to this volume were Mr. R.M. Burrell, Dr. Alvin J. Cottrell, Dr. Curt Gasteyger, Dr. Bernard Lewis, and Air Vice Marshal S.W.B. Menaul, RAF (Ret.). These papers, although revised and edited by the SSC project team, reflect in the main the views of the initial author of each, and the judgments on the Middle East are therefore somewhat at variance from one paper to another. In the light of the complex nature of the Middle East it is considered that the reader will find these individual interpretations of interest.

Richard B. Foster
Director
Strategic Studies Center

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THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF EGYPT, SYRIA AND SAUDI ARABIA

THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF EGYPT, SYRIA AND SAUDI ARABIA

Introduction

The war between the Arab states and Israel produced several diplomatic changes in the Middle East, an important one being the opening of the way for a renewal of U.S. relations with Egypt and Syria, but in terms of inter-Arab affairs the two most notable features were the reemergence of Egypt as the leading state in the Arab world and the newly-acquired importance of Saudi Arabia. One might pursue the analysis even further and say that the changes could almost be described in personal terms: the emergence of a confident (some would say overconfident) and popular President Sadat in Egypt, and the realization that the opinions of an autocratic ruler of a highly traditional state in Saudi Arabia are matters of great international importance.

To analyze the changes in this way could, however, easily lead to error, for although President Sadat has emerged as a figure with greatly enhanced prestige there is much evidence to suggest that there are many internal challenges in Egypt which still exist and to these he will have to pay attention if his regime is to survive. Western commentators have been swept up in a tide of Egyptian euphoria, and descriptions of Sadat such as "the undisputed king on the Arab chess board" are as misleading as they are glib. The attack on President Sadat's life in April 1974 is an obvious instance of challenge. In Saudi Arabia where the political system remains traditional, centralized, autocratic and small, the personal role of the ruler is much greater. But even here there are political pressures upon the king and ones that are more difficult to discern than those in Egypt. The traditional cast of King Faisal's mind and his greater concentration upon religious values are factors which may make Saudi Arabian policy more difficult to analyze, but they certainly do not reduce its importance. In Syria where no such dominant personality has emerged as a result of the War, analysis must turn, as always, to the internal divisions within the state and to the way in which these affect the processes of policy formation.

In other words the foreign policies of all these three states must be seen against the background of internal factors and not merely as the response to changes in the international diplomatic environment since October 1973.

Egypt

Egypt's position as the most important Arab state had prior to the October war been somewhat obscured. But it is essentially the only Arab state which possesses the recognizable attributes of nationhood. A corporate political entity and historically accepted territorial dimensions are characteristics which few Arab states can claim. European influence has been more direct and sustained in Egypt than anywhere else in the Arab world, and this too, by assisting in the creation of a centralized administration, has given Egypt the means of asserting its nationhood.

The dilemmas faced by Egypt in asserting its political identity were, however, considerable and were discussed by President Nasser in his brief apologia "The Philosophy of the Revolution." He said that he saw Egypt as being at the center of a group of circles--Arab, African, and Muslim. The search for a suitable policy touched upon issues in all three circles, but the essence of Egypt's policy lay in the first, the Arab, and in particular in Nasser's attempt to lead and influence the Arab world. Nasser's method was to champion the Arab nationalist cause and to encourage the other Arab states to strive for "independence," but with the aim of creating simultaneously an exclusively Egyptian zone of influence in the Middle East. Western-inspired defense systems were rejected, and arms were purchased from the Soviet bloc in order to show how independent Egypt's decisions had become. The liberation, reconstruction, and unification of the Arab world were the avowed aims, but the unification was to be under Egyptian guidance if not control.

In this campaign for "liberation," Israel played a major role. For even when Western influence had begun to wane and the pro-Western regime in Iraq was replaced, and after British influence in the Gulf began to decline, Israel remained and could be described as a Western bridgehead. The campaign for "liberation" also involved inter-Arab affairs, for opponents of Nasser's Arab policy were condemned as "reactionaries" and the reliance of several of

these regimes on the West for diplomatic support and military assistance was seen as further evidence of their reactionary nature. Leadership of the "reactionary" group fell to Saudi Arabia, and active Egyptian efforts were made to undermine that state. The support of dissident movements throughout the Arab world and elsewhere was justified by verbal sleight of hand familiar to Lenin. This was the distinction between "Egypt the State," Egypt as a member of the comity of nations which had to conduct formal relations with other members, and "Egypt the Revolution," a country which had dealings only with the representatives of truly democratic and revolutionary political movements!

However fine those policies sounded on paper, the reality in the 1960s was somewhat more somber. The Union with Syria was a failure and the attempt to take over the Yemen was also embarrassing and unsuccessful. The principle of Arab unity was further refined; there were now to be two concepts: unity of objectives, and unity of ranks. The first involved unity with the radical states and concerned political objectives such as democracy and Arab socialism. The second was wider and could embrace all Arab regimes regardless of their ideology or system of government and was the predominant policy pursued throughout the 1960s. The unity of ranks allowed Egypt to seek support in the confrontation with Israel and when necessary against the West. Unity of objectives became a less frequently avowed policy and was used in Egypt's dealings with certain Arab regimes but became much more a policy for internal consumption and propaganda than an operative principle of diplomatic relations.

The confrontation with Israel in 1967 was, in part at least, an attempt by President Nasser to restore his own personal authority and to refurbish Egypt's rather tarnished image in the Arab world. The resulting war was a disaster, with Israel left in occupation of Egyptian territory, the Egyptian armed forces beaten and discredited and the economy reduced to ruins. The economic aid of the "reactionary" Arab states was essential for the regime's survival, and in September 1967 Nasser virtually admitted the failure of his Arab policy at the Khartoum conference. At the Rabat conference in December 1969 Nasser failed to get the concerted economic or military support which he requested from the other Arab states and he turned

again to building up a revolutionary bloc of states with Syria, Libya and the Sudan. On Nasser's death in September 1970 there seemed to be very little on the credit side of his diplomatic account. Israel was still on Egyptian soil; positive neutrality was a sham, with Egypt's armed forces being armed and trained exclusively by the Soviet Union; the economy was stagnant and survived only by courtesy of "reactionary" Arab support; the Suez canal was still closed; and Arab unity was threatened by a guerrilla-led civil war in Jordan which threatened to bring down Lebanon as well. Sadat's heritage was indeed not an enviable one.

Since 1970, however, he has gradually legalized his authority, consolidated his power, and endeavored to remove potential--and even actual--rivals. This meant a reconsideration of Nasserist policies in both domestic and international affairs. The break, however, could not be too drastic, and in April 1971 Egypt concluded a union with Libya and Syria. Although this success was temporary, it helped Sadat at a critical time. It also aided President Assad of Syria, who had come to power in November 1970, to acquire legitimacy for his authority by gaining Egyptian influence over the Sunni Arabs in Syria, who otherwise might have caused trouble for the predominantly Alawite regime.

This union, however, created opposition in Egypt, and Ali Sabri endeavored to capitalize upon this, indicating that Egypt could be defeated by the combined vote of its two partners in the Presidential Council. In order to strengthen his power within Egypt, Sadat gained the support of General Sadik, who was second in command to General Fawzi. The Sadat-Sadik partnership began to develop along the lines of the previous Nasser-Amer combination. Despite Sadat's early support, the new union could not survive, but it helped him to overcome the objections to the already launched deviation from Nasserite policies. The Libyan leaders' call for the overthrow of the Jordanian monarchy, the subversion of Saudi Arabia, and the abandonment of the search for a political settlement with Israel were not policies likely to endear Libya to its partners.

The internal political struggle led to Sadat's dismissal of Ali Sabri in May 1971, but the Egyptian President still had to rely on Soviet military aid and diplomatic support, and on 27 May 1971 the 15-year Egyptian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship was signed. The Russians apparently were not convinced that Sadat was yet in complete control and believed that his rightist tendencies would produce a political reaction in Egypt from which they could benefit, possibly even resulting in the installation of a pro-Soviet President. Egypt was motivated to sign the treaty in part by the desire to get FROG missiles from the USSR.

Having got rid of his immediate rivals and having covered himself by signing the treaty with the USSR, the Egyptian leader began to follow a policy of reconciliation with the conservative Arab regimes. King Faisal paid a visit to Cairo in June en route to Washington, and the opportunity was taken by Sadat to improve relations between the two countries. Faisal was opposed to union between Egypt and Libya. Further evidence of Egypt's return to the policy of seeking friends among non-radical regimes was given in December 1971 when Sadat refused to break off relations with Iran over the occupation of Arab islands in the Gulf. These actions reflected little credit on the Egyptian President. Further, the year 1971, which had been described as "the year of decision," ended in debacle.

Within Egypt traditional nationalist sentiments began to express themselves, and student rioting, mostly against the Russians, became more frequent. Discontent was also noticeable in the armed forces, as voices were raised seeking either a firmer commitment from the Russians or their expulsion. The Egyptian President continued to keep his options open by maintaining Aziz Sidqi as Prime Minister--a man who was thought to be trusted by the Russians--while trying to open a dialogue with the United States. Temporarily, the mounting internal pressures were relieved by the expulsion of the Russian military advisors in July 1972 and by the dismissal of General Sadiq in October. These actions gave rise to a severe challenge to the regime by a group which included Sadiq but which also contained strongly religious elements. Muslim rioters burned a Coptic Church in November 1972, and there were signs of revival among the Ikhwan (The Muslim Brotherhood). Further riots followed, and the dismissal of Prime Minister Sidqi was widely

demanding to balance that of General Sadiq. The latter had no unified group around him and President Sadat was again able to survive.

Sadat's situation was not, however, very strong. He had evicted the Soviet advisors after the May summit conference between Nixon and Brezhnev in order to indicate to Washington that Egypt could still act independently, regardless of any other impression which Nixon may have gathered--or been given--in Moscow. Egypt's close identification of Israel and the United States was modified a little, and in February 1973 Sadat sent his personal advisor on security matters, Hafiz Ismail, to Washington in an attempt to break the diplomatic deadlock over Israel. The failure of this mission may have been the factor which finally convinced Sadat that the emergence of detente between the superpowers would frustrate Arab attempts to settle the Israeli issue. The communique issued after the Brezhnev-Nixon summit conference of June 1973, which omitted any specific reference to the Jarring mission or to U.N. resolution No. 242, served to confirm these fears. (The 3,200-word communique in fact devoted less than 100 words to the Middle East.)

An increasing sense of frustration drove the Egyptian president to dismiss both the Prime Minister (Aziz Sidqi) and the Secretary General of the Arab Socialist Union (Sayyed Mirai) in April. Power had to be consolidated before new policies could be pursued, and in May, at a speech to industrial workers near Cairo, the Egyptian president said that from that time on Egypt regarded the Rogers initiative as dead and that a state of total confrontation against Israel had begun.

Saudi Arabia

The pivot of the new policy was to be a much closer relationship between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, vital for any effective use of the oil weapon. In the search for a united Arab front no possible ally was neglected, and even though Khaddafi's new scheme for Egyptian-Libyan unity was put off, Sadat was careful not to make a formal break at this time with Khaddafi. The cooperation achieved by Sadat between radical and conservative regimes was a significant achievement, and almost certainly one which the more flamboyant

and ambitious Nasser could not have secured. Sadat's lower political profile and the abandonment of plans for Egyptian hegemony in the Arab world were undoubtedly decisive features, particularly in improving relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The reduction in the Arab military aim from the total crushing of Israel to the lesser one of seeking the liberation of territories occupied in 1967 also helped to secure wider Arab support.

The alliance was not, however, entirely of Sadat's making. King Faisal's influence in the Arabian peninsula was very significant, as was Syria's move away from a position of hostility to "conservative" Arab regimes. This change--one which owed more to the Syrian Minister of Defense (Mustafa Tlas) than to President Assad--was also very important, for it allowed Jordan to be brought into the defense planning. By the mid-summer of 1973 plans were well advanced, and King Faisal even went so far as to warn the United States that unless Washington changed its pro-Israeli stance, future oil supplies might be jeopardized. At one stage the use of the oil weapon alone seems to have been considered by Egypt and Saudi Arabia to make the West put pressure on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories. This was, however, rejected, as it was felt that such use of the weapon might not be concerted, and neither might its effects become evident with sufficient speed. Lack of success would undoubtedly lead to turmoil in the Arab world, which Libya and the Palestinian organizations could then exploit, and this might threaten the position of Sadat and perhaps even that of Faisal.

The two leaders seem to have decided in the summer of 1973 that war was necessary to ensure the degree of Arab unity without which the use of the oil weapon would prove fruitless. By May of 1973 the antiaircraft missiles in Egypt made war possible; the Egyptians realized that they could not hope for air superiority over Israel, because of the lack of pilots, and because their MiGs were short-range, defensive fighters. By the end of August, war was, to all intents and purposes, inevitable. The leaders of Syria and Egypt had staked their political futures on it and failure to attack would certainly have resulted in domestic political turmoil and the probable collapse of both regimes by military coup.

After the War

Although Arab military successes in the war were relatively brief in duration, the impact of the crossing of the Suez Canal and the attack on the Golan Heights was very great. For even limited success was interpreted as political victory, particularly as all previous Arab attempts at reversing Israel's conquest had been such public failures. The element of surprise and the maintenance of secrecy restored Arab confidence, and the apparent destruction of the myth of the Israeli superiority gave a great psychological boost to the Arab cause. These early successes enabled later failures--and the return to a position of military dependence on the USSR--to be obscured and even forgotten. The political deadlock had been broken.

The war did more than restore Arab confidence; it also restored the armed forces to a position of primacy within the Egyptian political system. The armed forces know--even if the Arab public does not--that the victories achieved in the October war were not as glorious as they have been painted and that defeat again came very close. Their patience with diplomacy is likely to be of brief duration unless its successes become immediate and obvious. Talk of renewed fighting is already beginning, and it is difficult to believe that Egyptian claims to Arab leadership along the lines avowed by Nasser will long remain dormant among the military class. Faisal may try to channel this claim into the defense of the Persian Gulf for a wide Arab strategic aim, which may not exclude another war with Israel. Unless the precarious nature of Sadat's success is appreciated, particularly by Washington, the pressure for renewed hostilities may become overwhelming. For President Sadat and indeed for President Assad the time is short; only King Faisal has the degree of internal control which will allow him to survive a breakdown in the Geneva negotiations.

The achievements of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger are in fact fragile. The disengagement agreements were not easy to achieve but the difficulties in getting a full settlement will be very much greater. The easiest problem should be Sinai. Israel has indicated a willingness to return much of the Peninsula--under suitable security safeguards--but Egypt insists on payment of \$2.1 billion by Israel for the oil which it has extracted from the Abu Rodeis oil fields in the Sinai since 1967. In other words,

whenever Israel appears to yield, the Egyptian price--even in Sinai--can be, and is likely to be, increased. The Golan settlement, too, will be fraught with difficulties, and that still leaves the even more complex problems of the West Bank and Jerusalem.

Egypt seeks a reconciliation between Jordan and the Palestinian resistance movement to facilitate resuming and making progress at the Geneva talks, and it was with this aim in mind that King Hussein was invited to Cairo in mid-July 1974. After the talks Sadat stated that it was not difficult to reconcile the two sides; the problem was rather to stop other forces from sowing dissension between them. The Egyptian desire for a reconciliation is not matched by that of the Palestinians; on the very day that Sadat's statement was published, Faruk al-Kaddoumi, the head of the political department of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, stated that a reconciliation with the King of Jordan was possible only on terms which would mean the effective end of his regime.

The immediate problem is over who should represent the West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians at Geneva. The PLO is adamant that King Hussein shall not be their representative, but the King on the other hand has refused to recognize the PLO and insists that the West Bank should again become part of Jordan. The communique issued after the Sadat-Hussein talks showed some progress. The Jordanian leader apparently agreed to accept the PLO as the representative of those Palestinians who did not live in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The PLO rejected this formula saying that it could never accept a situation in which it was not the sole representative of the Palestinians.

Even if a Jordanian-PLO agreement could be reached, the current attitude of Israel is scarcely conducive to further rapid progress. The Israeli government was reported to have conducted a lengthy reexamination of its policy towards the Palestinians in mid-July, but in a statement issued on 21 July 1974 the customary view was reaffirmed. The Cabinet's decision was reported as being that "peace will be founded on the existence of two independent states only: Israel with united Jerusalem as its capital and a Jordanian-Palestinian Arab state east of Israel with borders to be

determined in negotiations between Israel and Jordan." The statement continues, "This state will provide for expression of the self identity of the Jordanians and the Palestinians in peace and good neighborliness with each other." In the face of this rejection of the concept of a Palestinian state, it is difficult to see how any real progress can be made, for the Palestinian refusal to live under a Hashemite regime is deeply founded. On the Jerusalem issue, Faisal is unlikely to give in on the demand to return it to Arab control, and might use the oil embargo to enforce this point.

The actual processes of Jordanian-Israeli disengagement are also a proximate source of difficulty. In the Hussein-Sadat talks it was stated that the next step in Arab-Israeli negotiations should be a disengagement between Israel and Jordan, with Israeli forces pulling back to a line five miles from the River Jordan. The Israeli view is that the Jordan talks should follow further progress in Sinai. The Israeli cabinet is believed to dispute the need for a five-mile withdrawal and holds the view that the river is the best line of disengagement in any talks with Jordan. Retreat would, it is argued, merely strengthen the Arab states' military position in any renewed hostilities.

The Israeli desire to deal with Egypt first is understandable but is likely to receive little support in Cairo. As stated above, President Sadat's continuation in office depends on maintaining the momentum of diplomacy, but he cannot appear to be putting Egyptian interests above all else. However much some people in Egypt may want a settlement as part of what might be described as an "Egypt first" policy with little attention being given to any of Nasser's three circles (Arab, African, and Islamic), the legacy of the past cannot be discarded so quickly. Objectives fostered for so long and with such energy cannot be abandoned easily. There are powerful groups in Egypt which would be quick to remind the President of Egypt's historic mission to liberate all occupied Arab soil. Sadat would doubtless prefer, as would almost all the heads of state in the Middle East, that the Palestinians did not exist, but they do and their commitment to their cause is shared by other Arabs (and, it might be noted, encouraged most actively by the more distant regimes in Libya and Iraq). No Egyptian leader, nor any Syrian one, can hope to pursue for very long a policy which appears to ignore Palestinian

interests. President Sadat obviously feels that he cannot go much further in bilateral negotiations with Tel Aviv without incurring the risk of "getting too far ahead of the field" and so expose himself to hostile criticism and even to the danger of overthrow.

Syria

There are already signs that the unity of ranks between Egypt and Syria is under some strain. The differences appeared in March when the Syrian Minister of Defense claimed that Egypt's acceptance of the ceasefire on the Suez front robbed Syria of a chance to launch a massive counteroffensive against Israel, in the Golan Heights. The date, General Tlas stated, had been set for 23 October 1973 and the operation would have evicted the Israeli invaders. The Egyptian acceptance of the ceasefire he said came as a complete surprise to Damascus. There may be some truth in the statement, because additional Arab forces, including three Iraqi brigade groups, were on their way up to the Syrian front when the ceasefire began. Other reports have indicated that the USSR had to put considerable pressure on Damascus, even to the extent of threatening to block further arms supplies, to get the ceasefire accepted by Syria. The Syrian criticism was understood in Cairo, and in mid-April 1974 when fighting again flared on the Golan front, the Egyptian War Minister, Field Marshal Ahmed Ismail, was quick to warn **Israel** that if the hostilities continued, Egypt would not hesitate to back Syria militarily.

Egypt is still very sensitive to any accusations of deserting its Arab allies. The tensions between Israel and Lebanon prompted Sadat to offer Egyptian military assistance to Beirut in order to forestall such charges. On the seventh anniversary of the June 1967 war, when President Sadat visited Egyptian troops in Sinai, he emphasized that Egypt's work was not yet over. It would not be completed he said until the withdrawal of the last foreign soldier from all Arab territories and until Palestinian rights were restored. Here again is evidence of the Egyptian leader's care to emphasize the continuing role of the military and his insistence that the signing of the disengagement agreement did not presage the abandonment of Arab allies.

Syrian misgivings are not likely to be easily removed, and some Syrian politicians have been quick to point out that Egypt's pressure to ensure priority for a speedy reopening of the Suez Canal is an indication of the way in which Cairo is concentrating on its own interests, for the reopening of the Canal does nothing to restore Palestinian rights nor to regain further Arab territory. The Syrian leadership would, however, be reluctant to see a serious rift develop between Cairo and Damascus. The current Syrian regime is no more secure than most of its predecessors, and the close alliance with Egypt helps to keep the Sunni Arabs under control. The Pan-Arab aspirations of this group have caused serious problems for previous regimes in Syria, and Egyptian support for the current regime undoubtedly helps to dampen potential opposition from this quarter.

Soviet Union

The pressure from the Syrian military for a new round of fighting has been sharpened by the massive flow of Soviet arms to Damascus. In mid-April 1974 President Assad visited Moscow, and the joint communique issued at the end of the visit spoke of the Soviet Union's recognition of the need to consolidate Syria's defensive power. The Beirut press reported that the following weeks saw steady supplies of SAMs, Mig-23s, and Mig-25s arriving in Damascus. If Mig-25s are to be present in Syria they will probably be flown by Russian pilots, and their purpose in being there may be to provide fleet cover formerly flown from Egyptian bases.

The USSR gave maximum support to Damascus during Dr. Kissinger's attempt to achieve a Syrian-Israeli disengagement. The private diplomacy of the U.S. Secretary of State was not liked by the Kremlin, who wanted to get the negotiations back to Geneva as quickly as possible, for there the Soviets and the Americans have an equal role. At the same time, however, the Soviets wanted the Syrians to get maximum concessions from the Israelis, and it was with this end in view that Mr. Gromyko paid several visits to Damascus during the period of Kissinger's air-shuttle diplomacy. The Soviet aim was to stiffen Syria, but to stop short of actually wrecking the talks. As an exercise in brinkmanship, the Soviets had to tread carefully and at the

point of maximum Israeli concession, the Kremlin was quick to switch tracks and welcome the agreement. In private, however, Moscow warned President Assad--and by extension the Egyptian leader--that now that the talks were back at Geneva, the Arabs would need the powerful protection of the USSR. This argument was reinforced by pointing to the lifting of the oil embargo and by Moscow's hint that now that oil supplies to the United States had been resumed, Washington would no longer seek to put pressure on Israel and that the Pentagon would in fact use the interval to rearm the Jewish state. The latter twist in the argument was designed to stimulate still further Syrian requests for Soviet arms.

Soviet support for Syria has given the USSR an influential role in Syrian-Israeli negotiations. The Soviet government has backed Syrian demands for total Israeli evacuation of occupied territory. Should Moscow later decide to impede progress at the forthcoming Geneva Conference, the Russians could press Syria to remain adamant on the territorial question.

The problem in Syria is unlike that in Egypt, for President Assad has not made the same major changes in foreign policy which have been made by President Sadat. The fact that Israeli troops are closer to Damascus than they are to Cairo and that the Golan Heights is a much more sensitive area than Sinai seriously affects the position. Many members of the Syrian armed forces feel that Egypt deserted them at a crucial hour and they are therefore keen to resume the fighting. Soviet arms supplies have made this a realistic option, under the assumption that the Egyptians would be drawn into the conflict within a few days.

The value of Syria to the USSR is considerable: it provides Moscow with air and naval facilities for Mediterranean operations and its position enables the Soviets to bring pressures to bear on Turkey--a major source of interest to the Kremlin in view of current quarrels between Greece and Turkey, and of ever greater interest in terms of Soviet plans for the Balkans after the death of Tito. The Syrian economy does not suffer from the population pressures which have so bedevilled Egypt, and the existence of minority groups and rival factions gives the Soviets scope for the sort of political maneuvers which they appear to prefer. (The dangers of such maneuvers emerge only much later--sometimes, as the Kremlin has discovered, too late to repair the damage which has been done.)

The supply of arms to Syria by the USSR has given President Assad the option of renewing the conflict with Israel. The flow of arms has also been designed to put pressure on Cairo to rejoin the Soviet ranks. If diplomacy fails to give President Sadat the successes which he needs then the army in Egypt will doubtless urge a renewal of the fighting. Before that can occur, however, new arms as well as spare parts for weaponry previously supplied will be necessary. The Egyptian President has voiced his displeasure on several occasions at the reluctance of the USSR to supply all the arms which Egypt has demanded and has stated his desire to acquire arms from the United States. Domestic constraints may, however, prevent Washington from meeting the Egyptian requests. If this happens, the pressure on Sadat to seek a reconciliation with Moscow may become very great, and if these pressures are not heeded then his position would undoubtedly be threatened. The Kremlin is therefore playing a waiting game, being careful to extend periodic olive branches to Egypt such as the letter of 25 May 1974 from Mr. Brezhnev marking the third anniversary of the Egyptian-Soviet treaty, but at the same time causing envy among the military class by supplying large quantities of modern arms to Syria, and more recently to Libya.

Libya, besides being the recipient of Soviet arms, has been critical of its neighbor to the east. The Libyan leader Khaddafi stated, in a Beirut newspaper on 28 April, that his country and the USSR had the common aim of seeking to prevent the reestablishment of American influence in the Arab world; this was seen as a critical reference to President Sadat's attempts to improve Egyptian-American relations. The Libyan Premier, Major Jalloud, while in Moscow on 14 May, spoke of the need to improve Arab-Soviet relations along the lines set out by President Nasser. This again was an open criticism of Sadat, and the speech was given wide circulation by Soviet news media covering the Arab world.

Not all Soviet criticism of Sadat has been performed by proxy. When the policies of liberalization and so-called "de-Nasserization" began to achieve prominence in March and April 1974 and particularly when the scope of plans for economic reconstruction using massive American aid became more

widely known, the Kremlin's attacks increased in virulence. The Egyptian leadership was accused of belittling Nasser's legacy and destroying the fruits of socialism in Egypt. The attacks were careful not to mention Sadat by name but their target was obvious. Moscow Radio directed its Arabic listeners' attention to the unstable situation in Lebanon which, said the commentator, had "useful lessons" for other Arab countries which were currently endeavoring to open their doors to the West. Another broadcast said that in present-day Egypt "the dogs of the exploiting classes are barking and howling by the rubbish dumps for they have sniffed a smell which revives their hopes."

The USSR continues to maintain the tension in Egyptian-Soviet relations in the hope that Sadat's desire to gain closer friendship with the United States and Western Europe will be frustrated. The Egyptian President has indeed endeavored to improve relations between Cairo and Moscow. On 14 April 1974 the Egyptian deputy Prime Minister Abdul Kader Hatem endeavored to convince the USSR that his country's new direction in economic policy did not involve a rejection of Soviet friendship. A few days later a Soviet-Egyptian agreement covering technical and scientific operations was signed. The Egyptian leader's journey to Rumania and Bulgaria so soon after President Nixon's Cairo visit may be seen as further evidence of Egypt's wish not to let the rift in relations with the USSR widen still further. On 23 July, the twenty second anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, Sadat spoke of his regret at the lukewarm state of relations with the Soviet Union and expressed the hope that misunderstandings between the two countries would soon be removed. There are voices already being raised inside Egypt which doubt the extent to which the United States will be prepared to assist Cairo in its policies of economic reconstruction and the regaining of Arab lands. A notable example of this was the last article written by Heykal in Al Ahram.¹ This attack, which prompted his dismissal, called attention to what the author regarded as the essential disparity between long-term American and Egyptian interests. This was a most serious challenge to Sadat's public and euphoric friendship with Kissinger and it is one which continues to find echoes within Egypt.

1 Al Ahram, 1 February 1974

The fact that such views were published by so important a journalist as Heykal is an indication of the difficulties which the United States faces in reestablishing its influence in the Arab world. Suspicions of Washington's motives have been fostered for many years, and the effects of U.S. military and diplomatic support for Israel cannot be rapidly erased. The Soviet Union will, of course, endeavor to ensure that Washington's task is made as difficult as possible by reminding the Arabs of previous U.S. support for Israel and by slowing down the progress of the Geneva talks. As has been stressed already, Sadat's position is by no means as secure as some observers would seem to believe; the momentum of diplomatic success will have to be maintained if his prestige is to remain high, yet it is difficult to see how this can be achieved. On the one hand further successes are necessary, but on the other hand Sadat cannot afford to appear to be pursuing Egyptian aims to the exclusion of Palestinian needs. Any hint of a separate agreement by Egypt with Israel would be equivalent to a political kiss of death, and unless the Geneva negotiations satisfy King Faisal, particularly over the future status of Jerusalem, Egypt's economy would soon be under pressure since Saudi support would almost certainly be withdrawn. In order to counter this latter possibility, Egypt has been seeking economic assistance from all quarters: Western Europe, Japan, Iran and the other Arab states. Were King Faisal to withdraw his economic support, the smaller oil producers would almost certainly follow suit, and it is doubtful whether non-Arab support would be available on a sufficient scale to sustain the very ambitious plans which Egypt has now formulated. Were Sadat to fall, some of these schemes would, however, survive and here there may be an opportunity for Washington to ensure that its influence outlasts any changes in regime by granting aid for projects which any future leaders are likely to preserve.

The continuation of Saudi Arabian support for Egypt is crucial, both in economic and political terms. But this support restricts Egypt's freedom of maneuver. On the one side Riyadh has to approve all the steps taken by Cairo in its dealings with Israel. When Jerusalem is discussed, there is unlikely to be any reduction in the scope of King Faisal's demands.

(Even a change in leadership in Saudi Arabia is unlikely to affect this position materially, because the next king will endeavor, at least initially, to don Faisal's mantle and demands for the restoration of the Muslim holy places to Arab sovereignty form an important part of that garment.) On the other hand Saudi Arabia may well require Egyptian support for a policy which could put Egypt in an awkward spot. It could happen, for instance, that Saudi Arabia will wish to see a less radical government installed in, or less radical policies pursued by, Syria. If Damascus refused to bow to Saudi pressure (the Syrian economy being less dependent than the Egyptian one on grants from Riyadh), the Saudi leadership would undoubtedly ask Cairo to back its request for a change, and that would then reveal the true position of Cairo as a hostage of Saudi Arabia. Failure to assist Riyadh could result in economic losses on a great scale, while willingness to fall in with Saudi designs would render the regime open to propaganda assault for betraying Egypt's political destiny and failure to support the Arab radical camp.

Whatever policy the Egyptian regime proceeded to follow, its chances of remaining in power would be greatly curtailed. In Jordan and Kuwait, too, Saudi Arabia has a close interest in the sort of regime which holds sway, and Riyadh would at least expect Egyptian quiescence, if not active support, for any action it decided to take to preserve the sort of government which it regards as suitable.

U.S. Policy

It is hard to know just how the United States should react in such circumstances. It should certainly keep constantly in mind the weakness of Sadat's position and the dilemmas which he faces. Economic assistance for Egypt, and Syria too, is undoubtedly necessary--and on a dramatic scale. Arms aid would also help to reassure Sadat of the fact that U.S. policy really has changed and would allow him to disarm certain of his critics. Sadat will need to convince his people (and other Arabs who have been told for so long of the treacheries of Uncle Sam) that Washington is now a true and long-term friend of the Arabs. The U.S. government will need to tread carefully if more fuel is not to be added to that fire, and there will be plenty of people in Moscow willing and able in the meanwhile to use bellows on the flames.

Whether the United States can convince the Arabs that it has their interests at heart while others seek to destroy that image is the key to the problem, for one must remember that the Soviet Union places a high priority on the Middle East. The area adjoins its southern border, contains the home of the religion of the great proportion of its Asiatic subjects, forms the outlet to the Mediterranean from whence pressure can be exercised on NATO's vulnerable southern flank, limits direct access from the Soviet heartlands to the Indian Ocean and Africa, and contains the reserves of oil from which the West's industries are fed and its armed forces supplied. The value of influence in the Middle East to the Soviet Union is very great, and the price that it will pay to maintain it will be equally high. The Arab-Israeli dispute is not the reason for Soviet involvement, but an occasion for it, and the Kremlin will be extremely reluctant to see such opportunities for involvement lost. Soviet interests in the Middle East and those of the United States are not parallel. Hostilities and rivalries are what the Kremlin seeks, for the possibilities which they provide for the implementation of fundamental Soviet aims. Unless this dimension--the Soviet interest in reducing U.S. influence to a minimum--is also kept in mind, policies pursued by Washington are unlikely to achieve lasting success.

A stalemate in Geneva could give rise to immediate problems in Egypt. A renewed situation of "no war no peace" would probably be intolerable, and Egypt would doubtless then begin the search for new and forceful ways out of the impasse. This would certainly be the reaction of the military, some of whom have retained sufficient confidence from October to face the prospect of renewed hostilities with equanimity--and some perhaps with a warmer emotion. The pressure for renewed hostilities can already be observed and in Egypt's case bowing to such pressure would involve reversion to a position of military dependence on the USSR and an end to hopes of friendship with the United States. It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the extent of and limit to possible U.S. pressure on Israel in seeking an agreement with the Arab states, but observers in Cairo, Damascus, and Riyadh are certainly expecting evidence of such pressure, and of seeing a resultant change in Israel's negotiating position.

With regard to Saudi Arabia, the policy requirements for the United States seem clear, and perhaps easier to implement, than those in regard to Egypt. The energy needs of the U.S. economy require close cooperation between Washington and Riyadh for at least a decade and probably beyond. Military and technical assistance is required by Saudi Arabia; schemes for social, economic, and educational development all require external skills, and here there are great opportunities for the United States. (With the opportunities there are also dangers, of course; the industrialization of Saudi Arabia will be very difficult to achieve and the importation of foreign labor on a massive scale has political implications which cannot be ignored, particularly for a system of government such as that which now prevails in Saudi Arabia.) Again the United States should lend all possible assistance to long-term development plans, and here competition from the USSR need not be feared. The present ruler, and probably his successors, seem unlikely to fall prey to Soviet blandishments, and there is a fair degree of parallelism between U.S. and Saudi objectives in the Middle East. The need to counter Soviet attempts at subversion is appreciated in Riyadh (but further Saudi help for the Sultan of Oman would be appreciated in Muscat). Anything the United States can do to promote an understanding between Riyadh and Tehran about the Persian Gulf would also be welcome, but Washington might find that the Royalist Arab states would hope for some restraint on the Shah's desire to be the Gulf's policeman and this would probably be difficult for Washington to achieve. In its dealings with Saudi Arabia the United States will, however, have to consider the Egyptian situation and remember that the desires by some Egyptian politicians to revert to policies which seek the leadership of the Arab world for Cairo are by no means dead. Egypt's memories of Nasserist aims cannot be easily expunged, but these aims may well clash with Saudi Arabia's long-term political ambitions. In the past these have been few, but an increase in wealth and prestige after the October war has doubtless enhanced the ambitions of possible successors to King Faisal, if not of the Saudi ruler himself. These ambitions could well take on a Pan-Arab aspect, but this would then raise problems with Egypt, where aspirations to Arab leadership may now be dormant but are certainly not moribund. The political objectives of the current Saudi leader are unclear, but they are

unlikely to be very ambitious or very sophisticated. Many of the causative factors are, however, likely to change, and Washington might well find in the future that to give simultaneous support to Riyadh and to Cairo is not always an easy, or compatible, task.

With regard to Syria, very little can be said. In a country with so many deep internal divisions and sectarian suspicions, politics is inevitably obscure and impenetrable. The revolutions of fortune's wheel are unpredictable in such a country. The current regime is not stable. In negotiating at Geneva, the Syrians are likely to proceed very cautiously, for any sign of weakness--or even of flexibility--will doubtless be used as criticism of the regime for betraying the Arab cause. The hatreds against Israel which have been so assiduously--and insidiously--fostered have produced a bitter harvest. The ability of any Arab regime to make real progress in diplomatic negotiations, a process which demands mutual confidence and reciprocal concessions, has been inexorably restricted if not totally eliminated by the repeated propagandistic assertions of hate over the last quarter century. It is difficult to negotiate with people whose destruction you have constantly predicted without suffering a severe and painful loss of honor and respect. All Arab regimes are now open to the charge of betrayal if they cannot produce the political rewards which are so widely expected. That the basis of those expectations is a largely mythical interpretation of last October's military events is, in this respect, a truly academic point. If no political satisfaction is achieved, regimes will totter, and in Syria and perhaps in Egypt too, they will fall. Whether a more radical Baathist regime under someone like Jadid will emerge or whether Saudi pressures will produce an opposite effect cannot be foretold with any degree of confidence. Whatever happens, the way forward for U.S. policy in Syria will not be easy. An appreciation of the largely self-engendered difficulties faced by any Syrian regime may enable Washington to offer a more congenial, and therefore more effective, hand of friendship to Damascus, but the task will not be easy.

Finally, with regard to Egypt, the problems are very complex and the pitfalls many. Sadat has had to abandon so many of Egypt's former objectives that his position, without the momentum of continued success, can only be regarded as insecure. It is easy for him to issue statements, and even to pass decrees, which announce the end of Nasserism, but the principles behind those former beliefs of the need for the modernization and the independence of Egypt cannot be rejected without putting his political position in peril. A Pan-Arab revolutionary posture can perhaps be abandoned, but a reversion to a position whereby Egypt appears as the hostage of either Saudi Arabia or the United States, or for that matter the USSR, is impossible. Of the two aspirations, modernization probably takes second place to independence. The rebuilding of Egypt's economy and society is widely desired but if it had to be at the price of autonomy, the aim would probably be rejected. The new investment law in Egypt has already come under domestic attack for putting the economy of the country back into the hands of foreigners, and even in this sphere, let alone the political and diplomatic one, the United States and Western Europe will have to proceed with discretion. Support for President Sadat will have to be given generously but skillfully. His difficulties in accepting help from the West are many and profound. He has made a major gamble. If he fails, the West too may share the loss.

SOUTH ASIA: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES AFFECTING
REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY

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The designation of South Asia as a region usually is accepted as embracing India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Republic of the Maldives. This analysis, however, will focus on the two key powers whose continuing conflict since 1948 has been the mainspring of instability in the Subcontinent: Pakistan and India.

Of these two bitter rivals, India has always been the stronger, militarily and politically. India drew inherent advantage from the fact that it reached independence after World War II as a reasonably established national entity, and thus was easily accepted as such by the international community. Pakistan, by contrast, represented an artificial compound of regions that had been under British colonial sway but could not be integrated into an independent India. Prime Minister Bhutto reminds us that the letters forming Pakistan derived their meaning from the geographical makeup of Pakistan as its founders saw it: "P" was for Punjab, "A" for the Afghan Frontier, "K" for Kashmir, "S" for Sind, and "TAN" for Baluchistan.¹ (It is interesting to note that no letter for Bengal was provided for in the name.) While Pakistan had to struggle for internal identity and external acceptance, India after the war could rely on political institutions that had already coalesced during the independence struggle and upon a greater increase of internal cohesion provided primarily by the dominance of the Congress Party in the Indian political system.

Militarily, India has always maintained a quantitative advantage over Pakistan, ranging anywhere from 2:1 to 4:1. This has been particularly true, as will be seen below, in the vital arena of airpower. Furthermore, Pakistan's military disadvantage is just as grievous, if not worse, on the ground and at sea. The simple manpower statistics bear this out.

¹ Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, "Pakistan Builds Anew," Foreign Affairs, April 1973, p. 545.

At the time of partition, 500 million Indians confronted 150 million Pakistanis. Since the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, this ratio has widened into 600 million Indians versus 76 million Pakistanis.

Despite this blatant inferiority across the military spectrum, Pakistan was--until 1971--able to deter and resist any efforts on India's part to decisively defeat its rival. Indeed, in the 1965 conflict, Pakistan actually defeated India in the air, downing 70 Indian aircraft while losing only 48 of its own airplanes. The Pakistani air force, however, remained relatively static throughout the six years following that battle, while the Indian air force made enormous quantitative and qualitative strides during the same period.¹

By 1971, through a program of modernization and expansion, the Indian air force ranked as the world's fifth largest, after the United States, the Soviet Union, Communist China, and France.² This explains in good measure why Pakistan was decisively defeated and dismembered in 1971 by the loss of its east wing, and why India emerged after the two-week war as the regionally dominant power by dint of its vastly superior military posture in all categories of armament. What made the essential difference in the conflict was the stark quantitative and qualitative inferiority of the excellent Pakistani air force, which could not give adequate cover to the Pakistani ground forces and navy. The numerical air balance between India and Pakistan now stands at roughly 3:1, and the Indian superiority in quality of aircraft is overwhelming. Five of Pakistan's eight combat-ready air force squadrons consist of obsolete planes, four squadrons of Chinese MIG-19s, and one squadron of U.S. Sabres. They have at least two more squadrons of Sabres, but the Pakistan air force contends that these are used only for training advanced flying cadets. Both the MIG-19s and the Sabres are obsolete in comparison with, for example, the more than 200 advanced MIG-21s in the Indian inventory of

¹ For an excellent discussion of the change in the relative Indian and Pakistani air force postures between 1965 and 1971, see Major General Fazal Muqueem Khan, *Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership*, pp. 234-246 (National Book Foundation, Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore, 1973).

² Ibid.

865 combat planes. The most modern aircraft possessed by the Pakistanis are the some 25 French Mirage Vs. India's military predominance is also reflected in the number of military ordnance factories each possesses. Pakistan has only one, whereas India has about 30, which produce all kinds of weapons, including MIG aircraft.¹

Thus Pakistan no longer can mount anything resembling a remotely credible deterrent to Indian military strength. In the past conflicts, Pakistan was able to fight long enough to allow the international diplomatic processes to bring about a cessation of hostilities and a return to the status quo ante bellum, which, for the most part, was the objective of Pakistan strategy.² In the event of a new conflict, West Pakistan could be overrun so swiftly that such a strategy would be doomed to failure. The successful explosion of a nuclear device by India now adds some potential nuclear dimensions to India's established conventional supremacy.

Pakistan's manifest military weakness--which is all the more pronounced in the face of Indian hegemonial ambitions under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi--has also undermined the general political posture and influence of Pakistan. Against the backdrop of expanding Soviet involvement in the affairs of the Subcontinent, this imbalance not only threatens the stability of South Asia but also threatens the security of Iran and hence the stability of the Persian Gulf as well.

Many permutations of the potential conflict situations could evolve from the current imbalance of political and military strength which presently favors India so definitively. These potential conflict situations relate to the internal political situation in Pakistan and India, but are likely to spill over into other states in the area--principally Iran and Afghanistan, but also possibly Iraq and the entire Persian Gulf.

1

Anwar Syed, "Pakistan's Security Problem: A Bill of Constraints," ORBIS, Winter 1973, p. 852.

2

Alvin J. Cottrell, "Political Balance in the Persian Gulf," Strategic Review, Winter 1973, p. 37.

Kashmir from the beginning of the partition of the Subcontinent in 1948 has always been a potential source of conflict and will remain so. The Pakistanis have always pressed for a plebiscite to determine the region's future based on the assumption that the 3.5 million people of Kashmir, being largely Muslim, would opt for union with Pakistan. The issue has flared again as a result of rumors that Sheik Mohammad Abdullah has been discussing the issue with Indian leaders and is prepared to accept autonomy in return for not permitting the plebiscite to take place. It should be recalled that Kashmir is already partitioned--Pakistan holds one-third of the area and India the remaining two-thirds. There has been rioting again in Kashmir, and troop movements by Pakistani and Indian forces were reported during July 1974. Thus Kashmir could once again become the cause of conflict between Pakistan and India and perhaps the cause of fighting among other powers who would be forced to make decisions regarding intervention on their own (e.g., the United States, Russia, China, and Iran).

In addition to the Kashmir question, provincial conflicts and disputes in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier areas of Pakistan could lead to local or interregional hostilities. One mainspring of potential regional conflict is the drive for autonomy or perhaps even separation on the part of the two Pakistani provinces of Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province. There is no need here to enter into a lengthy discussion of the background of these two questions. Suffice it to say that the central government of Prime Minister Bhutto has not been able to maintain complete tranquility in either of the two provinces. In the North West Frontier Province, the longstanding claim of the Pathans--going back to the original partition of the Indian Subcontinent by Britain--has been reasserted with some force since the defeat of Pakistan in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war. The leaders of the movement have called for the creation of an integral Pushtunistan which would enter into some form of union with Afghanistan. There are approximately 7 million Pathans, almost equally distributed on opposing sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Since the overthrow of the King of Afghanistan in early 1973, the new ruler of Afghanistan, Prince Sardar Daud, has pressed this issue, which had been kept muted while the King was in power. Daud enjoys intrinsic support on this issue,

which strongly motivates his countrymen. Indeed, nearly all Afghans, irrespective of their tribal affiliation or political orientation, seem to believe that Pushtunistan must one day be part of Afghanistan.¹ They recall that past kings of Kabul not only ruled over much of what is now Pakistan, but actually sat on the throne in Delhi.

The tough and aggressive Sardar Daud will continue to exploit this emotional issue, if only for purposes of unifying his country around him. It is a mission to which Daud is personally committed--he has often been called the architect of the Pushtunistan movement--and he could rally a nearly fanatical response.

As has been noted, under the King--primarily as a price for good relations with Pakistan and Iran--Afghanistan in effect put the Pushtunistan question on ice. This restraint can now quickly dwindle in the face of the patent weakness of Pakistan and the temptations that this may present to an ambitious man like Daud, who is intent upon shoring up his own authority in his country and is not as sensitive as the King whom he deposed to the ramifications for stability in the larger framework of the Subcontinent.

Even if Daud himself should fail to take the lead in such a concerted campaign, it could be pressed by those who supported him in his coup against the monarchy--that is, the young group of radical Afghan military officers who undoubtedly pursue their own grand design vis-a-vis a weakened Pakistan. There is reason to believe that Daud was used in the coup because of his respected name and his well-known opposition to the King. In the grand tradition of military-engineered coups, once he has served the initial purposes of the young officers, they may well remove him. The young officers behind the coup apparently include a number of men who were trained in the Soviet Union, who possess Russian weapons, and who might play the Soviet game when and if the Soviets deem it propitious and prudent.

¹ Discussion with the Honorable John Steeves, former United States Ambassador to Afghanistan. For an excellent discussion of Daud's longstanding interest and motivations on the Pushtunistan issue, see James W. Spain, The Way of the Pathans (Robert Hale: London, 1962).

An Indian military delegation has visited Kabul for the ostensible purpose of concluding arrangements for training Afghan officers in Indian military establishments.¹ All of these factors attest to the inflammability of the Pushtunistan issue and to the likelihood that it can be pushed any time Russia, Afghanistan, India or the three in combination may wish.

The Afghans can initiate a conflict, but they cannot impose on Pakistan a favorable settlement of the Pushtunistan issue by force without outside help, and they are undoubtedly aware of this. Prime Minister Bhutto articulated this forcefully: "Afghanistan on its own does not pose a problem for us."² Bhutto, however, went on to acknowledge that Pakistan would be in deep trouble if Afghanistan received "military support and assistance from external forces."³ He voiced the fear that such external aid was precisely the subject of a variety of clandestine dealings. He said there have been "ominous developments--military missions coming, going, all sorts of discussions taking place, agreements in depth, secret agreements, agreements to give arms, agreements to train personnel. All these things do not happen for nothing."⁴

If the North West Frontier problem were not enough, Pakistan faces a possibly more serious threat in its Baluchistan Province, which is bordered by Iran on the west, Afghanistan on the north, and the Arabian Sea on the south. The province is sparsely populated: it comprises 40 percent of the territory of Pakistan and has only 2.5 million inhabitants. Baluchistan shares a 500-mile border with Iran, and approximately 1 million Baluchis inhabit the Iranian side of the frontier. The Baluchis living in Pakistan are demanding more autonomy from the central government. Yet Bhutto's power base is in the Punjab. There are no Baluchi members of Bhutto's

1 Morning Times, Karachi, 3 May 1974.

2 Morning Times, Karachi, 29 April 1974.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

Pakistan Peoples Party represented in parliament. Rather than yield to Baluchistani demands for autonomy, Bhutto has followed an opposite course: namely, to bring the tribal rulers more under the central authority. The tribal leaders have sought to retain their old power bases, and therein lies much of the source of unrest and rebellion which has openly flared in Baluchistan. The movements in both Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province have been emboldened by Pakistan's ostensible political and military weakness in the wake of defeat and dismemberment in the 1971 war with India. Thus Pakistan's great military inferiority has had the effect of encouraging internal elements with longstanding grievances to surface in the hope that Pakistan's weakness might make it easier for external forces--principally India and the Soviet Union--to involve themselves more intensely in these problems.

The Baluchistan issue seems to be the more serious at the moment. Despite Pakistani claims that the problem is under control, outside observers reported in November 1973 that long stretches of the road leading from the provincial capital of Quetta to Karachi could be traveled only by military convoys, and that even railway traffic in certain parts of the province had to be guarded by armed detachments.¹

The dispute is also more serious because it vitally involves Iran. Iran very much fears that an insurgency in Baluchistan Province of Pakistan would attract the Baluchis on its side of the frontier. In short, Iran fears that India, possibly in concert with Iraq and Russia, may attempt to inspire dissension in Baluchistan which would lead to dismemberment of the Baluchi state within Pakistan and remove a buffer area on Iran's east border. This in turn could become a base for infiltration and insurgency among the Iranian Baluchi tribe.² Although it has not been publicly

¹ Peter Hess, "Trouble in Baluchistan," Swiss Review of World Affairs, November 1973, p. 7.

² Dale R. Tahtinen, "Arms in the Persian Gulf," Foreign Affairs Studies (American Enterprise Institute: Washington, D.C., 1974)

acknowledged, several Iranian helicopters with advisors have already landed in Pakistani Baluchistan in an effort to counter the insurgency.

The Shah's fears are understandable. Already deeply involved in the Persian Gulf region via his relatively large intervention in Oman against the Front for the Liberation of the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG), the Shah relishes neither a "second front" in Baluchistan nor difficulties with Pakistan.

It is important in this context to understand the vital role Pakistan plays in Iranian strategy. A fundamental tenet of Iranian security policy concerns the territorial integrity of Iran's Moslem but non-Arab neighbors on its eastern and western borders--i.e., Turkey and Pakistan. Iran needs a friendly Pakistan as a buffer against the extension of hostile power adjacent to Iran's borders. While the focus of the Shah's apprehensions is on the Baluchi issue because of the volatile potential immediately adjacent to Iran's border, in a larger sense he cannot accept any intervention in Pakistan by external powers. Thus his fears extend to any conflict--even one sparked in the North West Frontier Province--that could escalate to full-scale military action leading to the takeover of Pakistan. An uprising in Pakistan which triggered Indian intervention could lead inexorably to a major conflict between Iran and India.

Iranian-Indian relations are reasonably good at the present time, as reflected in the fact that Prime Minister Indira Ghandi has become the first Indian Prime Minister in fifteen years to visit the Shah. This warming of relations, however, is due in no small measure to the chronic deficiencies of India's economy. India imports today about three-fourths of its total purchases of 120 million barrels of oil from Iran, and India needs this oil at reasonable prices. Thus the Shah, by threatening either to withhold oil or to keep the price high, has some leverage over India. This leverage undoubtedly accounts for the Indian government's silence regarding the flights of Iranian helicopters to Baluchistan--notwithstanding the fact that India is well aware of Iran's military activity in support of Pakistan's counterinsurgency efforts in Baluchistan.

India's new nuclear state is not likely to have an immediate impact on Indian-Iranian relations. Clearly, however, the Shah is not likely to sit back while India adds nuclear power to the drive to extend its influence from the Subcontinent to Pakistan and beyond to the Persian Gulf. It is in this context--as well as against the background of the U.S.-Egyptian nuclear assistance agreement--that Iran's nuclear development plans must be viewed. It has already become known that the French government will supply Iran with five nuclear powerplants, and that the United States will supply two nuclear reactors. Although the Shah has continued to emphasize the peaceful nature of Iranian nuclear ambitions, it should be remembered that the Indians stressed a similar theme even after they exploded their first nuclear device. An interesting aspect in this connection is that Pakistan, by dint of its own peaceful nuclear development, conceivably would be in a position to provide plutonium to Iran.¹

The Shah also continues to be concerned about India's close ties with the Soviet Union, which parallel Moscow's bonds with Iraq, and the Iranian ruler has been disturbed by Indian efforts to advance military assistance to Gulf states. He has persuaded the Sultan of Oman to remove a small unit of Indian naval officers who had been assigned to the Sultanate to assist in the development of the small Oman navy and to have them replaced by Pakistanis.

Given the Shah's regional interests and security imperatives, he has not been similarly apprehensive of Pakistan's military assistance to both royal and nonroyal Arab states--assistance which has been particularly extensive in air training missions. Pakistan has been aiding the air forces of Iraq, Kuwait, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and Libya. There is no question that the Shah does not look kindly upon

¹ Pakistan is considered one of the states which could immediately become a nuclear power by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency provided it will pay the price. The Shah has the money. New York Times, 5 July 1974.

this help to revolutionary regimes--particularly to Iraq, which has been actively supporting an independent Baluchistan state through propaganda from Radio Baydad and by direct arms assistance to the Baluchi insurgents in Iran and Pakistan. He has expressed his irritation on this score.¹ Yet the Shah is fully aware of Pakistan's motives in these assistance programs--the same motives which impelled Bhutto's hosting of the Islamic Conference in Lahore on 22 February 1974,² at which all Moslem countries were represented and during which Bhutto recognized Bangladesh.

The Conference was highly successful from the standpoint of Prime Minister Bhutto's image and for Pakistan's relations with the Moslem-Arab world. Ever since their defeat and dismemberment, the Pakistanis have sought to associate more closely with the Arab states--and indeed with all Moslem states. Given their military weakness, they are seeking to reduce their vulnerability by strengthening diplomatic links--and thus their political credibility--with a grouping of states that might be in a position to help them in the event of future attack by India. In this quest, they have concentrated also on oil-rich countries because they believe this will, because of their strategic location, give them a more favored position with countries of the area as well as with countries dependent on the oil, i.e., the United States and Western Europe.

This raises the subject of Pakistani expectations vis-a-vis the United States. Naturally the hope lingers in Rawalpindi that the United States will provide Pakistan with modern weaponry to help redress the stark military imbalance that now favors India. Toward that end, the Pakistanis continue to try to cater to American security predilections. In this respect, they have recognized the new sensitivities in the United States and Western Europe regarding access to Middle East oil, and they have tried to emphasize the role that Pakistan could play in helping to protect the oil routes to the Persian gulf. There is little illusion in Rawalpindi, however, about any major steps to equalize the balance of military power between Pakistan

¹ This point has emerged from private discussions with Pakistani officials.

² Foreign Reports, The Economist (London), 14 February 1974.

and India, given the widespread support that India continues to enjoy in the United States. Some hope has grown in Pakistan that India's detonation of a nuclear device might dampen the pro-India sentiment in the United States and provide the United States with an adequate rationale for supplying more sophisticated weaponry, especially aircraft, to Pakistan. This motive was implicit in the Pakistani government's Aide Memoire¹ which expressed grave concern over the Indian nuclear explosion and stated that "the Government of Pakistan will resist pressures to follow in the footsteps of India." The Pakistanis would be able to build a nuclear weapons capability, but the cost would be enormous. It is clear that they much prefer to rely on a substantial quantitative and qualitative improvement in their conventional military capabilities. The motive was evinced also by Prime Minister Bhutto in an interview in Pakistan in February 1973 in which he disparaged the extent to which Communist China, despite its generous assistance, could help Pakistan in the event of a new contingency and emphasized that "there is only one country that can really help us adequately, and that is the United States." Such hopes notwithstanding, however, Pakistan knows that it cannot realistically count upon a substantial U.S. shift of policy in Pakistan's favor in the immediate future.

Pakistan's priorities therefore are directed at strengthening its regional ties. By flying for Arab countries, Pakistan wishes to cement relations with the Arab world. There is the direct hope that in return for such assistance, Arab recipients--particularly Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, where Pakistani air training missions are engaged--will transfer modern jet aircraft to Pakistan in the event of a future conflict with India (as the Shah did in 1965, when he loaned 50 aircraft to Pakistan). The Pakistanis, however, would prefer the U.S. F-4 to the French Mirage,² which they will fly for Abu Dhabi. (Abu Dhabi will receive about 32 Mirage fighters from France.³)

¹ Pakistan Embassy, Washington, D.C., 17 June 1974.

² Discussions with Air Vice-Marshal Eric Hall, Defense Attache of Pakistan to Washington, 14 June 1974

³ Dana Adams Schmidt, "New Indian Worry--Pakistan Pilots," Christian Science Monitor, 5 February 1974.

Pakistan receives little financially for the services of its pilots in the Arab countries for whom they fly. The pilots are regular Pakistani air force pilots and wear Pakistani air force uniforms. According to Pakistani sources, they operate under arrangements similar to those that govern the secondment of British military personnel in Oman, Dubai, and other Gulf ministates. As has been stressed, Pakistan's principal interest in the assistance programs is the political one of drawing important parts of the Arab world closer to Pakistan's cause (and in the process also reducing India's influence in the Middle East).¹ A secondary benefit of the assistance arrangements is that they give Pakistani pilots much-needed training with the most modern aircraft not in their own inventory.²

As has been noted, the Shah of Iran looks upon these Pakistani activities with misgivings, if also with understanding. Yet clearly the widespread Pakistan military training program in the Arab countries poses some potentially serious implications for Pakistani-Iranian relations, despite their current cordiality and need for close political and military collaboration. It is possible--unlikely as it now seems--that Pakistani pilots may yet find themselves flying in combat missions for countries that are antagonistic to Iran, and that certain scenarios of conflict could emerge in which the two countries might be caught on opposing sides. This could eventuate, for example, if some current traditional rulers, such as the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi or even Saudi Arabia, should change from royal rule to a more socialist Arab-type rule such as is found in Iraq, Syria, South Yemen, etc. The current community of interests between Pakistan and Iran seems to preclude such a contingency, but such is not beyond the realm of the possible.

¹ Private discussion with the then-president and now Prime Minister Bhutto and top-ranking political and military leaders in Pakistan during February 1973.

² Discussions with Pakistan Embassy attaches in Washington.

Much of the potential danger in South Asia stems from the internal weaknesses of both Pakistan and India. Pakistan's weakness invites internal unrest, which in turn beckons to outside intervention. The danger is compounded in this respect by the combination of India's preponderant military strength vis-a-vis Pakistan and its abiding internal troubles, particularly economic ones. History abounds with examples of rulers and governments opting for external adventurism or confrontation with neighbors in order to deflect the attention of their citizens from internal woes and to unite their otherwise squabbling populations. The great outburst of domestic adulation for Indira Ghandi following India's victory over Pakistan has been dissipated by the rapid deterioration of its economy with little relief in sight.

13 Thus it is quite plausible to envisage a scenario in which India would intervene in Pakistani problems, particularly in the North West area if Afghanistan chooses to push the Pushtunistan claim. This intervention could even take the form, in the event of a large-scale rising in the North West Frontier Province, of a mobilization of Indian forces near the Pakistani border at or near Lahore. Such a mobilization would force Pakistan to mass its forces to guard against this threat, enabling the uprising in the North West Frontier Province to proceed against the weakened national garrisons. Should India then choose to follow up its threat with a thrust into the Punjab through Lahore, Pakistan's second largest city, Pakistan would be virtually wiped out as a national entity. Under those circumstances the Shah could not be expected to sit idly by: Iran would almost certainly move to confront India from Baluchistan and with airborne forces. Thus an escalating and spreading conflict would be set in motion--and one that could easily lead to superpower involvement. Prime Minister Bhutto has invoked precisely this danger in his warnings against India's hegemonial ambitions and his pleadings for a redressing of the balance on the Subcontinent: "Pakistan will never accept the concept of Indian hegemony on the Subcontinent, but it is also equally against India's own real interests. Since her economy cannot sustain the role of dominant power, she would have to depend to a large extent on outside assistance, and her preeminence would be virtually that of whatever superpower she

chose to ally herself with at a given time. It is therefore in the interest of the global powers as much as of the neighboring countries to see that a just balance is established in the Subcontinent."¹

It bears mentioning that Pakistani views of a potential Iranian intervention in behalf of Pakistan are not unqualified. While Pakistan welcomes Iranian military support for Pakistan, many Pakistanis are understandably concerned about hinging their territorial integrity to another country, no matter how closely the interests of that country may correlate with their own. There is also the concern, albeit muted, that if Iran intervenes it might choose to exercise dominant influence in that country. While Pakistan would undoubtedly prefer Iranian hegemony to conquest by India, it does not look with relish to either eventuality.

If India goes on to deploy a nuclear weapons capability, as seems likely, Pakistan's apprehensions of Indian military pressures and interventions would be immeasurably heightened.² In the event of a contingency along the lines that have been described, a major question would concern the likely actions by the Soviet Union and China. Pakistani officials today are not sure what China would do. Some point to China's failure to aid in the case of Bangladesh, but they acknowledge that this was a different and somewhat awkward scenario for the Chinese to the extent that the Bangladesh rebellion had at least the trappings of the kind of "national liberation war" that Chinese policy and ideology are pledged to support. Therefore, there is some feeling that the Chinese would not sit quietly by in the case of an imminent defeat of West Pakistan, and might at least stage diversionary attacks against India in the east. These issues were reportedly discussed during Prime Minister Bhutto's May 1974 visit to China.

¹ Ali Bhutto, op. cit., p. 547.

² Pakistan's Minister of Foreign Affairs has stated that India has enough plutonium to make 17 nuclear bombs, and Canada agrees with these estimates. Washington Post, 25 June 1974.

The Soviets for their part might desist from involvement in a major conflict in South Asia if the United States chose to commit itself in some form, i.e., even a large-scale carrier force in the area, as was the case in 1971.¹ Peking in any event is very concerned over the close relationship between India and Russia, especially the 20-year treaty for defense and cooperation signed by the two countries in 1971. The Chinese are watching closely other Soviet activities in the Subcontinent, including the pro-Soviet coup which took place in Afghanistan during the spring of 1973 and the possibility that the Soviets are quietly supporting the Pathans in the North West Frontier Province and the Baluchis in Baluchistan--if not directly, then at least through the Iraqis, with whom they also are linked by a 15-year treaty involving mutual defense obligations.

The success of these efforts would bring the Soviets to the Indian Ocean by land, and Pakistan stands athwart the principal route. Thus the Chinese undoubtedly see the potential danger of being outflanked in the Subcontinent.² Sensitivity to this danger could make West Pakistan far more vital to them--politically and militarily--and hence make them more ready to intervene directly in Pakistan's behalf. Yet the question remains of how strong an intervention they would be prepared to mount--even in the form of a diversionary attack against India--knowing that the Soviets could deploy 40 divisions against them.

The profound changes in the Subcontinent that have been described above form the background against which the Indian Ocean has assumed vastly increasing importance to both Pakistan and India. Until the 1971 war, both India and Pakistan gave at best limited attention to the Indian Ocean. For Pakistan the main concern was to maintain the security of the sea routes between the western and eastern parts of the country.

¹ Sultan Ahmad, "Bhutto's Visit to China and the Future of the Subcontinent," Morning News (Karachi), 10 May 1974.

² Tad Szulc, "The Chou En-lai Analysis," Washington Post, 12 June 1974.

India's security concerns were overland: China to the north and Pakistan to the west and east. Both countries were preoccupied with internal problems, with their immediate confrontation in the Subcontinent, and only lastly with the Indian Ocean.¹

Following the British departure and the crushing defeat and dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, however, both countries began to pay more attention to the waters fronting them. India, buoyed by victory and confident of its regional power, began to look to the Ocean as a natural and proper area of its domain. Defeated Pakistan, recognizing that its future survival would hinge more than ever before upon external help, began to see the Ocean as the major source of access for such assistance and as the power-political arena for the two superpowers.

¹ Norman D. Palmer, "South Asia and the Indian Ocean," in Alvin J. Cottrell and R.M. Burrell, The Indian Ocean: Its Political, Economic and Military Importance, p. 240 (Praeger Publishers: New York, 1973).

Privately Pakistani officials favor a naval presence by the United States in the Indian Ocean even though publicly Pakistan has taken a position in favor of neutralism for the area as far as the superpowers are concerned. Concern has been expressed about the Soviet naval presence and about the fear that the funds for further development of the U.S. naval base at Diego Garcia would not be appropriated. Indications of approval of military presence have been made not only by Pakistan but also by Iran and the Sheikhs of former Trucial Sheikhdoms of the Southern Gulf and of Bahrain and Qatar.

When it is inferred that the Indian Ocean states fear a naval race, it should be added that neither do they wish one superpower to establish naval supremacy. This is particularly true of Pakistan. Of the key states of the region of concern to Soviet and U.S. interests, only India is opposed to the U.S. presence. The Indians have been lobbying against Diego Garcia for a long time and yet, as has already been pointed out, India never appears threatened or concerned over the Soviet naval presence. They obviously see the Soviets as a protector against China. Interestingly enough, China appears to wish for a continued U.S. presence rather than disengagement in the entire area East of Suez.

It is also worth noting that India has repeatedly denied that it has granted naval bases to the Soviet Union. This may be technically true, but it has permitted several Soviet naval visits per year, and Soviet ships may have used replenishment capabilities at the Indian naval base of Vlaskhapatnan on the Bay of Bengal which the Soviets helped develop for Indian use. Soviet ships may also have used a restricted area on India's southwest coast. Pakistan has permitted both Soviet and U.S. naval visits. U.S. combatant vessels have not visited an Indian port in several years.

OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA

1. The United States could continue to pursue its present policy which has tried to steer a middle course between India and Pakistan--trying not to take sides--but which, in spite of it or because of it, has led to two wars (1965 and 1971) and which has pleased neither India nor Pakistan. Given this option, the United States would seem to be flirting with the possibility of another conflict which again would require us to choose sides with all the controversy which has been involved in the previous two military engagements.

2. The United States could choose to support Pakistan since it is a Muslim nation, is strategically located on the Arabian Sea at the entrance to the strategic Gulf of Oman and the vital routes to the oil-rich Persian Gulf, and has a closer association with the Arab-Muslim world than does India. This option would antagonize the very strong pro-India sentiment which pervades academic and official America. This option, because it would tend to write off India, would appear to be unacceptable--whatever its results--given the practical politics of the United States.

3. The Indian Subcontinent and especially the balance of military power between Pakistan and India has been so drastically altered since the conflict of 1971 over East Pakistan that it could be argued that the most stable balance of power would consist of permitting India to continue to outdistance Pakistan militarily to the point where India's military predominance would become so great that this balance would be a balance based upon a clear Indian military hegemony. This option is as unfeasible as the previous one because it would be unacceptable to Iran which is the protector of Pakistan and which would never accept the view that it must always fear an Indian attack on West Pakistan supported by the Soviet Union which would eliminate Pakistan as a buffer state between India and Iran.

4. Another option would be, since Pakistan has renounced for the time being its intention to develop a nuclear capability, that the United States could build up Pakistan's conventional military forces to a point where Pakistan could either deter an Indian attack or defend itself against such an attack long enough to provide international diplomatic intervention which would bring about a cessation of hostilities and restore the situation to the status quo ante bellum. This has been Pakistan's policy and strategy in previous conflicts and, despite many difficulties with this policy in terms of its ambiguity and unacceptability to both sides, it nevertheless has prevented widespread uncontrolled conflict--a conflict which could now spread to Iran with all the implications such a development would have for U.S. policy toward the oil-rich Persian Gulf.

It should be remembered here that, prior to the current dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, there never was a serious danger that a war between India and Pakistan would spread beyond the confines of the Subcontinent and involve other countries such as Iran and, given Iran's great importance in the Persian Gulf, to that region as well. This policy would seem to be the most prudent one since it would be consistent with U.S. past policy in the Subcontinent of maintaining some semblance of a military balance between Pakistan and India. This policy would appear to be all the more justified now since India has exploded a nuclear device, which clearly gives it the option of developing a nuclear weapons capability. The United States could clearly argue that India should not fear a restoration of Pakistan's military capability to a level enabling Pakistan either to deter or prevent an almost automatic extinction of their national territory by India.

After all, Pakistan does not base its relations with Russia on the fact that Russia is heavily arming India, and there is no reason why India should base its relations on U.S. provision of arms to Pakistan. There can be no doubt that the Indians would object, but they would be most unlikely to change their relations with the United States to an orientation much different than now prevails. This would be the most logical and sensible policy for the United States in this area since the great weakness of Pakistan militarily is creating a serious military and political

contingency for the United States in the entire area from the tip of the Arabian peninsula to the Subcontinent. Added to, and in support of, this option should be the establishment of a permanent, but flexible in terms of size, U.S. naval presence in the northwestern Indian Ocean to provide the necessary psychological foundation for those countries such as Pakistan, Iran, and the traditional rulers of the Persian Gulf-Arabian Peninsula area. These states fear the Russian naval presence and wish to see a countervailing force in the form of an American naval presence to offset it and thus to inhibit its political influence on revolutionary states and forces (e.g. PFLOAG, Iraq, the Palestinians, etc.) which seek to bring an end to traditional forms of rule in the entire area. Pakistan is not traditionally ruled, but its defense is presently linked to royal-ruled Iran and it is very much concerned about Soviet inroads into the Subcontinent and about Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. This is why Pakistan privately is hoping that the U.S. Congress will provide the necessary funds for the further development of Diego Garcia.

WESTERN EUROPE, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

WESTERN EUROPE, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

Summary

It is no exaggeration to state that the conjunction of the Middle East and oil crises in the fall of 1973 produced a series of interconnected results which had a profound and still not fully measurable effect on the international system. In the specific context of transatlantic relations it introduced a new dimension by emphasizing America's power and exposing Europe's (and Japan's) vulnerability. It promoted the disintegration rather than the integration of the European Economic Community (EEC); it increased Eastern Europe's dependence on the Soviet Union and Western Europe's on the oil producers; it improved the American position both in the Middle East and towards Western Europe by broadening its political-strategic base in the former and strengthening its economic-monetary position toward the latter.

The main loser of all this (leaving the developing countries aside) is Europe in general, and the EEC in particular. The double crisis laid open its political weakness and its geopolitical limitations as an actor on the international scene.

The events in the Middle East brought to the fore the various historical, structural, and conceptual differences among the policies and outlooks of the European countries. There are at least four major differences. In the first place, the Latin countries (France, Italy, and Spain) have a pronounced Mediterranean orientation whereas Anglo-Saxon Northwestern Europe is oriented toward the Atlantic. Secondly, the Latin countries are, on the whole, more dependent on external energy sources than their Northern neighbors. The third difference is at least partly a function of the preceding two. It relates to the varying degree of concern about the security of energy supplies and the policies towards the producing countries which follow from it. Finally, Europeans have a different perception of the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict than Americans. Europeans on the

whole do not see the conflict as an extension of the East-West confrontation or as part of the "Cold War", as is often depicted as the U.S. point of view. They consider it much more as a conflict sui generis, which consequently calls for different policies towards the parties involved.

Such different concepts and outlooks were bound to clash when, in October 1973, the risk of a dangerous confrontation with the Soviet Union coincided with the Arab oil embargo. In the first instance, the Europeans felt painfully dependent on the United States, which seemed to by-pass them in its response to the confrontation; in the second instance, they found themselves almost totally dependent on the Arabs. European irritation was to grow still further when the United States came out of the conflict as the winner on both scores: with an extraordinary and unexpected reentry to the Arab world and with better long-term prospects for its economy and currency. Doubts were raised in the minds of many Europeans (and Japanese) whether Washington had not been somehow instrumental in unleashing or tolerating the crisis. However untrue, such suspicions are symptomatic, inasmuch as they show that henceforth European and American politics in the Middle East will be, more than before, a part of transatlantic relations: the gains or losses in the former are likely to have repercussions on the latter.

The policies of the principal European countries towards the Middle East reflect their attitudes on several important issues: first, their general interest in the Mediterranean-Middle East area; second, their dependence on Middle East oil and their views of how to overcome or reduce it; and third, their future politico-economic relationship with the United States and the content of a "European identity" as distinct from, or a precondition of, a reformulated "Atlantic partnership".

All these differences explain the great difficulties the countries of the EEC had, and still have, in agreeing on a common policy towards the Middle East which does not antagonize the producing countries or unduly challenge the United States, which takes into due account the varying security requirements of each member country, and which contributes to the reduction of the structural differences which still exist among them. Their policies, however, followed national and not European interests and

were therefore often contradictory and rarely reconcilable. Thus France and Germany agree on the need for more European cooperation but disagree on whether it should be achieved with, or independent from, the United States; France and Britain stepped up their arms sales to the Middle East without much concern about what effect this would have on their own partners and on the receiving countries; together with Italy they let their balance-of-payments deficit grow to unmanageable proportions while at the same time Germany's trade surplus continued to an extent which further increased the monetary disequilibrium among the Nine.

In spite of manifold deals with the oil-producing countries, Europe will remain vulnerable, with regard to both its energy supply and the vast sums of Arab investment capital which are bound to invade its markets. In attempting to become less vulnerable through the sales of arms, nuclear reactors (the example of the United States and France could well be followed by other countries), and industrial technology, Europe could become more vulnerable in other respects.

Neither the strength of its internal organization nor its greater political cohesion will remove the basic dependence of Western Europe on Middle Eastern oil or on American strategic protection. Europeans have come to realize that for the foreseeable future this double vulnerability will stay with them. It will considerably limit their freedom of action with regard to the Middle East and, even more importantly, with regard to the United States. They are therefore doubly sensitive vis-a-vis their American ally because of its neglect of consultation during the October 1973 crisis, because of a lingering uneasiness about superpower collusion immediately afterwards, and because of their fear that the United States might use its improved position for pressing its allies into stricter alignment with its own foreign and energy policies.

Given this vulnerability and its continuing structural differences, Europe has little other choice than to pursue a policy in the Mediterranean and Middle East that is essentially trade oriented and based on a series of new or renegotiated treaties of association. Such a Mediterranean policy could, however, further the trend towards a "regionalization" of world trade. Europe might be increasingly inclined to consider the Mediterranean

as its "domaine reserve" if it fails to agree with the United States about a common approach towards the Middle East. It is in this economic field more than in any other that frictions could arise between Europe and America; with growing interdependence the conflicts are bound to spill over into other fields.

At present it seems that a consensus is emerging among the principal European countries (led by France and Germany) with regard to the basic order of priorities of their future policy: the first priority is a strengthening of the EEC; the second, the improvement of transatlantic relations; and the third, the "dialogue" with the producing countries, "Ostpolitik" having lost momentum and acceptability. This sequence is interesting because it reverses the order of priorities which many European countries have been following until recently and which had disastrous results for European cooperation and Atlantic relations. Whether this order can be adhered to depends also on Washington's willingness to accept greater European independence and to give priority to Alliance cooperation, however laborious, over its relations with the Soviet Union and its specific interests in the Middle East.

WESTERN EUROPE, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

A. A New Dimension in Euro-American Relations

It is no exaggeration to state that the conjunction of the Middle East and oil crises in the fall of 1973 produced a series of interconnected results which had a profound and still not fully measurable effect on the international system. In the specific context of transatlantic relations it introduced a new dimension by emphasizing America's power and exposing Europe's (and Japan's) vulnerability. It promoted the disintegration rather than the integration of the European Economic Community (EEC); it increased Eastern Europe's dependence on the Soviet Union and Western Europe's dependence on the oil producers; it improved the American position both in the Middle East and towards Western Europe by broadening its political-strategic base in the former and strengthening its economic-monetary position towards the latter.

The main loser is undoubtedly Europe in general, and the EEC in particular. The double crisis revealed to a painful degree its political weakness as well as its geopolitical limitations as an actor on the international scene, deficiencies which its stupendous economic prosperity tended to conceal. Western Europe's strength and aspirations appeared powerful and persuasive at times of economic growth and political stability (and so did Japan's); they were, however, not sufficiently resilient to withstand economic challenge and political pressure. The EEC turned out to be "a fair weather organization" based on, and fed with, the expectation of sustained growth. Its minimum political consensus was derived more from a defensive reaction against potential superpower intrusion than from a concept of positive action towards the outside world.

Nowhere is this now more evident, more blatant, than in Western Europe's policy, or rather policies, towards the Mediterranean and the Middle East. There are a number of reasons for this. A unique combination of factors has made the Middle East the catalyst which has brought to the

tere the historical, structural, and conceptual differences that shape Europe's outlooks, orientations, and policies in important fields. In some ways these differences lie also at the root of American-European dissension. Inasmuch as the Middle East with its oil acquired a new and vital importance for Europe, it was almost inevitable that these differences would become an additional element of strain between Europe and the United States. It seems therefore essential to examine them in some detail.

B. The Mediterranean and the Middle East in European Perspective

There are at least four major and partly interrelated areas in which European countries differ in outlook either among themselves or with the United States. The first concerns the pronounced Mediterranean orientation of the Latin countries (France, Italy, Spain) compared with the more Atlantic orientation of Northwestern (Anglo-Saxon) Europe. This difference in point of view, which has, of course, geographic as well as historic reasons, has now been reinforced by the fact that, roughly speaking, the Mediterranean countries of Europe are more dependent on external energy supplies than their neighbors to the northwest. This has resulted in a second structural difference: the degree of industrialization and the status of the oil companies of the Latin countries is quite different from those of Northwest Europe.

The third difference is at least partly a function of the two preceding ones. European countries are concerned in different degrees about the security of their energy supplies. Accordingly, their attitudes towards the Arab countries, their willingness to make concessions to them and their eagerness for either major bilateral deals or multilateral negotiations differ considerably. The fourth difference relates to the fact that American public opinion (including that of the Administration) perceives the political nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict quite differently than many European governments (and perhaps also individuals).

C. Mediterranean vs. Atlantic Orientation

Historical ties, geographic location, commercial interests, and cultural affinities account for the fact that Italy and France, in spite of their membership in EEC, and Spain, with close links with both Western Europe and the United States, have preserved a "Mediterranean" orientation while the countries of Northwest Europe have an "Atlantic" point of view. Britain, with former colonial strategic interests in the Middle East but with little, if any, cultural affinity for the Mediterranean, occupies, as usual, an intermediate position. To be sure, the Second World War and its aftermath have severed most of the links which existed between France and the Lebanon, Syria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria; between Italy and Libya; and between Britain and Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf. The British now have little more than a symbolic presence in Cyprus, Malta, and Gibraltar. These European countries, however, have left their imprint on the commercial and cultural structure of their former dependencies. These relationships have, although in a modest degree, influenced the EEC's Mediterranean policy, in the formulation of which France and Italy were and are instrumental. They are likely to be even more so in the near future.

Italy (probably more than any of the other countries) has been marked by this dual North- and South-bound outlook. The Italian peninsula was recently correctly described as a long bridge: one end lying in democratic, industrial Western Europe, the other deep in the very different world of the Mediterranean. Italian history has been largely formed by the play of these two worlds against each other.¹ Italy's policy has always been torn between industrialization, integration, and security within the framework of "Northern Europe" and development, association, and neutrality within the Mediterranean area. It was the ruling Christian Democratic Party (de Gasperi in particular) which opted for the first alternative, including an alliance with the United States. Ever since, Italy has steered a pro-European course, with membership in the EEC and NATO. As the influence of the Christian Democrats has waned and that of the Left has strengthened, interest in the second alternative, or at least some of its components, has revived. France's situation, as well as Spain's,

1 "Italy in Peril," Washington Post, reprinted in International Herald Tribune, 17 June 1974.

differs from Italy's in various ways. But the outlook of both France and Spain contains an important Mediterranean element. It has its roots in a continuing "special relationship" with some of the Arab countries and is nurtured by a sense of cultural mission which serves as a kind of counterweight to their association with the Anglo-Saxon-Germanic world.

It was hardly surprising under these circumstances that the disarray of the EEC, compounded by the oil embargo, strengthened the hand of those who advocated a more pronounced southward-looking policy in Italy and France (and possibly in Spain), even to the extent of presenting the Mediterranean/Middle East region as a kind of "third alternative" to the Atlantic Alliance and recommending a widening cooperation with Communist Europe. After the Ostpolitik had lost its momentum and the limitations of Eastern trade became increasingly visible and as tensions grew with the United States about its role and influence in Europe, a reorientation of Europe's policy towards the nearby Mediterranean and the oil-rich Arab world seemed a promising outlet for Europe's economic dynamism in exchange for much needed oil and labor. Such a turn, however unrealistic in almost every respect, offered some attractions. It would put France in the role of the community's natural leader in the forthcoming Europe-Arab dialogue, and it would combine an assured oil supply with a more credible resistance to real or imaginary American predominance. Rarely has a hitherto unknown foreign minister become as popular overnight as when Monsieur Jobert presented this perspective to the French.

With the changeovers in the French Presidency and in the German Chancellery, hopes for a "relance Europeenne" have probably dampened the enthusiasm for a too one-sided and pronounced "Mediterranean orientation" that smacked of anti-Americanism. The Euro-Arab dialogue will therefore probably take place in a different context and spirit than some Europeans might have liked to see.

D. Different Degrees of Vulnerability

The second set of differences, which relates to the different degree to which the EEC members are dependent on external energy resources, is a matter of objective fact rather than political inclinations or tactics. As the tables show, the EC countries find themselves in rather different positions in terms of the structure of their supply, the distribution of their energy resources, and, last but not least, the state of their balance of payments. These differences have a direct bearing on their attitudes towards the producing countries as well as towards the United States.

Again, roughly speaking, the countries of Northwestern Europe find themselves in a better position than those in the South: Britain and Norway, because of the North Sea oil deposits; the Netherlands, because of its major gas resources, and Germany, because of the large coal deposits which are still sufficient to generate a considerable foreign trade surplus. They are all, in one way or another, less vulnerable than France and Italy, who are both short of oil and gas as well as of foreign currency. Their precarious situation explains at least partly the almost panic rush for bilateral deals with Arab countries and, in the case of France, a crash program in nuclear reactors which, given the additional commitment to Iran, may well turn out to have overextended French nuclear industry. Thus, by a strange coincidence, the paucity of energy resources contributed to the reawakening and vindication of their "Mediterranean vocation." It provided both a welcome pretext and a useful basis for their negotiations with the producing countries. To this must be added another distinctive feature which distinguishes France and Italy (and Spain) from the other EEC members: they are so far the only countries with important nationalized oil companies. This provided them with a temporary advantage insofar as their governments could use them--though not all too successfully as it later turned out--in their negotiations with the producing countries. It was, however, precisely this state ownership which promoted bilateral deals without at the same time increasing flexibility of bargaining and distribution. In both of these areas, the "multinationals" were able to operate with greater efficiency.

E. Changing Notion of Security

The third area of divergences relates to the various concepts of "security". Threatened with an oil embargo, West Europeans (and many other nations) became suddenly aware that their security was jeopardized by a different kind of threat than they had hitherto been accustomed to. Unlike the "traditional" threat, this new one was not political or military but rather economic in nature. Unlike previous threats, it did not arise in the East-West context but along the North-South axis. In spite of numerous warnings, hardly anyone had been foresighted enough to gauge the high degree of economic vulnerability of Western societies to such a threat, let alone the ways and means to cope with it. The oil embargo exposed this vulnerability, thus adding to the notion of security a new and no less serious economic and social dimension. Above and beyond the security from military aggression and political pressure, Europeans (and Japanese alike) now had to worry about the security of their supplies of energy and raw materials, which they discovered were vital to their economic well-being and social stability.

While probably all European governments would agree on the importance of this new dimension of security, they would differ considerably on the place and priority it should be given in their overall policy. Their different interpretations of the nature and scope of this particular security threat and of the means to deal with it would, of course, be partly determined by the different degrees of their economic vulnerability. These conflicting and often contradictory interpretations became more divisive than the relatively minor disagreements about the defense against a commonly perceived military and political threat. It is not simply the known versus the unknown or the traditional versus the new which divided the European countries in their approach to meet this "economic threat". It was precisely the structural and conceptual differences among them that shaped their reaction and led them to adopt a wide variety of often conflicting policies that generated bilateralism rather than multilateralism and promoted a (defensive) nationalism at the expense of a policy of interdependence. Whereas the necessity for common defense placed the Europeans in the same boat although perhaps on different decks

and seats, they found themselves in considerably different situations with different outlooks and different ideas about remedies when confronted with the task of securing their energy supply.

F. Diverging Interpretations of the Arab-Israeli Conflict

There remains the last (fourth) divergence. It exists less among the Europeans and more between the Europeans on the one hand and the United States on the other. It has its roots in a different understanding of the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Contrary to what--for easily understandable reasons--Israel wants the Western countries to believe, many Europeans do not see this conflict as an integral part, or extension, of the "Cold War" or a fight of the "Western democratic world" against "Soviet-Communist expansion." They remember its origins and see its evolution since 1947 (if not since the Balfour declaration) in a different light.

While recognizing the dangers of a further Soviet penetration into the Middle East and the importance of a free and democratic Israel, many European governments (if not people) find the contention difficult to accept that the conflict is little more than a transfer to the Middle East of what has plagued Europe in the last 30 years, with all the consequences that follow from this. Successive French governments have consistently rejected this interpretation. The reasons have to do both with mercantile calculations (the Arab world being so much more interesting as a customer and supplier) and a deep political distrust of any Soviet-American collusion, the first manifestation of which occurred in 1956 and was precisely directed against France (and Britain).

Britain has many historic links with Arab countries and still prides itself on some residual influence in them. "In order to maintain this influence," says an English writer, "it is essential to give a larger degree of direct aid and comfort to the Arab, than to those whom they regard as their enemies."² The British thus seem to have moral obligations to Israel (leaving the political and strategic ones to the United States) and political-economic interests in the Arab world. This

² D. Watt, "A Clash of Interests and Sympathies," The Financial Times, 19 October 1973.

attitude is basically shared by other European countries. The Germans are in a more delicate position, but they, too, are unwilling to opt for one side, as if the Arab-Israeli conflict were an extension of the East-West confrontation.

These European attitudes towards the Arab-Israeli conflict differ considerably from those which were (and perhaps still are) held in the United States. Large sectors of American opinion, public and private, were more convinced than the Europeans that assisting and supporting Israel was equivalent to fighting against a growing Communist (particularly Soviet) influence in the Middle East. In order to secure continuing American support, Israel had every interest in reinforcing rather than correcting this view. As the ongoing American-Arab rapprochement shows, the view is dangerously simplified and surely does not adequately reflect the complexities of the Middle East situation.

While the United States, at least until recently, was therefore inclined to see the Arab-Israeli conflict as part of its worldwide rivalry or confrontation with the Soviet Union, European governments tended to treat it as a regional conflict *sui generis*. They admitted, however, that an ever increasing Soviet involvement in it could jeopardize European security interests. Nevertheless, they were not prepared to tolerate any extension of Alliance responsibilities into that area. They refused to take sides, in the wake of the United States and its powerful Sixth Fleet, in favor of Israel at the risk of antagonizing on the one hand the Soviet Union to whom they are directly exposed on the continent and whose power they cannot match, and on the other hand the Arab states, with whom many entertain friendly relations and whose oil they need much more than their American ally does.

Such differences between the positions and attitudes of the Europeans and the Americans were bound to surface when in October 1973 the risk of a dangerous confrontation with the Soviet Union coincided with an Arab oil embargo. The Europeans, who felt painfully dependent on the United States, were ignored, much to their chagrin, by the Americans when the confrontation was at its climax, and when the embargo was invoked, they found themselves vitally dependent on the Arabs. European irritation,

if not resentment, was to grow still further when the United States came out as the winner in both crises. The Americans made an astounding comeback to the Arab world, where the Europeans' "neutrality" had brought them only short-term advantages, and America emerged from the energy crisis with better long-term prospects for its economic and monetary position than either Europe or Japan could hope for.

Small wonder, then, that here and there voices could be heard which accused or suspected the United States of having manipulated (if not instigated) the Middle Eastern crisis so as to reassert its leadership over its emerging economic rivals in Europe and Japan.³ However untrue, such suspicions are in a way symptomatic, inasmuch as they bear out the basic and important fact that henceforth European and American politics in the Middle East are bound to have a direct influence on transatlantic relations. The gains or losses which are made in the former will have repercussions on the evolution of the latter--at least as long as the Western countries fail to agree on a common approach to the Arab world.

G. The Policies of the Principal European Countries

It is against this background that the policies of the main European countries towards the Middle East have to be evaluated. The differences in their attitudes and interests derive from their different concepts and positions on several important issues: (1) their general disposition towards, and interests in, the Mediterranean-Middle East area; (2) the different degree of their dependence on Middle East oil and their different views of how to overcome or reduce it; and (3) the nature of the future politico-economic relationship with the United States and the organization and content of a "European identity" as distinct from, or a precondition for, a reformulated "Atlantic partnership." On a different level, as transatlantic relations are increasingly influenced by the evolution of Soviet-American relations, so has the Middle East, or rather U.S. policy towards it, now become a determinant for European-American relations.

3 P. Pean, Petrole: la troisieme guerre mondiale, pp. 215 ff (Paris, 1974)

All this adds up to a mixed bag of conceptual and structural differences which is difficult to disentangle. It explains the great difficulties the EEC had--and still has--in agreeing on any common policy which does not antagonize the producing countries or unnecessarily irritate the United States and which takes into due account the varying security requirements of each member country. Germany, for example, still stresses its politico-military vulnerability and, consequently, gives priority to Alliance cohesion whereas France and Italy are primarily concerned about their economic-energy vulnerability. Finally, the EEC must work out a policy which contributes to the reduction of the structural differences among the European countries without over-exposing them to the growing pressure of the "Petrodollar."

There are, however, no clear lines between particular sets or groups of countries, pitting, for example, those who are basically hostile to "American hegemony" and favorable to bilateral deals with the Arabs against those who insist on close consultation or collaboration with the United States and prefer multilateral negotiations. France and Italy have been foremost in pressing for bilateral deals but they were rather eagerly followed by Britain and Germany who, for different reasons, nevertheless pleaded more forcefully for a concerted action which would involve the United States (and Japan). France and Germany have agreed on the principle of strengthening European cooperation but they still differ (though less now under Giscard and Schmidt) on its procedural and substantive terms. They also part company where balance-of-payments problems are concerned. Germany with its large surplus can pursue a more relaxed and cautious policy of investment and trade vis-a-vis the producing countries; its arms trade, for obvious reasons, is negligible. France, on the other hand, finds itself rallied with its former colonial rivals, first and foremost with Britain. They have entered a new round of arms trade competition involving also occasional frictions with the United States. And finally, there is the rivalry between the nationalized and private oil companies, which is partly the result of their different status and partly the result of a general trend (particularly noticeable in Germany but also in Britain and Scandinavia) towards greater government

control over the oil and gas industry and a preference for state-to-state negotiations.

The picture is thus rather complex, if not confused, and hardly shows any overall pattern. It explains first the pro-Arab turn in the EEC declaration on the Middle East of 6 October 1973, the generalities of the declaration laboriously arrived at by the EEC summit meeting in Copenhagen in mid-December 1973, and finally the difficulty of predicting the precise nature of the EEC position at its long-expected dialogue with the Arab countries.

In taking a closer look at the policies of the principal European countries during and after the Middle East crisis, the differences, frictions and contradictions become evident. Under the common heading of self-interest the ensuing breakdown of almost any EEC cohesion and solidarity, old prejudices and new preferences surfaced. Thus, Britain under Prime Minister Heath showed its (as we have seen: traditional) pro-Arab inclination more clearly and, much more discreetly, its Gaullist-tainted diffidence of the United States and of its robust Secretary of State. Like France, the British stepped up their arms deliveries considerably. On 21 January, only 3 days after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, it lifted the embargo to Israel and its immediate neighbors. Before that, Britain had agreed to equip Iran with the "Blindfire" antiaircraft radar system; agreements with Omar were signed in early 1974 for eight B.N. Defenders, six Short Skyvans, and four B.A.C. 167 MK 82s; in March 1974 an agreement was concluded with Jordan for S.A. Bulldog trainer craft and in May 1974 (together with France) for 36 Jaguar fighter planes. All this complements a number of previous (mid-1973) deliveries to Israel (12 Short Blowpipe submarine-launched SAMs) and Saudi Arabia (an unspecified number of Scorpion light tanks).

This promotion of British arms deliveries to the Middle East coupled with a considerable expansion of agreements for trade and economic cooperation contrasts somewhat curiously with Britain's intention (confirmed by the new Labor government) to reduce still further its presence "East of Suez" and possibly also whatever forces are left in

the Mediterranean (i.e. one naval command and a few planes in Malta plus one infantry battalion, one armed reconnaissance squadron and some aircraft with two squadrons of an RAF Regiment in Cyprus). A politico-military presence is obviously no longer a precondition or safeguard for ever expanding economic and oil interests in the area. Unlike France, Britain thus maintained a link, however tenuous, with Israel and favored, at least nominally, a limitation of the weapons trade in the Middle East.

The French attitude on both accounts was less balanced. In concluding new and rather major arms deals with Pakistan, Kuwait (18 Mirage F-1s, 10 SA-330 E Pumas, an early-warning/control radar system, and 20 light Gazelle helicopters plus, together with Britain, 36 Jaguars), Saudi Arabia (38 Mirage IIIs, 150 AMX-30 tanks, and some frigates and minesweepers) France made substantial inroads into a formerly almost exclusive Anglo-American domain. In late 1973 it also signed an agreement with Morocco (for two patrol vessels) and Tunisia (one patrol vessel) and expanded its arms deals with Libya. Germany and Italy agreed to sell three coastal patrol boats to Lebanon, and four MB-326 trainers to Dubai.

These various deals were and are still backed up or complemented by a host of bilateral negotiations and agreements between the European and the producing countries. In the center of all stands Iran. It concluded major agreements with France, Britain, and Germany, the most spectacular of which was with France in June 1974. It is a 10-year deal worth \$4 billion worth of French industrial equipment and technology, including five large nuclear power reactors, all in exchange for Iranian oil. This treaty was only the climax of numerous other negotiations which France conducted in January and February, mostly in connection with Foreign Minister Jobert's trips to the Middle East. These include bilateral negotiations with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria, Iran, Libya, and Abu Dhabi. Except for its major agreement with Iran and another one with Saudi Arabia, little has so far come out of these negotiations. Few tears are shed about this in Paris today, as France would have found itself committed to prices which by now would be considerably above the current world market price. One prime motive for Jobert's hasty rush into bilateral deals

was no doubt his wish to go to the Washington energy conference with enough oil contracts in his pocket to permit him to resist more credibly any American attempt at bullying his country into "submission."

Britain and Germany, too, signed agreements with Iran. Furthermore, the English sent missions to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states while the Germans concluded agreements with Algeria and Egypt. On the whole, Germany pursued a middle-of-the-road policy the main objective of which was an overall improvement of its relations with the Arab world--symbolized by Brandt's visits to Algeria and Egypt--without jeopardizing its delicate relationship with Israel. Italy, finally, signed agreements with Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Libya, the net effect of which remained, however, limited.

All those efforts covered a time span of little more than six months, i.e. from December 1973 to June 1974. Their simple and common objective was to assure a minimum of oil and gas supplies (including the construction of oil pipelines) in exchange for generous economic, scientific, and technological assistance. They were neither planned nor coordinated nor do they spring from any kind of political concept about what the future nature of Euro-Arab relations should or could be. It is worth remembering that the EEC or, more precisely, its Davignon Committee, had so far made little progress in formulating anything resembling a coherent Middle East policy. It was the crisis in the fall of 1973 which forced the EEC countries to take a common position, however vague. Under the given circumstances, it could surprise nobody that it was biased in favor of the Arab countries rather than Israel. It merely summed up what in practice each country had done thus far on its own. But these individual actions and national interests hardly add up to a "European policy" towards the Middle East. Beyond noncommittal generalities there were no concrete proposals for an Arab-Israeli settlement nor was there any agreement on the role and place the Middle East was to have in future European politics. What we are left with then are some common features which characterize Europe's reactions. They may help to explain to some extent its future actions.

There is, in the first place, the fact that in spite of the remarkable volume of transactions the total amount of money or investments which the European countries have pledged to transfer to the Middle East still falls far short of compensating for the total flow of cash which the producing countries now receive and which will mostly be channeled back into Europe (and North America). Also, no agreement, however impressive, which has been concluded so far guarantees any European country more than a small percentage of its actual oil requirements. The gap between the two will have to be filled, as before, by private companies or nationalized industries. In other words, Europe's vulnerability is basically unaltered. It will remain a major concern for European governments. As such it is bound to influence their policies towards both the Middle East and the United States.

In the second place, this hectic and uncoordinated series of bilateral negotiations and agreements testifies to the complete breakdown of any Community approach in the fields of energy and foreign trade. Moreover, it has profoundly shaken the solidarity among its members. Some of the bilateral agreements will have long-term effects on the domestic industrial policy and the external commercial orientation. They bear the mark of revived nationalism, if not protectionism, with occasional anti-American overtones. As their only purpose was to overcome temporary shortages and to satisfy short- and medium-term needs they lack any broader perspective which would take into account the political and social consequences which such far reaching agreements inevitably entail, first and foremost for the Arab societies but also for Europe. In short, it was an ad hoc, stopgap approach without any preconceived ideas about its long-range implications. The arms deals in particular reveal a disquieting "insouciance" about their potential impact on the stability and security of what continues to be a politically highly volatile region.

To be sure, the United States has sinned on both counts, perhaps even more than the Europeans. It is, after all, still the major seller of arms, and it has pursued a highly nationalistic and frequently narrowly conceived energy policy itself. By declaring its determination to regain complete independence of external energy sources by the early 1980s it

contradicts all its solemn proclamations about the benefits and obligations of "mutual interdependence" which the other industrialized countries are called upon to accept. In so doing it raises doubts about its willingness to work, on an equal footing, for common solutions and makes its warnings to the Europeans against unilateral actions sound rather hypocritical. Not surprisingly, Europeans have reacted, or overreacted, to such admonitions with growing irritation. In the wake of the Middle East crisis and American singlehandedness they were even less disposed to accept what they considered to be a reassertion of American predominance.

European sensitivity to anything which, rightly or wrongly, smacked of such an attempt had been further awakened by the way the Middle East crisis was handled by Washington. At the same time it increased rather than decreased the anxieties about Soviet-American collaboration and its potential impact on third parties whether in Europe or in the Middle East. To be sure, in the fall of 1973, there were probably as many fears about a collision between the two superpowers as there were about their possible collusion. But Europeans (like the Israelis and Arabs) became perhaps more than ever before aware of what the superpowers can actually impose on others once they are able to join forces. Still, this uneasiness was overshadowed by the impressive display of American power and diplomacy in the Middle East, highlighted by the unexpected improvement of its relations with formerly hostile Arab countries, and only partly matched by the much less impressive performance of the Soviet Union. It made the United States look like an almost unrivaled power in the area.

The Europeans have little or nothing to counter-balance this gain in prestige and influence in a region that is so important to them, and they can not exclude the possibility that the United States might play out their improved position in the Middle East in the unfolding competition with its industrialized partners there. Such a U.S. comeback into an area as vital to European economy as the Middle East is expected to reinforce the U.S. position vis-a-vis Europe as well. In other words, Europeans felt even more exposed to, or dependent on, America's goodwill once they realized that not only their strategic security but also their

security of supply was to be influenced if not determined by the American power and diplomacy so manifestly displayed on the continent as well as in the Middle East.

This feeling of double vulnerability accounts for many of the grudging reactions with which Europeans answered in the wake of the October war Washington's initiatives for common actions, appeals to solidarity, and proposals for cooperation. It was certainly one reason why they insisted so much, perhaps more than ever, on consultation and greater independence. Finally, it explains why many Europeans had become more reluctant than before to accept Washington's thesis about the inseparability of strategic and economic interdependence which it wanted to enshrine in the Atlantic Charter. In accepting this proposition, Europe would have formally acknowledged a position which, however real, seemed to many incompatible with its desire for greater independence and equality.

H. European and Middle East Security

On this issue, then, Europe's concern for security in the traditional strategic sense merges with its almost desperate drive for "security of supply," with the United States in a sense providing the key to the two. In order to assure the latter, some European countries seemed prepared to lower somewhat their standards for the former. The example of the rather light-hearted expansion of arms trade with the Middle East has already been mentioned. It is now being followed by a series of highly controversial sales of nuclear reactors. Here again, the United States moved first. Its pledge to sell such reactors to both Egypt and Israel has torn down whatever barrier of inhibition might still have existed in this field. Whatever its reasons, the decision has given an easy pretext for France to follow suit immediately and to outdo the Americans by selling no less than five reactors to Iran. Under such circumstances it would be surprising if other European countries or indeed Japan did not jump sooner or later on this apparently profitable bandwagon.

On a different level but in the same vein, France's recent agreement to cooperate with the Soviet Union in the field of nuclear technology could stir up some controversy with the United States from which part of French nuclear technology has been acquired. Once more, then, the search for additional energy sources (because this was a major motive for the Soviet-French treaty) cuts right through time-honored political and strategic inhibitions. It shows to an equally disquieting degree how relaxed (or resigned) industrial countries have become about the dangers of "peaceful proliferation" with its inherent risks of spill-over into the military field. Here the growing discrepancy between the two concepts of security referred to above becomes most disturbing. For the sake of ensuring "economic security," highly sophisticated weapons as well as nuclear reactors are given to politically unstable countries situated in a strategically central area--and all this is done with little or no concern for the repercussions and the possible "feed-back" such deliveries could have one day on the buyers no less than on the sellers.

Of the sellers, Europe is probably the most exposed. Unlike Japan, it is contiguous to the Middle East and thus first to suffer from any conflict to erupt there. Unlike the United States, it has neither the means nor the political will to contain it. At the same time any major economic or military agreements with the producing countries, particularly those which entail the transfer of major industries and technologies, create new dependencies. Like those concluded with the Soviet Union, they have, for better or worse, not just economic but also political and strategic implications. In attempting to become less vulnerable in terms of energy supply, the EEC countries may thus become more vulnerable in other fields.

Europe's economic vitality, like that of Japan, depends crucially on free access to an outside world, including, of course, the Middle East, over which it has little or no means of control. Had the October War acquired much wider proportions (such as a substantial Soviet presence in the area), Europe would have been directly affected. It had to rely on the United States for redressing what at a certain moment appeared to be a dangerously shifting balance of power. In retrospect it seems

surprising, and rather symptomatic for the general political climate of diffidence vis-a-vis Washington and detente with Moscow, that in spite of all this Europe seemed to be more worried about its immediate supply problems and more upset by American single-handedness than by a substantial increase of Soviet influence in the Middle East.

The difficulty (if not fallacy) with a European Middle East policy proper is that it is not backed up by a political and security structure on which Europe (or the EC) could draw, except the alliance with the United States. The primary reason for the European countries' reluctance to support openly American help to Israel was not so much the desire to affirm its independence and "identity" (which did not exist anyway) but the fear of having its oil supply from Arab countries cut off. While this attitude may have attenuated the impact of the embargo (which, in hindsight, turned out to be much less damaging than it was thought at the time) it did not diminish American influence in the Middle East (quite the contrary) nor did it increase Europe's bargaining power vis-a-vis the Arabs.⁴

There are, of course, several explanations for this. One of them is surely that only the United States had the political power to act at the same time as a constraining force vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and a mediator between the belligerents. It alone had the credibility to live up to its commitments and sufficient weight to counter Soviet actions. Europe's political presence in the Mediterranean was insignificant in military terms and basically economic in nature. It is symbolized by a series of association treaties with most Mediterranean countries (the most notable exceptions being Egypt, Syria, and Libya), some of which are up for renewal or renegotiation this year. With the exception of Algeria, none of these associated countries is an oil producer. The EEC's "economic connections" and its much disputed (but overrated) "Mediterranean policy" was therefore of small use during the crisis. It did little to influence favorably the Arab attitude towards the EEC as a whole. (The ostracizing of the Netherlands proved this clearly). One might even argue that the Arabs took the Alliance much more seriously than the EEC, since they concentrated on disrupting the former while ignoring the latter.

4 L. Ruhl, "The Nine and NATO," Atlantic Paper 2/1974, p. 42 (July 1974)

It is, however, only fair to add that Europe's weakness and its desperate attempt to overcome its economic vulnerability are not simply due to its political fragmentation and military insufficiency alone. Even a politically united EEC would have been vulnerable and of modest influence in the Middle East. If, as Lothar Ruhl suggests in his paper, at the moment of the Arab-Israeli war and the threat of an effective oil embargo against the EEC as a whole without any distinction between "friendly" and "unfriendly" countries towards the Arab cause, the EEC had had (a) an elected European Parliament with exclusive budget authority, (b) a European Executive with competence for foreign affairs, common defense, shipping, energy supply, transports, etc. and all the other attributes of power, and (c) common armed forces including a navy and nuclear arms, even then Europe would still have been seriously dependent on the Middle East for crude oil and on the United States for managing (with or against the Soviet Union) the crisis and bringing back a semblance of peace.

The fact is that neither the internal organization of Western Europe, its political cohesion, or the degree of its economic integration can radically change its overall position vis-a-vis the outside world. These factors can increase Europe's power to act in a crisis and improve its bargaining position in peacetime (both would have been highly welcome in the last ten months), but they cannot remove its geopolitical and economic dependence on foreign resources, markets, and labor or its vulnerability to strategic attack.

Here lies the basic answer to the question about Europe's future relationship with the United States and its capacity to pursue a more or less independent Middle Eastern policy. Both are in many respects a function of this fundamental European weakness. It is a fact which Europeans only gradually and reluctantly acknowledge: on the one hand it means that for the foreseeable future they will remain dependent both on Middle East oil and on American protection. While the dependence on oil is expected to decrease over the next decade (although the flow of vast amounts of Arab capital into the European market will probably become an even more serious threat to its stability), the dependence

on the United States will undergo little change. This is true for Europe's security in the traditional sense, i.e. protection against Soviet military aggression or, more likely, political pressure, as it is true in many ways for Europe's economic security (including the security of supply lines), insofar as it depends to a great deal on the stability of the Middle East which in turn is partly contingent upon the continuing politico-military presence of the United States.

The situation there is likely to undergo further change with the reopening of the Suez Canal. The Soviet Union will probably benefit the most from it. It will make them less dependent on the Arab littoral states and their nearby port facilities (Egypt's in particular) and more flexible in their naval movements around the Arabian peninsula. The reopening will thus increase Soviet military options. Given their interest in the area, Europeans cannot view this development with equanimity. Many seem rather relaxed about it, however, perhaps because here again there is little they can do to prevent it. Thus, at a recent meeting of European and American experts, it was stated that "the Soviet Navy is unlikely to exploit these wider options in a way that will significantly increase the Soviet threat to the Middle East." It was also stated that "there is no direct or close link between the Middle East situation or the reopening of the Suez Canal on the one hand and the political and strategic interests of the external powers (mainly the Soviet Union and the United States) in maintaining naval forces in the Mediterranean on the other."

This is a rather important conclusion. It relates directly to the role of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Europeans recognize its utility for the foreseeable future. While they are somewhat skeptical as to its ability to carry out its full mission of supporting a land battle in Southern Europe, they believe that it can fulfill a stabilizing function in the Middle East as a "guarantor" of a Middle East settlement as well as a counterweight to the Soviet Eskadra.

On neither account can Western Europe contribute much. What one can expect at best is a reappraisal of the EEC's "Mediterranean economic policy." Some figures may demonstrate its rather minor importance. Until now only 7.5% of the EEC's total foreign trade was done with the Mediterranean countries in general, 3.5% of which was with those in the Eastern Mediterranean. Eighty percent of this trade accounts for oil imports in exchange for manufactured goods in about the same order of magnitude (80 to 85%). Conversely, some of the Mediterranean countries conduct almost all their trade (up to 85%) with the EEC, a situation which has led to a disturbing imbalance in the overall trade structure. Long before the oil embargo was initiated, the EEC had begun to search for a means of redressing this lopsided balance. It was in a way an attempt to complement the EEC's Northwestern-Atlantic trade orientation with a more rational Mediterranean counterpart.

This is now happening, although less, as originally planned, under EEC auspices and more on a bilateral country-to-country basis. Still, after several months of deadlock the EEC Council of Ministers on June 26 reached an agreement on prolonging the Commission's mandate to negotiate new agreements with the Magreb States, Israel, and Spain. This is a modest first step in reviving a more communitarian policy. It will probably take a long time until anything like a more comprehensive approach towards the entire area emerges. But this seems to be the only field in which, in the near future, Europe is likely to play any significant role in the Middle East. Even minor success in this area could create new frictions with the other industrial countries (first and foremost the U.S.), particularly if it means an enlargement of the controversial preferential zone and a further step towards a "regionalization" of world trade.

The impetus for a more concerted European action could come from the yet ill-defined "Euro-Arab dialogue." European officials assert that it will not and should not contradict in any way U.S. interests in the area but rather complement them. Given their strategic vulnerability and their continuing structural differences, Europeans have, in the final analysis, little other choice. There are signs that this is now more

fully recognized. The eventual compromise on the "Atlantic Declaration" is one, although not the most important, evidence of this. More important is the gradually emerging agreement among the European leaders (Giscard and Schmidt in particular) about the basic priorities of future European policies in the first instance, a strengthening of the Community which includes the preservation of what has been achieved so far ("preserver l'acquis" as the French say) and a pragmatic tackling of the most urgent issues (inflation, balance of payments, energy); second, the improvement of transatlantic relations; and, third, the "dialogue" with the producing countries--"Ostpolitik" having lost both momentum and acceptability. This sequence is interesting. It more or less reverses the order which a good number of European states have followed until quite recently--with all its disastrous results for, first, European cooperation and, then, Atlantic relations.

Whether in fact this order of priority can and will be adhered to depends to a great deal on Washington's policy towards the EEC on the one hand, and towards the Soviet Union on the other. As regards the former, Europeans hope for less abrasiveness from the United States and more tolerance for their desire for greater independence, however modest and remote. They are concerned that their American ally has lost patience with, and sympathy for, the painfully slow process of European integration; that it is now more inclined to deal bilaterally with individual European countries than with the Community; and that it tries to impose on them a leadership which defines its national interests more narrowly than before and occasionally succumbs to the temptation of playing out its regained strength.

As regards Soviet-American relations, Europeans hope that the dialogue between Moscow and Washington will not go against their own objectives and interests, first, as regards their political status; second, with regard to the East-West negotiations (in particular the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Vienna talks on mutual force reductions); and, third, on commercial and monetary issues.

Their concern is not unfounded, because on all these issues their interests do not always and necessarily coincide with those of the superpowers. And as if all this were not enough, the Middle East with all its fallacies and fantasies has added yet another dimension to this list of potentially divisive issues.

Table 1

Foreign Trade (in billion US \$)

	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>	<u>Total</u>
West Germany	54,50	68,46	122,96
France	38,67	37,80	76,47
Britain	47,20	37,49	84,69
Italy (1972)	19,27	18,54	37,81

Table 11

Monetary Reserves (in billion US \$)

	<u>in 1968</u> <u>(total)</u>	<u>gold</u> <u>(official</u> <u>price)</u>	<u>in 1974</u> <u>(total)</u>	<u>February</u> <u>gold</u>
West Germany	9,9	4,5	32,0	5,0
France	4,2	3,9	8,1	4,3
Britain	2,4	1,5	6,0	0,9
Italy	5,3	2,9	5,4	3,5

Table III-Estimated Production of Crude Oil in Europe
(including distillates)

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1985</u>
<u>North Sea Area</u>							
England	0	0	0	3	14	100	140
Norway	2	2	4	19	31	45	
Denmark	0	0	1	1	1	2	80
Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0	3	
Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Subtotal	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>150</u>	<u>220</u>
<u>Other Areas</u>							
Germany	7	7	7	7	7	6	5
France	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Italy	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Netherlands	2	2	2	2	2	2	1
Others	7	7	6	5	5	8	10
Subtotal	<u>20</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>20</u>
GRAND TOTAL	<u>22</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>170</u>	<u>240</u>

Table IV

Imports and Exports of Crude Petroleum 1971* (000 metric tons)

Consuming Countries	Imports of Crude	Imports from			OAPEC Imports as % of Total Energy Consumption*
		OAPEC %	Iran %	Others %	
United States	1,50,000	19.4	6.2	74.7	2
United Kingdom	30,320	69.2	15.2	16.6	44
France	16,050	56.6	3.5	39.9	52
Germany	103,200	71.1	5.4	20.5	50
Italy	10,250	71.3	8.5	20.2	36
Japan	3,250	65.0	23.2	12.8	43
Canada	112,300	77.9	10.0	12.1	66
Belgium-Luxembourg	60,400	72.4	11.1	16.5	47
India	10,210	73.8	10.0	16.2	34
China	189,800	70.4	43.7	15.9	32
India	12,520	72.0	78.0	—	4

* Source: United Nations Energy Statistics, 1973.

* The latest year for which detailed information was available in January 1974.

* The members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries are: Algeria, Libya, Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Syria. The United Arab Emirates (Dubai), which was a member until the end of 1972.

* The figures have been adjusted to allow for exports of products and re-exports of crude by the importing countries, insofar as some consumer countries may import from other consuming countries supplied by OAPEC, their dependence on OAPEC oil will be a little greater than it appears in the table.

Table V

The EEC in 1985

- The three principal objectives laid down by the Commission would be:
- a 10% reduction in energy requirements for that year by enacting radical plans to save energy (the 1972 oil crisis was only equivalent to 110 million oil equivalent tons);
 - increased oil production, then limiting it to 35% of energy consumption by 1985 (as opposed to 10% in 1972), and stabilizing at 1973 rates of oil consumption;
 - a strict limitation on the use of external energy sources to some 4% of total consumption in the Community (160 million oil figure registered in 1972).

Following are the Commission's figures used to back up the goals for internal consumption in the Community in 1973 (in millions of ton oil equivalent and percentage):

	1973 (actuals)		1985 (Commission's 1972 forecast)		1985 (Commission's revised forecast)	
	Mio. tons	%	Mio. tons	%	Mio. tons	%
Solid fuels	225	24.6	175	10.5	225	15
Oil	539	58.5	1020	61.4	600	40
Natural gas	117	12.7	265	16.1	375	25
Hydroelectric energy	27	2.9	40	2.4	40	2.5
Nuclear energy	14	1.5	160	9.6	260	17.5
TOTAL	922	100	1660	100	1500	100

THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM

. THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM

The problems of the Middle East must be seen at three levels and in three categories. Much of their difficulty and complexity arises from the interaction and intermingling of the different problem areas.

A. Local Conflicts

The first and lowest level is that of local conflicts--that is to say, conflicts originating in the area, in which the issues and the interested parties are local. These are of several kinds: those internal to one country; disputes between countries in the area; disputes affecting the whole of the area; and disputes between countries in the area and outside parties. They are also of different types, including ethnic, territorial, religious, and ideological conflicts. Examples are the troubles with the Kurds in Iraq and the Dhofar rebels in southern Arabia, the conflicts between Arabs and Iranians, between radical and traditional states within the Arab world, between Egypt and Libya, between the countries and states of eastern and southern Arabia, and the disputes over Cyprus and Eritrea.

The best known and most publicized is certainly the Arab-Israeli conflict, which involves several different but interconnected problems: relations between Israel and the neighboring states of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan; relations between Israel and the Palestinians; and such secondary but nevertheless important problems as the Arab and Jewish refugees, the social and economic changes resulting from the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, and the problem of terrorism.

If the Arab-Israeli problem had remained on a purely local level it would certainly have been solved long since. Neither side is able to impose its will by force on the other, and both would have understood this as a result of successive inconclusive wars. The Arabs are unable to conquer Israel by their own unaided efforts and the Israelis are unable to impose their will on the Arab world as a whole, since even the most crushing victories over Israel's Arab neighbors would in the long run be inconclusive.

left to themselves, both would sooner or later have settled down to some kind of modus vivendi based on mutual tolerance, which might in time have given way to a more peaceful relationship. Both sides are weary of endless and futile struggle, of the strains of permanent readiness for war, of the wasteful deflection for military purposes of scarce and much-needed human and material resources. An increasing number of both Israelis and Arabs are becoming disillusioned with ideological mystiques and are dubious about the attainability or even the desirability of some of the aims they have been pursuing. Without interference by outside powers, this would in time have led to one of two results: either a compromise solution, satisfactory to neither side but acceptable to both, or a smoldering but quiescent minor local conflict, troublesome but not dangerous to those directly involved, and unimportant to the rest of the world. The Arab refugees would have been resettled without international aid or intervention, as were the many millions who fled or were driven from their homes in India, Pakistan, Poland, the lost German territories, and Africa, when the world was reshaped in the aftermath of the Second World War. All these refugees were resettled, in far greater numbers and by far poorer countries, without international aid or interference.

Even if there had been no earlier settlement, the war in October 1973 would probably have resolved the issue. On this occasion the Arab forces attacked with the maximum advantage of tactical and strategic surprise and at a time of Israeli domestic confusion and international isolation. In spite of this, they were unable to gain a military victory and were saved from military disaster by an externally imposed cease-fire. The Arab commands certainly are aware of this.

After October conditions were uniquely favorable for negotiation. The Arab states had achieved sufficient success in their initial assault to restore their military self-respect and enable them to negotiate without loss of face; they had suffered sufficient subsequent failures to discourage them from trying again for a while. The Israelis, on their part, realized the danger, the cost and the strain of maintaining a military posture against the Arabs. In the absence of the great powers, both would undoubtedly have been amenable to direct negotiations.

Unfortunately for both the Arabs and the Israelis, their dispute is not a purely local one. It is complicated not only by external powers but also by the United Nations, once waspishly defined as "an organization for the conservation of conflict." This is perhaps unjust, but contains some element of truth. In some ways the functioning of the United Nations in dealing with difficult international conflicts has been rather like that of modern medicine in dealing with certain previously fatal diseases. It has advanced far enough to prevent the patient from dying but not far enough to cure him, and instead keeps him in a state of suspended invalidism. In the meantime, the United Nations, immobilized or deflected by the politics of its members and weighted down by its own increasing professionalism, tends to conserve what it cannot resolve.

B. The Role of Oil

On the second level of Middle Eastern conflict the most important issue is that of oil. In part this is a straightforward commercial problem--the natural and rational desire of the oil producers to get more money for their product while it lasts and while the world still needs it. The desire for greater returns on the sale of oil is a rational motivation and the actions it inspires are therefore predictable, discussable, and negotiable.

Unfortunately that is not the whole story. The attitude of the oil producers towards the Western world must be seen within the context of a larger and more complex issue, of which it is an integral part and an expression. By this is not meant the Arab-Israeli conflict, nor the superpower confrontation. Oil has no inherent connection with either, although it has--partly by chance, partly by design--become involved with both. What is meant is another and older confrontation, variously described as between rich and poor, between the West and the Third World, between developed and developing countries, or between the industrial powers and the producers of raw materials. Of these raw materials, oil is one of the most important and hence an effective tool for political pressure. For many of the peoples of the poor countries, or Third World, this confrontation is far more vital and important than the remote and

irrelevant rivalries of Washington and Moscow. Though the term "poor" may seem a little odd as applied to the oil-rich countries of the Middle East, it remains appropriate to their attitudes and to much else besides.

The relationship between the developed and less developed countries is part of a long and complex historical process which began with the expansion of Europe and eventually engulfed the whole world. This expansion, and the ascendancy to which it gave rise, have taken various forms. In the Middle East it meant colonial rule only in a few places, and for relatively brief periods. Mostly the impact of the West was indirect, but nevertheless sufficient to shatter the old society beyond repair and give rise to urgent social, economic and political problems and to deep resentments directed against the Western standard-bearers of the civilization from which these disruptive changes originated. Islam is an old and proud society; its relegation for the past century or more to a subordinate and imitative role has been hard to endure. For some years past, the attitude of people in these countries has been one of revulsion against the West and against the institutions and way of life associated with it such as liberal democracy and free enterprise. This mood of hostility has given rise to exultation at any opportunity to show and use strength against the West. This attitude was not created by the Russians, but it has been effectively exploited by them. An early indication of this feeling was the wave of ecstatic rejoicing with which even conservative Arab states greeted the first Soviet-Egyptian arms deal in 1955. What caused them so much pleasure was not the extension of Soviet influence or power to the Middle East, but rather the slap in the face administered to the West. Their appreciation can only have been heightened by the fumbling and ineffectual Western response at the time. There have been other occasions since then although none so striking and gratifying as the use of the oil weapon against the West.

On the larger question of attitudes towards the West, there is a notable contrast between most of the Arab world, on the one hand, and Turkey and Iran on the other. This is, of course, in part due to the fact that the latter countries adjoin the Soviet Union and have a direct historical experience, which the Arabs have hitherto lacked, of Russian

imperialism. But that is not all. There is also the vital distinction between those countries formerly under imperial rule, whether direct or indirect, and those which never lost their independence. It is striking that the old independent countries, almost without exception, are pro-Western or associated with pro-Western alliances--Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Thailand, Japan. It is only the others, which have undergone prolonged Western domination, that reacted emotionally against the West and failed to perceive a similar but greater threat from the Soviet Union. There are many signs, however, that they are learning rapidly.

In the meantime the oil weapon and the panic disarray which it caused in Europe and elsewhere have given a feeling of elation and of power to those who use it, which is very gratifying and at the same time very dangerous. This is typified by those Palestinians who, believing that the Egyptians, Jordanians, and Syrians are concerned only with recovering their own lost territories and serving their own interests, are convinced that the Palestinians are about to be betrayed by their so-called Arab brothers. But on the subject of oil, the general attitude is one of "having the world by the throat." Such a feeling brings solace and delight to peoples smarting under the long domination of alien powers and cultures. This mood makes the Arabs ready victims of any force which opposes the West and challenges Western power and Western values. It enabled the Nazis, while in fact offering the Arabs very little, to win extensive Arab support; it enables the Russians to do the same--often the same support, from the same quarters.

The Russians succeeded where the Nazis failed, and established themselves in the Middle East, thereby inaugurating the inevitable process of disillusionment. They are still able, however, to use and encourage the anti-Western mood, and in this they are greatly helped by the supine, almost willing submission of Europe to Arab demands.

The mood is a dangerous one, and can lead to dangerous miscalculations. Some far-sighted Arabs are aware of this, and in Egypt, for example, an article in al-Ahram pointed out the injury the oil embargo was doing to the Arab cause. Yet at the same time the English-language Egyptian Gazette was exulting in the panic disarray of the West, and demanding a tightening of the screws by the oil powers.

America stood firm against the oil weapon, thereby winning the respect of Arab governments, and is seeking ways (although perhaps not with sufficient urgency) of protecting itself against any future Arab attempt to wield it. Europe and Japan, however, remain vulnerable, and the poorer countries of Asia and Africa even more so. In the meantime, the increased cost of oil is placing another and more powerful weapon in the hands of the producers--that of money. If the present buildup of funds continues unchecked and their use unrestricted, the oil producers will soon have it in their power to cause considerable damage to the whole Western monetary system. This would not of course be to their advantage, but it would be rash to assume that enlightened self-interest will necessarily prevail over immediate self-indulgence in determining action.

C. Conflicting National Interests

The third and highest level is that of great power conflict, especially the rivalry between the two superpowers.

1. Soviet Union

Soviet aims in the Middle East are obvious. For the Soviet Union it is the route to Asia and to Africa, the hinge of three continents, and an area of vital strategic importance whether in the confrontation with the West or with China. It is in particular the route to the Indian sub-continent, likely to be the main political battleground between the Soviet Union and China if the rivalry between the two continues. From a defensive point of view, it provides a forward bastion for the Soviet south, which is otherwise vulnerable to attack from the Middle East. Perhaps of far greater importance at the present time, it provides a means of preserving the Muslim subjects of the Soviet empire--the Turkish and Persian-speaking peoples of Trans-Caucasia and Central Asia--from ideological contamination by their independent co-religionists to the south.

Soviet methods in the Middle East have undergone a number of changes. The classical Marxist approach of class war, for which the Middle East is singularly unsuited, has long since been abandoned. Soviet techniques currently used in the Western world, those of ideological and

industrial subversion, are not appropriate for the area. In most Middle Eastern countries there are no free trade unions, no free universities, no free press and media, and no liberal intelligentsia to exploit. The Soviets must deal with governments or at least with groups capable of seizing power and forming governments within the system. They pursue therefore a "Great Power policy," imperial in the traditional rather than imperialist in the modern sense, using communism, nationalism, even religion and race, as and where necessary, and directed to a number of local and specific purposes as well as to the general overall aim of extending the influence of the Soviet Union and diminishing that of the West.

Detente has not changed Soviet intentions in the Middle East. On the contrary, it has given greater opportunity of pursuing them. Here as elsewhere, detente for the Russians is neither a policy nor a substitute for policy, but an instrument of policy. The Russians have made it clear in a number of ways that they do not regard detente as applying to the Middle East but rather see a detente in Europe as an opportunity to devote greater efforts to other areas including the Middle East.

There is some doubt as to how soon the Soviets were aware of the impending Arab offensive in October 1973. It is certain that they knew of it at least several days beforehand, as is evidenced by the movement of families out of Egypt and Syria. It may well be that the period was longer. It is very unlikely that the Soviets actually instigated the attack, but it is clear that they did nothing to prevent it. They might have claimed that such an offensive, launched without prior consultation with them, was a violation of the Soviet-Egyptian pact of 27 May 1971, and in particular of Article 7, which states that "in the event of situations developing which, in the opinion of both sides, create a danger to peace or a violation of peace they will contact each other without delay in order to concert their positions with a view to removing the threat that has arisen or restoring peace."¹ They have made no such complaint, though they have no reason at the present time to spare the feelings of the Egyptian Government. Under the terms of the U.S.-Soviet Agreement of 24 June 1973, the Soviet Union was under an obligation to inform the United States of any impending danger of war. They did not see fit to do so, thus violating their

¹ For a discussion of the somewhat divergent Russian and Arabic texts of this treaty, see Bernard Lewis, Times (London), p. 16 (8 October 1971).

undertaking within only a few months of having given it. President Sadat has told us that the Soviets tried to stop the war immediately after it had begun. It would indeed have been politically advantageous to secure a cease-fire while the Arab attackers were still in possession of their initial gains. But the attempt, if it was made, failed, and thereafter the Soviets, far from trying to stop the war, tried to extend it by urging other Arab states to join the fray.

Another way in which the Soviets violated the detente agreement was by inciting the Arabs to use and maintain their oil weapon against the United States in particular and the West in general. Later they warned the Arabs against lifting the oil embargo and thus weakening their own position. Even the Egyptian disengagement agreement was portrayed in Soviet broadcasts as an attempt by the Americans and their reactionary Arab allies to isolate the Arabs from the Soviet Union and force them to abandon their socio-economic and political gains achieved under socialist rule and with Soviet help. For this and similar reasons the Soviet Union repeatedly called on the Arabs to escalate their economic warfare against the West. At the time of the disengagement agreement with Egypt, opposition in Cairo, vigorous though naturally not public, came especially from those circles known to be in touch with the Soviet Embassy and well disposed towards the Soviet Union. A statement ascribed to Gromyko and published in al-Ahram on 22 January 1974 was seen by them as an expression of support for their views and an encouragement to intransigence. According to this statement, Andrei Gromyko gave assurances of the continuance of Soviet support for the Arab peoples and the people of Palestine. Gromyko defined the attitude of the Soviet Union in the following points:

- Moscow does not oppose any efforts undertaken by the United States in the Middle East as long as these efforts have as their basic objectives the protection of the rights of the Arab peoples and the people of Palestine and as long as these efforts do not injure the interests of a third party.

- The Soviet Union will not accept anything less than [what] the Arabs themselves would accept, and if this does not happen, the Soviets will announce their position clearly.
- The key to the solution of the Middle East crisis is in the hands of Egypt in the first instance. The Soviets are fully aware of this and they will strive to establish relations with some of the other Arab states.
- The attitude of the Soviet Union towards Israel must be clearly defined. It is that the Soviet Union is the friend and strategic ally of the Arabs and that the security and peace of the peoples of the area depend on the solution of the problem of the Palestinian people and the restoration of their rights.
- The Soviet Union aims at maintaining relations with all the Arab states, irrespective of their political regimes.

This statement does not appear to have been published either in the world press or in the Soviet press, and was presumably a direct communication to the Moscow correspondent of al-Ahram. It seems to have had no immediate significance relating to the situation at that time but should not be underrated for that reason. Its importance seems rather to be as a preparation for possible changes of policy at a later date, as a statement for the record, and as a form of guidance to pro-Soviet elements.

The present situation offers certain dangers to Soviet interests. One of these is the danger of peace, of a peace negotiated under American auspices resulting in a pax americana in the area. On a personal level, Americans are better liked than Russians and are generally seen by Middle Eastern countries as constituting far less of a threat to their independence and identity. A state of peace would also reduce, although certainly not eliminate, the hold which the Soviets have over the Arab states as their military suppliers. For these and related reasons the Soviets have no great interest in the establishment of peace between Israel and its neighbors, and if they do not actually obstruct the conclusion of such a peace, they will take care to lay a minefield across the path of the peacemaker which they can detonate at any time suitable to them.

There is also a danger, however, to Soviet interests in an armed conflict between Israel and the Arab states which could again result in a humiliating defeat for the Arab proteges of the Soviet Union and for the Soviet arms which they wield. This would place before the Soviets, as in 1967 and 1973, the need to choose between suffering this defeat and entering into a dangerous situation of confrontation.

For the Soviets, therefore, there is an agonizing choice to be made between the dangers of peace and the dangers of war. Which considerations will prevail, which dangers will they find greater? Obviously their decision will be shaped very largely by American policy, or at least by their own perception of American policy, which may not be the same thing. In general terms, a continuance of the state of conflict would no doubt be more suitable to Soviet interests, provided the dangers inherent in that condition can be contained or minimized. If the Soviets became convinced that in the event of another confrontation not they, but the United States, would back down, then any incentive to peace would disappear and the advantages of the state of conflict would become dominant.

It is such an assessment by the Russians that constitutes the major danger of the present situation. At the moment they do not yet

appear to have made up their minds. They are offering resistance to the process of peace by still encouraging the Arabs in the use of the oil weapon and by encouraging "hard liners" in the P.L.O. and in Syria to delay progress--not yet to the point of breakdown, though with increasing boldness. They may not unreasonably hope that peace talks will break down without their assistance. If peace talks, however, do seem likely to succeed, one must prepare for more active Soviet intervention against them.

Soviet leaders were less than delighted with the disengagement agreement with Egypt. Secretary of State Kissinger's attempts to associate them more closely with the negotiations for a disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria seem only partially to have pacified them. Arabic broadcasts from Moscow present these moves as part of a concerted maneuver to consolidate and expand neo-colonialist positions. American business, according to a broadcast from Moscow in Arabic, was seeking new opportunities at the expense of "the national sector in the Arab countries." David Rockefeller's trip to Cairo was presented as an attack on the revolutionary social and economic changes in the Arab world. Other broadcasts attacked those elements who were alleged to be undermining the united Arab-Soviet front against Israel, and menacingly reminded Arabs of their dependence on Soviet aid.

Most striking was the sudden appearance of Foreign Minister Gromyko in Damascus in the final stages of Dr. Kissinger's negotiations. Just at the point when things seemed to be going well and drawing towards a successful conclusion, Mr. Gromyko made a sudden flight to Damascus. The immediate result of his appearance was a hardening of Syrian attitudes, the reopening of questions already agreed to, and the sudden appearance of obstacles not previously present. One was the problem of the linkage between the disengagement and a final total Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories. Clearly this question must have been resolved at an early stage in the negotiations, otherwise there would have been no further discussions and no possible basis for such discussions. The question raised is the fundamental one of the interpretation of Resolution 242: whether it requires withdrawal from territories or from all the territories. The issue is an old one and one on which Israel clearly will not compromise

before even the negotiations begin. The Egyptians had agreed to a disengagement without such a clause and the Syrians seemed likely to do the same. The sudden raising of this issue at a very late stage by the Syrian government was obviously something new and not a continuation of their previous negotiating position. It seems a likely guess that this hardening of Syrian attitudes was at Soviet instigation; this was confirmed by a public statement made by Mr. Gromyko on 26 May 1974 when he declared that the real issue was Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied in the 1967 war. The insertion of this argument at this particular point can only be described as an attempt to sabotage the disengagement talks.

On this point the Syrians finally gave way, and contented themselves with a reference to Resolution 338 of the Security Council, which in turn refers to Resolution 242, which allows both sides to reserve their positions on the territorial question.

More serious--and more dangerous--was the exclusion of the Palestinian organizations from the cease-fire agreement. The Egyptian disengagement agreement had applied the cease-fire to military and paramilitary actions; the Syrians refused to include the reference to paramilitary actions, and had their way. This, coupled with the return of 60,000 civilians to Quneitra, virtually gives the Palestinians--and therefore the Syrians--an open license to resume and escalate hostilities at will, while the resulting American assurance to Israel authorizes them to respond appropriately. Mr. Gromyko did not conceal his direct interest in retaining this option of paramilitary warfare.

2. Arab States

With regard to the question of the aims and intentions of the Arabs themselves, here one must distinguish three groups, each in turn subdivided within itself. The first group consists of the four Arab states immediately adjoining Israel, each with its own policies and purposes. Here it may be remarked that any serious conference genuinely concerned with peace and settlement, and not merely with temporary arrangements and revisions, must include Lebanon as well as the three states militarily engaged.

The second group consists of states not directly involved, but playing an active part in the dispute by political activity, military contributions, or, most important of all, by the sponsorship of terrorist organizations. Libya, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia are clearly the most active in this context.

The third group consists of the Palestinians--the most concerned, the most important, yet the most difficult group to define and identify. A distinction must be made between the Palestine entity and the Palestine people. The Palestine entity is an invention. The Roman name Palestine, preserved in the West, died out among the Arabs before the Crusades, and has no roots in Arab history, sentiment, or tradition. It was adopted by Britain to designate the Mandated Territory assigned to it on both banks of the Jordan after the First World War, and then arbitrarily restricted to the West Bank only; it was abandoned, with the Mandate, in 1948, and later revived by the Arabs. Both names, Palestine and Jordan, are more ideological than geographical. The Palestine people, on the other hand, by whatever name they may be designated, are a reality, and their problem is a real one, which must be solved as part of any general settlement. There is some doubt, however, as to who has the right to speak for them--the Jordanian monarchy, the local notable leadership, or the militant organizations centered in Beirut. These, it will be recalled, include bodies sponsored by various Arab governments for use in inter-Arab conflict as well as against Israel.

The Arabs find themselves basically confronted with a choice between two objectives: (1) to accept the existence of Israel and try to reach a settlement on the best possible terms available to them; or (2) to pursue their original objective of unraveling the past, a part at a time, first the 1967 war, then the 1948 war, and so ultimately undo what they regard as the great injustice constituted by the very existence of Israel. The option is retained by the common use of open-ended formulae, notably the demand for "the restoration of the rights of the Palestinians." This is a convenient slogan, capable of many interpretations.


In Egypt, and perhaps in some other Arab countries, there is at the present time a genuine disposition to try the path of settlement, and there seems no good reason to doubt the sincerity of the present Egyptian government in this matter. It would be foolish, however, to overlook the fact that there are other Arab leaders who are still firmly determined to destroy Israel and regard any settlement after this last war merely as a first step towards that end. It would be equally unwise to ignore the

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fact that even the most moderate would gladly adopt the second policy if they judged the opportunity favorable. Some Arab officers put Arab aims in this way: "We and they [the Israelis] both need a period of peace to recover from the wars which we have fought. This peace will not involve any measure of friendship or goodwill, merely that we live side by side without conflict and without armed hostilities. During that period we shall see what happens, and how things develop. It may prepare the way for a genuine peace of good and neighborly relations, or it may merely be an interval of preparation for another war. We can keep open minds on this subject." This is a fairly general attitude and (from the Arab viewpoint) a fairly sensible one. Here again, Arab policies will be affected very largely by American policy or by their perception of American policy, and of course also by the policies and actions of Israel.

3. Israel

Israeli policy is concerned exclusively with one problem, that of survival, and with finding the best and safest methods of ensuring that aim. Israelis are, however, not in agreement on how best to achieve this purpose, how much stress to lay on defensive borders, or how much value to place on agreements with Arab neighbors. In particular, on the problem of the Palestinians, they cannot agree on the question of which of their neighbors or which of the contending parties they should attempt to reach an agreement with. The Israelis know very well that in a straight conflict between themselves and their Arab neighbors, without interference by any of the Great Powers, they would be able to hold their own without serious difficulty. They also know, equally well, that in a conflict between themselves and their Arab neighbors, in which their Arab neighbors enjoy the support of the Soviet Union and they do not enjoy the support of the United States, their position would be very weak indeed. Their policies too, therefore, will to a very large extent be conditioned by their perception of American policy and, in particular, of probable American actions in the event of a new conflict.

Some Israelis have argued that the only rational policy for Israel to pursue is one of Finnish-style neutrality. That is, to retain Western-style institutions and way of life and to maintain friendly cultural and commercial relations with the Western world, but to end the Western alliance and to assure the Soviet Union that Israel would in no way interfere with Soviet aims and policies in the Middle East as a whole, provided Israeli independence is respected. The proponents of this view argue that America is half-hearted and remote while Russia is near and determined and the Middle East will inevitably pass under Soviet domination. In such a situation, they say, Israel's only hope--and it is a slender one--is to persuade the Soviet Union to accord it the same status as Finland. Most Israelis reject this argument as a chimera and believe that their survival ultimately depends on the American alliance.

4. Other Interested Countries

Other interested parties are the lesser world powers--Western Europe and Japan--and the countries of the Third World, especially those of Asia and Africa which are largely dependent on Middle Eastern oil. These countries are affected by a number of factors, but three in particular: (1) the need for Arab oil and the consequent fear of Arab action; (2) a residual and recurrent anti-Americanism which frequently distorts their perceptions and their policies; and (3) at the same time, the need for American support against the dangers of communist invasion or political intimidation. These countries were the main victims of the 1973-1974 oil embargo and of the sharp rise in oil prices. Their policies and actions at the time of the conflict and oil crisis were short-sighted and selfish and showed neither wisdom nor courage. In Europe in particular it was quite clear that they were relying on the United States to incur the odium of doing what needed to be done for their interests as well as Middle Eastern interests, while at the same time trying to gain short-term benefit by making noises and engaging in actions pleasing to the Arab governments. It is both wise and necessary to involve the countries of Europe and of Asia and Africa in any kind of concerted action to deal with the hardships inflicted by the rise in the price of oil and the threat to the world monetary system. At the moment this seems to be difficult, but

with the emergence of new leaders in European countries and the signs of a growing awareness in Asia and Africa of the problems of oil, firm and determined American policy initiatives might well produce results.

5. United States

The United States has two basic national interests in the area. The first is a strategic one--to prevent the area from falling under the exclusive domination of the Soviet Union, with all the disastrous consequences which would flow from this for Turkey, Iran, Europe, the Mediterranean, Africa, the Indian Ocean, and Asia. This is an overriding and vital concern of the United States in the area.

A second basic interest of the United States in the Middle East concerns oil and the various aspects of the oil problem, including the impact of oil on the Western alliance and on the international monetary system. A third but less basic U.S. interest is the survival of Israel. This is a matter of vital interest to an important section of the population of the United States, and therefore an electoral and political factor of considerable domestic importance. The Israeli interest and the oil interest appear to clash, and the exponents of both have argued that their particular interest coincides with the national strategic interest of the United States. Neither such identification can be regarded as axiomatic or accepted without question, but obviously both constitute important factors influencing American policy and limiting American policy options in the area. Support for Israel is based on domestic political considerations, on affinity of institutions and aspirations with the only state in that area of Western type and Western democratic institutions. These considerations are sometimes furthered by the argument that Israel is the only one where the alliance would certainly survive any change of government or regime and does not depend on the survival or caprice of an autocratic ruler.

Support for the Arab case against Israel on the other hand is provided, among others, by those with commercial interests in the area. The growth of the oil industry and the enormous sums now available to Arab oil producer states constitute a powerful source of political influence and pressure. Arab funds may easily become a major factor in the whole economic system of the Western world. The main compensating disadvantage is the precariousness of Arab regimes and the unpredictability even of those that survive.

D. Effects of the October 1973 War

The war of October 1973 brought a number of important changes to the situation. Some of these are negative--to the disadvantage of the West and the advantage of the Soviet Union. Foremost among these is the disarray of Europe, the conflict which arose between the European states and between Europe and the United States. The disagreements between the United States and its European allies--first on the question of the supply route to Israel and second on the best method of dealing with the oil crisis--greatly strengthened the Soviet position in Europe to the disadvantage of both the West European countries and the United States. Another negative result was the oil crisis itself and the degree of dependence on Arab oil which it revealed--especially in Europe and Japan but also in the United States. Here, however, there was a positive element to be discerned, in that the use of the oil weapon by the Arab states and others gave forewarning at a time when it could still be heeded effectively. Had the war come a few years later, when American dependence on Arab oil would have doubled or trebled above its figure in October 1973, the damage would have been far greater. As it is, the United States suffered little more than inconvenience, and even to some extent profited by the Arab use of the oil weapon, in that America is itself an oil producer state and therefore gained some advantage against its industrial competitors in Europe and Japan who were far more grievously affected. This advantage was reflected in the rise of the dollar and the profits of American oil companies. The crisis has given sufficient time to initiate research into the means of discovering alternative sources of energy and thus to end, or at least reduce, the present dangerous dependence on a single source in a single area. Whether, of course, the American government will take the necessary steps to achieve a greater degree of self-sufficiency is another question.

Another negative result is the entrenchment of Soviet positions in Syria and Iraq and their growing influence with the Palestinian organizations which now seem to be turning increasingly to the Soviets for support. There have been a number of indications of this and even of Soviet complicity in, or at least tolerance of, Arab terrorist actions.

The options and alternatives for a solution of the Arab-Israel conflict remain basically the same as before the war. There are, however, two important changes in the situation. The first is that both the Arab states and Israel have been shocked out of their immobility by a sudden awareness of the degree of their dependence on superpower support in a state of conflict. The second is the restoration of American influence in the Arab world. Neither change is necessarily permanent, or even of long duration, but while they persist they provide an opportunity for constructive statesmanship, an opportunity that inevitably carries with it an important element of risk.

Several of the Arab states have indicated their readiness, even if in carefully indirect terms, to accept the existence and continuance of Israel as a state. This acceptance, if meant seriously and conveyed convincingly, could achieve the indispensable preliminary to the solution of the conflict--namely its normalization. As long as the issue is the existence of Israel, there is no possibility of compromise or even discussion; if the existence of Israel is accepted, and the issue its size, then the conflict becomes for the first time a "normal" political dispute about frontiers, capable of discussion, negotiation, and eventual solution. Legally, Israel has never had frontiers, only cease-fire lines--a status which applies even to the former international frontier of mandatory Palestine. Thus Article V, Subsection 2 of the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement of 24 February 1949 states:

The Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary, and is delineated without prejudice to rights, claims, and positions of either Party to the Armistice as regards ultimate settlement of the Palestine question.

Ironically this clause was included on Egyptian insistence.

The solution of the frontier question between Egypt and Israel as states should not prove impossibly difficult to achieve--perhaps it can be accomplished in stages and with various provisional arrangements. The terrain lends itself to such solutions, and the Egyptian government has shown real willingness to enter into meaningful negotiations. The frontier between Israel and Syria presents far greater problems because of the intractability both of the terrain and of the dialogue itself. The recently concluded disengagement agreement illustrates both the difficulties of negotiations and the uncertainty of the results achieved.

One of the main obstacles to the Syrian disengagement agreement, and one of the main dangers to its survival, is the continuing doubt about Syria's real readiness to come to terms with the existence of Israel in any shape or form--a doubt reinforced by some of President Assad's speeches. Some other Arab states, notably Iraq and Libya, are quite explicit in refusing any form of recognition, and in demanding and working for Israel's destruction. This attitude creates difficulties for those who have already in some form agreed to recognize Israel. It throws doubt on the effectiveness and permanence of such recognition, renews the ever-present danger of a competition in extremism between Arab leaders, and, worst of all, encourages the most extreme and uncompromising elements among the Palestinian organizations.

Among the three groups who claim to represent the Palestinian people, there are many different views. The Jordanian East Bank establishment is divided. A minority, including, however, the King and many senior officers, demands the return of the West Bank and Jerusalem, if necessary in a system of federal autonomy. Their military honor requires the recovery of what they have lost; their duty to Arabism imposes this task on them. UN Resolution 242, calling for the restoration of territories conquered in 1967, by implication to the previous owners, provides them with a juridical-political basis for their claim, which is indirectly supported by the Israeli administration of the West Bank as occupied Jordanian territory. Another, and larger, group of East Bankers sees the

West Bank and the whole Palestinian problem as a burden and a danger to the Hashemite kingdom, which in their view would do better to concentrate on the development of the tranquil and loyal East Bank and leave the fate of the turbulent West Bankers to be settled between the local leadership, the Israelis, and the organizations.

The local leadership probably commands more support among the Palestinians in Palestine than either the Jordanians or the organizations. Their dilemma is that they are unable to form a coherent leadership or formulate a decisive policy while the Israelis are still there and would be overwhelmed in a clash between their two rivals if the Israelis go. Yet they probably offer the best hope for a peaceful solution, in agreement with both Israel and Jordan.

The Palestinian organizations have hitherto made no secret of their refusal to consider any compromise involving the continued existence of Israel. Though their leaders no longer speak in public of "driving the Jews into the sea," their program of a secular but Arab state of Palestine, in which "Palestinian" Jews would find their place as a religious minority, and non-Palestinian Jews and their descendants would leave, would certainly mean the end of Israeli statehood. Even now, when some leaders of the P.L.O. are arguing for the recognition of a truncated Israel, within the 1947 U.N. partition borders, as a temporary and tactical measure, they are having great difficulty in winning support.

As between Israel and the Palestinians, three solutions are theoretically possible. The first is that of the Palestinian organizations--the death of Israel and the rebirth of Palestine. Since no state will voluntarily cooperate in its own destruction, this could only be achieved by force of arms, and might well lead to an Israeli recourse to nuclear weapons. To Westerners, the destruction of Israel may seem remote and absurd. To the dominant generation of Israelis, still seared by the memory of Nazi crimes and Western acquiescence, it remains a fearsome

possibility, and one that overshadows their political and strategic thinking. These fears have been increased by the events of the last few months--the loss (much exaggerated) of military self-confidence, the total abandonment of Israel by Europe, and the beginnings of Israeli territorial retreat under U.S. pressure.

Another theoretical possibility is a binational state. Here there are two obstacles. The first is that no significant group on either side desires such a solution, the only supporters of which are some minor Jewish leftwing groups in Israel and certain Western sympathizers of the Palestinian militants, who either misunderstand or misrepresent their aims. The second obstacle is that such a scheme, even if attempted, would probably be unworkable. The experience of binational statehood even in such advanced and peaceful countries as Belgium and Canada does not augur well for the union of two peoples divided by decades of strife and separated by wide social and cultural disparities.

The third possibility is a new and final partition of the lands which between 1918 and 1948 constituted Palestine and Transjordan. Here there are three alternatives. The first is the establishment of an Arab state, consisting of all those areas of mandatory Palestine which are not Israel, with frontiers and relationships with its neighbors to be determined by agreement. The danger of such a state from the Arab point of view is that it could easily degenerate into an Israeli Bantustan; from the Israeli--and Jordanian--point of view, that it would become a nest of terrorists and a launching-pad for attacks on its neighbors.

A second possibility, reportedly discussed between the P.L.O. and the Syrian government, is that this Arab state should be federated with Syria. Given the present Syrian leadership, such an arrangement is unlikely to be acceptable to Israel, Jordan, or even Egypt.

The third possibility is that there be not three but two states in the area: one of them Israel, the other an Arab state on both banks of the Jordan. This might be unitary or federal, and might be called Jordan or Palestine. The difference between the two names is

programmatic, and involves the maintenance of the Hashemite monarchy or its replacement by a radical republic. The implications of this choice, in terms of the international behavior of such a state, are obvious.

Much will depend on the role of Egypt and of Saudi Arabia, the two most influential of the Arab states, and, to a lesser extent, on other Arab governments which have influence with the guerrillas.

E. U.S.-Arab Relations

The most important positive result of the war is the restoration of the American position in some Arab countries. One should not, however, overrate the importance or permanence of the successes that have been achieved. The relationship with President Sadat is clearly an excellent and a valuable one, but it is highly personal. It depends on two things, first, that Sadat remains in power, and second, that he does not change his mind. It is something quite different from an alliance based on a genuine community of interests and policies, and underpinned by basic affinities. A relationship based on the individual policy of an autocrat is necessarily insecure and should be treated accordingly.

The Russians for the moment are in retreat in Egypt. It would be very unwise to assume that they have written off Egypt. On the contrary, it is very likely that they are planning to return at the first opportunity. President Sadat is now in great danger. He has acquired a series of dangerous enemies in the Soviet Union and in the Arab world, including Libyans, Syrians, and Palestinians, and the survival of his regime--or of its present policies--can by no means be taken as axiomatic. In the meantime, however, it offers interesting possibilities, which may lead to results. The present mood of Egypt is Egyptian rather than pan-Arab, and the President would probably be content with a solution which meets Egyptian national requirements. The question remains, however, whether it is politically and financially possible for him to withdraw from the Palestine question. The Syrian disengagement agreement makes this easier, and this may be its principal merit. Pressure in the opposite direction comes largely from Saudi Arabia, and here there is an opportunity for the constructive use of American influence.

There are two interpretations, two perceptions, which are now current of the present relations between the United States and its Arab friends. Each of these has very different consequences.

The first perception sees this as an Arab triumph, the triumph of Arab oil and Arab money, and some even add the success of Arab arms, in forcing the United States to change its policy. According to this view, it was the pressure of the Arab oil embargo which compelled the United States to reconsider its relationship with Israel and adopt a stance more favorable to Arab interests. This perception has been encouraged both by Israeli lamentations and by American eagerness. It appears to receive some visible support by such actions of the United States as the failure to insist on a condemnation of the Kiryat Shemona massacre in the resolution passed by the Security Council condemning the Israeli reprisals (thus departing from previous practice) and by the reported willingness of the United States to supply sophisticated modern weaponry on a large scale to Saudi Arabia and possibly to other Arab states without the customary clause prohibiting the transfer of such weapons to front line states for use against Israel. It may be argued with justice that such transfer clauses are of little value, as was demonstrated by France and Libya. But the diplomatic consequences of the failure even to insert such a clause, like the refusal to insist on even-handed condemnation of terrorism by the Security Council, can be and has been interpreted as a change of policy by the United States under Arab pressure.

The other interpretation sees the change as a triumph of American strength and firmness. Here a contrast may be noted between the war of 1967 and the war of 1973. In the first the United States maintained a carefully neutral and even-handed posture, as a result of which America was accused of supporting Israel and a number of Arab states broke off diplomatic relations, destroying and attacking American offices and other property. In 1973 the Americans, for the first time, intervened actively and decisively, and this time the Arab states resumed diplomatic relations with the United States. According to this interpretation, it was American strength and American firmness and resolution, the defiance of the oil weapon, and the defiance of diplomatic pressures which persuaded the Arabs

that they had to deal with the United States as the only power capable of wielding effective influence in the area. An important element in this change was the Israeli military success, that is to say, a success of American weapons wielded by an American protege, thus raising the reputation of both American arms and American patronage. The Russians are at a great disadvantage, in that they have no leverage in Israel--not even an embassy--and have no way in which they can exercise influence on Israel for the benefit of their Arab proteges. The United States possesses this advantage. The United States "hand" in the Arab lands is based on two cards, first on Israeli power and second, on American ability to control that power. Without the first the second is useless.

F. American Policy: Retreat or Resistance?

Is American policy one of weakness or of strength? Are the Americans courting Egypt or being courted by Egypt? Much depends on the perception of the answer. And this in turn must be seen within the larger framework of American foreign policy.

Here again there are broadly two possibilities. The first of these is a policy of retreat. According to this view, America must accept the fact of Soviet superiority in both weapons and morale. With a crippled government and a demoralized public opinion, with unreliable and disloyal allies, the United States in this assessment is unable to offer effective resistance to the Soviet advance. It is therefore necessary to draw the appropriate conclusions and to prepare if possible an orderly rather than a headlong retreat and compel America's allies and wards to do likewise. A reading of the American domestic situation and of the policies of the Western allies might indeed lead to some such conclusion. The present state of the alliance and the confusion of Western opinion seem to offer little encouragement for a firm policy of resistance to Soviet advance.

Nevertheless, a policy of retreat would be profoundly and historically wrong. International relations are not a chess game in which there is a limited number of possible moves by two sides and in which, therefore, a master viewing the board can calculate all the possibilities and

concede defeat by an assessment of measurable prospects. Such calculations would have led to the capitulation of Britain in 1940, of Israel in 1948, and of Egypt in 1967. None of these happened because international relations are not limited to a finite number of measurable possibilities and are not carried on by strict rules. What happened in these three cases was that instinctive loyalties and the will to live outweighed rational calculations, and triumphed. The United States cannot adopt a policy of defeat and retreat without suicide--and America is not ready for that yet.

The second possibility is one of resistance and containment. This means a policy of holding the Soviet Union and where possible, restricting and reversing the Soviet advance. The first requirement of such a policy is clarity and firmness of purpose and above all the avoidance of dangerous self-deception and delusion. This is a characteristic hazard of democratic states, where governments have to keep in touch with public opinion and require from time to time to be reelected. Politicians and their electors are only too ready to accept apparent improvements and apparent detente rather than face disagreeable realities. This sometimes leads to the deliberate refusal to perceive violations and deceptions by the other side, to slanted, policy-oriented intelligence assessments, and even to a kind of idealization of the adversary who is seen as a counterpart of oneself operating within the same limits and bound by the same rules and restraints. He is not. A firm policy would encourage belief in the accuracy and maturity of American judgment, the value and reliability of American friendship, and the unwisdom of incurring American hostility.

The greatest danger in the present situation in the Middle East lies in a possible misreading of American policy by the Arabs and the Russians. The danger would be even greater if it is not a misreading but a correct reading.

G. Looking to the Future

It is not difficult to envisage the circumstances in which a new conflict might begin. The disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria might collapse, opening the way to a resumption of hostilities in the north, which in turn could drag in Egypt and other Arab countries. Alternatively, and more probably, the disengagement agreement might hold for long enough to begin political negotiations at Geneva. These in turn could easily get bogged down because of the inherent difficulty of finding common ground between the two sides. If this were not sufficient, one can certainly count on deliberate obstruction by the Palestinians, the Soviet Union, and certain Arab countries, each with their different interests in preventing the conclusion of a peace under American auspices. In such a situation a resumption of full-scale war would become a serious possibility.

Clearly, neither side would start such a war without a reasonable hope of achieving some success. At the time of the second cease-fire on 24 October, the Arab military commands had a pretty good idea of the real situation, and knew that it was only the intervention of the superpowers which saved them from a further and humiliating defeat. The interval which they gained, however, served more than one purpose, and it was believed by many senior Arab officers that had hostilities been resumed two or three weeks later, after they had had an opportunity to redeploy and rearm their forces, they would have been able to give a very much better account of themselves and, in their own judgment, to defeat the overstrained and over-extended Israelis.

The crucial factor, however, is not the military capacity of the two sides, but the reliability of their superpower patrons. The Arabs can be fairly sure that in a crisis situation the Soviet Union would step in to save them--that it would not permit the Israelis to advance on either Damascus or Cairo, assuming that they have any desire to do so. The Soviets would prefer to do this themselves, but would be content to do it through the United States as they did last October. There is no doubt that they would be willing to take independent action if they felt it to be safe to do so. In such a situation, a Soviet armed intervention in the area would be a

real possibility. Alternatively, if the Arab states with Soviet arms seem to be winning the advantage, the question then arises whether the United States would intervene to save Israel or, assuming that it did, would be able to do so with sufficient speed and vigor. One hears different judgments on this question. Some, notably Dr. Hasanayn Haykal, are of the opinion that in a crisis situation the United States will always rally to Israel for reasons both of international and of domestic policy. It was indeed for this reason that Dr. Haykal opposed President Sadat's policy of rapprochement with the United States and was removed from the editorship of al-Ahram. The underlying assumption of President Sadat's policy is that Dr. Haykal's analysis is untrue and that the United States can be relied upon--from an Egyptian point of view--not to support Israel. At present this means no more than support for what are conceived as legitimate Egyptian aspirations and withdrawal of support for more extreme Israeli positions. It could, however, easily give rise to the belief that American support for Israel in a situation critical for Israel's survival would either not be forthcoming, or would be late, slow, and consequently ineffective.

The Israelis themselves have contributed greatly to the rise in Arab morale by their incessant criticism of themselves, their army, and their leadership. Since the war, Israeli radio, television, press and parliament have been concerned with little else and it may well be that they have succeeded where the Arab leadership failed in persuading the Arab peoples that they did indeed win a great military victory in October. It is noteworthy that the Arabs under Israeli rule are much more elated than those of the Arab states--no doubt because of the direct impact of Israeli gloom. American eagerness for Arab goodwill, manifested diplomatically, commercially, and militarily, could also encourage similar ideas. If the belief is genuinely accepted by the Arab leadership that they could attack and destroy Israel with Russian help and without American interference, they may well decide it is worth the risk. In due course they would no doubt find that they had been mistaken, but in the meantime terrible damage would have resulted--deep divisions within the United States, divisions within the Western alliance, and a grave danger of open conflict all over the Middle East.

The Arab choice, as has already been noted, is between recognizing Israel and getting the best terms that they can on frontiers and other matters in a settlement, and pursuing the aim of unraveling the past and destroying Israel in stages. The choice will depend very largely on the indications which they receive of American reactions in such a situation. The first would mean peace, the second catastrophe.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND THE
MILITARY BALANCE IN ARABIA AND CENTRAL ASIA

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A. Introduction

The outbreak of fighting between the Arab states and Israel acted as a catalyst in political, economic, and military terms. All the factors had been available for study long before the events of October 1973, and no extraordinary foresight was required to predict that sooner or later the Arab states, for all their chronic inability to act in concert, would recognize the utility of the oil threat. It was also clear that neither of the superpowers was prepared either to defend its individual political position in the region to the point of global conflict or to tolerate the total defeat of its respective client state. Furthermore, the very wide gap in military capability between the Israelis and the militarily backward Arab states was gradually but significantly closing.

What the conflict succeeded in doing was to bring all these matters suddenly to a head. The political incoherence of the Arab states was highlighted--especially the schism between the Soviet-oriented countries and the more truly Islamic ones such as Saudi Arabia. The West European states were made rudely aware of their lack of common policy and their political insignificance. They were also made aware, with equal brutality, of their dependence on the Islamic oil-producing states. The Soviets perceived the unreliability of the Arabs as client states (or perhaps a perception already made was fortified). The two superpowers were able to take the measure of each other's determination in a situation which was in fact extremely dangerous. As it turned out, what proved to be remarkable was the success of U.S. political initiatives and diplomacy from a position

of apparent political weakness stemming from domestic controversy over the position of the President and collapse of any form of unity and lack of support of U.S. policy on the part of the NATO states. In fact the United States warded off a threat of direct military intervention by the Soviet Union, terminated the war at the earliest practical moment, and since has played the leading part in the subsequent peace negotiations. This has demonstrated that realities of political power in the modern world rest, as they always do, not on moral or transcendental factors but on economic and military resources measured by superpower standards.

In fact, not a great deal has changed, but a great deal has been clarified. This paper attempts to assess the regional balance in the light of this clarification and to see what this suggests as the most profitable strategy for the United States in the region.

B. The Strategic Setting

If Israel is regarded as the storm center of the region under discussion, the whole can be divided rather loosely into three strategically concentric zones. The first consists of those Arab states which share a common border with Israel which bore the brunt of the fighting in 1967 and 1973: Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, with Lebanon as a passive spectator. The second consists of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Libya--three states whose different attitudes towards the questions of Arab unity and Israel illustrate the diversity of Arab opinion and also the difference between professions of policy and interpretation when, as it were, the chips are down. The Gulf states can be included in this zone. They epitomize the overall Arab predicament, combining as they do immense wealth (in purely financial terms) derived from oil revenues, Sheikly or autocratic governments, and societies which have hardly emerged from a Koranic, feudal stage.

In the third, or peripheral, zone lie Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. The last three are somewhat remote from the storm center and are neither rich in resources nor exert any real external political power. Furthermore, in the oil bargaining arena, they are on the loser's or buyer's side of the market. Afghanistan and Pakistan, however, as strongly Muslim states, sympathize with the Arab cause, as does India, which has more

Muslims than all Pakistan and is also completely dependent on Arab oil. The political significance of these three countries concerns their links with and attitudes toward the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

Iran is a different matter. While Iran is in some ways a "Third World" country, part of whose territory is arid and part of whose population is tribal, it is unmistakably an emergent state using its oil revenues for modernization and also, as it happens, to build up powerful military forces. Iran is Muslim (but heretically Shia, as opposed to the Sunni orthodoxy of the Arab states) and is in no sense an Arab state if we accept the definition that an Arab state is one which is Islamic regardless of its political orientation as between the rival power blocs, is Arabic-speaking, and above all identifies itself with the Arab "cause", which simply turns on the continued existence of Israel and the occupied lands. Iran itself is the most important power in the region, being able to exert military pressure if necessary and also being prepared to use its oil-based wealth for aid programs, as it has in the case of India.

The political linkages and tensions in the regions are themselves worthy of a deeper and more detailed analysis than is possible in this primarily military analysis, but they must be mentioned so as to enable the strategic factors to be seen in better perspective.

The hard core of opposition to Israel is Egypt and Syria, although "core" is not entirely appropriate because it is geographically split and Arab divisiveness (the basic source of Arab weakness) has prevented anything more than a loose coordination of policy and strategy, whereas so large and complex a war as was fought in October demanded unity of command both for operations and for the subsequent peace negotiations. This is manifested again in failure to secure the full cooperation of Jordan, whose position on Israel's longest land frontier is crucial. Jordan, having had a taste of Israel's enmity and Egypt/Syrian "friendship," is as neutralist as King Hussein dares.

Iraq is Soviet-oriented and at odds with powerful anti-Soviet Iran and has a slight military rapport with India over military training, but India, anxious about oil, cultivates friendly relationships with Iran as well. Iran and Iraq have current border disputes over sovereignty concerning navigational rights in the Shatt al Arab, the islands of Tums and Abu Musa, and Iraq has long cast covetous eyes on Kuwait. Iran for its part has every intention of resisting any Iraqi adventures and maintaining control over the Gulf area.

The position of Libya is equivocal--pan-Muslim, pro-Arab, and yet open to Soviet overtures--as discussed below.

Saudi Arabia is staunchly Arab but has no intention of becoming militarily committed to hostilities against Israel, except possibly by a token force, as in the October war. King Faisal prefers to rely on oil diplomacy. As for his military forces, a significant development is the reported establishment of a well-armed special force whose primary role is counter-guerrilla and internal security.

Turning to the eastern end of the region, there are sources of friction between Pakistan and Iran over the Baluchis who live on either side of the border and between pro-Soviet Afghanistan and pro-Chinese Pakistan over the question of Pushtunistan (the Pushtu-speaking minority who live on both sides of the old British-delineated frontier). Then there is India (non-aligned but Soviet oriented). Indian military action has for the moment removed any threat from Pakistan, but the new state of Bangladesh is virtually in a state of anarchy and an uncomfortable neighbor. Kashmir is a continuing problem and the presence of an armed and apparently politically intransigent China on its all too vulnerable northern border does little for peace and stability.

It is with these factors in mind that a tentative estimate of the military balance in the Middle East is attempted.

C. The Arab-Israeli Qualitative Balance

At the outbreak of the October 1973 war, the Egyptian and Syrian forces outnumbered the Israelis by approximately 3 to 1 in manpower, 3 to 1 in tanks, and more than 2 to 1 in aircraft. The Soviet Union had equipped the Arab states with some of their most modern weapons systems: tanks, antitank missiles, aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, guns (artillery and antiaircraft), helicopters, transport aircraft, naval craft and missiles, and a wide range of sophisticated ancillary equipment.

But even though the Arab offensive caught their opponent unprepared, the Israelis, after an initial hesitation which could have been fatal (and was entirely their own fault), recovered the initiative in a matter of days and achieved what must be considered a limited military victory.

In retrospect it is quite clear that the Arab armies were saved from yet another humiliating defeat by the intervention of the superpowers and the successful negotiation of a cease-fire. Superior weapons in the hands of more determined, better trained, and more competent soldiers, sailors, and airmen were responsible for Israeli successes, but not before defects in their tactical doctrine and lack of some modern sophisticated weapons had been exposed on the battlefield and in the air.

The most glaring deficiency on the Israeli side was the failure of their military intelligence organization to assess correctly the information placed before them. The Israelis learned a hard lesson in October 1973, which they are not likely to repeat. But their whole intelligence organization needs to be updated and their current intelligence-gathering equipment replaced with more modern systems, particularly in the field of photographic and infra-red reconnaissance.

One Israeli weakness was in underestimating the effectiveness of "second-generation" antitank guided weapons (ATGW). They relied on tank gunnery and airstrikes, having only a few French SS11 ATGW in their armory.

The Egyptians and Syrians were generously supplied with Soviet Sagger antitank missiles, which took a heavy toll of Israeli tanks in the opening stages of the war. The Israelis were surprised by the efficiency and effectiveness of these weapons, because they had not expected to see them deployed in such large numbers by both the Syrians and Egyptians. All the Israeli tanks (U.S. M 48s, M 60s and British Centurions) proved highly vulnerable (no modern tank is likely to prove immune to the current generation of ATGW and certainly not to the next). The Israelis have since made good this deficiency with the acquisition of Hughes TOW missiles from the United States, a few of which were received just before the war ended, but not in time to play a decisive role in the tank battles. Israel is now also ordering up to 50 of the latest Bell/Cobra AH1Q attack helicopters armed with TOW, which will give Israeli forces a distinct advantage over Arab armies equipped with Soviet Sagger missiles, which are currently capable of being fired from the ground only. The Soviets are producing their own antitank helicopter, the MIL 24 Hind, capable of carrying six and possibly eight Sagers. Another deficiency which the Israelis must make good is their lack of an effective shoulder-fired antitank weapon such as the Soviet RPG 7.

The 105mm tank guns used by the Israelis appear to be more effective and more reliable than the Soviet 100mm and 115 mm guns (although it is questionable whether this would be the case if they were Soviet-manned). At the moment the Israelis are markedly superior in all aspects of armored warfare except missiles, but this advantage will inevitably be narrowed as Arab training is improved and more advanced equipment comes to hand. Israel will not be able perpetually to face adverse odds with a certainty of winning.

Israel must as a matter of urgency substantially improve its air defense capability, especially in the field of missiles. Its airfields and industrial complexes are virtually undefended except by manned aircraft, which cannot provide air cover, direct support for the ground forces and protect the home base. Its Hawk surface-to-air missile batteries barely saw action because of the failure of the Egyptian air force to intervene, a circumstance which may be unlikely to be repeated. By contrast the Arabs

had, as is well-known, a complete family of weapons--static SAM-2s, and SAM-3s, and the highly successful mobile SAM-6s and the hand-held SAM-7s--which exercised a powerful tactical influence on the course of operations. Losses due to battle casualties and lavish missile expenditure have been more than made good by the Soviet Union. There is no doubt whatever that this will alter the character of all future operations in the region.

There are other weapon systems in which the Israelis will be deeply interested, as each holds out prospects of greater efficiency and therefore of the manpower saving so essential to the Israeli philosophy of war. The first system includes so-called "precision munitions" such as the U.S. laser-guided Mark 84 bomb and the Maverick electro-optical weapon. The second system consists of electronic countermeasures (ECM and ECCM). The third system is the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) such as the Boeing E3A. It is a truism that efficient command and control systems are as effective in improving overall effectiveness as actual weapons, especially in complex two-front air-land battles such as the October War. The fourth system involves the use of the developing Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs), particularly in the reconnaissance and ECM roles with the future possibility of a strike role against certain specific targets. Of these, ECM should have priority, especially against the SAM-6. Defense suppression weapons are another field deserving priority. The balance in the Middle East, as elsewhere, will be decided by the pendulum of measure and countermeasure.

In surface-to-surface weapons, the Arabs are well supplied with Frog 3 and Frog 7 missiles as well as the longer range Scud, which no doubt the Soviet Union will continue to supply as required. Israel has its own Jericho missile, and it is likely that its range will be increased (or a new missile developed) to reach most major Egyptian and Syrian industrial complexes, airfields, logistic supply depots, and other targets. All these unguided "area" missiles are untested in action apart from a few harassing rounds fired by the Syrians into the northern settlements. Israel, however, is by virtue of its size and position far more vulnerable

to bombardment than its opponents, and if the Arabs obtain a quantity of long-range, guided surface-to-surface missiles capable of carrying a heavy high-explosive payload, there would be a significant change in the military balance. It would affect the question of defensible frontiers--these becoming less important--and affect the powerful constraints which have lately restrained the Israelis from preemptive action and both sides from bombing civilian centers of population.

At sea the Israelis demonstrated the superiority of their own Gabriel surface-to-surface missile over the Soviet Styx missile, and there seems little doubt that the Israelis also enjoy a marked superiority over the Arabs in the performance of their Saar-class fast patrol boats (FPBs) over the Soviet-supplied Osa-and Komar-class boats. In the air the Phantom F4E, the A4E/H Skyhawk, and the Mirage 3B/C proved to be superior to all the Soviet-supplied Arab aircraft, including the much vaunted MIG 21 Fishbed and the SU 7 Fitter. Comparisons between the load-carrying capacity, range, speed, and armament of the respective aircraft clearly show the actual and potential superiority of current and projected Israeli aircraft over those likely to be supplied to the Arabs by the Soviet Union, and few would question the superiority of Israeli pilots flying these aircraft in aerial combat or strike missions.

The superpowers are continuing to provide their proteges with modern armaments, not only to replace the losses suffered in the October war but also to increase their military potential. According to the Israeli Finance Minister, the 18-day war cost Israel some \$7,140 million, and a record draft budget of \$8,440 million was recently presented in the Knesset for 1974-75 representing approximately 40 percent of total spending. Israel's Defense Minister has drawn up an impressive shopping list covering almost every range of modern weapons and equipment for land, sea, and air forces. These include surface-to-air missiles, antitank missiles, precision munitions, tanks, supersonic interceptors, strike aircraft, ECM equipment, heavy artillery, vehicles of all kinds, defense suppression weapons, and naval missiles. All this is in addition to the output of local arms industries in Israel whose production is to be stepped up.

D. Defensible Frontiers for Israel

Israel's abiding problem lies not so much in the factor of relative military strengths, as in whether or not it can establish frontiers which give a reasonable prospect of defense. It is hardly necessary to argue that Israel's original frontiers were almost impossible to defend if the precondition of defense was that the initiative should be surrendered and that Israel should adopt a "blameless" nonaggressive stance taking only those military measures required to preserve its own territory inviolate and therefore fighting inside its own borders. The 1967 war was fought, in military terms, for tactical elbow room. In the north, the Syrians were driven from the Golan Heights and thus deprived of a start line for offensive operations and a line of observation from which the settlements in Huleh could be harassed and any move by the Israelis could be checked. In the east, the dangerous Arab enclave west of the Jordan valley was removed and a defensible position established along the escarpment overlooking the Jordan valley. In the south, Sinai was gained as a theater of maneuver where much ground could be ceded tactically, if only temporarily, to absorb an Egyptian offensive. This is exactly how the Israeli defensive operation was conducted in October 1973--a classic example of the defense "on interior lines."

There was one factor, however, missing from the equation. There was no Arab offensive on the eastern frontier with Jordan, for three reasons. First the Jordanian army had been very roughly handled in 1967. Had it been committed at the outset in the October war it might have suffered severe losses, especially in its elite Bedouin-recruited units who are the mainstay of the regime. King Hussein would have been reluctant to dissipate this important asset. Second, the main thrust, by reasons of terrain, would have been into former West Bank Jordan territory with almost certainly bloody consequences for the Arab population. (It would be reasonable to credit Hussein with this humanitarian consideration. All his policy appears to have been to avoid involvement and suffering in a barren cause for his poor and backward people. The King's real goals are stability for his regime and the return of his West Bank territory.) The third reason is--and here is a typical Arab situation--that his real enemies are his Arab neighbors.

It would be perfectly possible to mount a Jordanian offensive from the east side of the Jordan valley, formidable though the terrain appears. After all, the Israelis tackled the Golan Heights successfully in 1967, moving armor up what appeared to be impossible routes. Such an operation would have to coincide with Arab offensives in Sinai and the Golan, so as to spread the Israeli defenses. A force of at least two equivalent infantry divisions would be required for the initial assault. This would be beyond the capacity of Jordan and geographically the obvious reinforcing country would be Iraq, assuming that Saudi Arabia adheres to its present attitude of modified belligerence towards Israel. But the one thing King Hussein cannot afford to risk is the establishment of a foreign military Arab presence on his soil, at any rate in strength too great for him to contain with his own loyalist units. It does, therefore, seem that as long as the present regime in Jordan remains secure and stable and the King can continue to pursue his cautious policy towards both his dangerous Arab neighbors and Israel, then Israel's defense commitment on its (present) eastern frontier can be limited to maintaining forces in observation and for the internal security of the occupied Jordan territory.

The importance of geographical frontiers may be less prominent in Israeli arguments if the Arabs become more powerful in the air and acquire greater numbers of long-range, more accurate surface-to-surface missiles. Egypt has shown a measure of disillusionment with the Soviet Union following the outcome of the Middle East war and is now seeking to acquire more effective weapons systems from the West. Oil concessions will no doubt be a feature in any negotiations with a Western country willing to supply arms. Israel could find itself at a severe disadvantage if the Arabs were to acquire an overwhelming missile strike capability against its industrial base, ports, airfields, and logistic depots, particularly fuel storage dumps. Oil supplies to Israel are precarious at the best of times, and, with access to only one oil-producing area, Israel could find its fuel supplies highly vulnerable to air and missile attack.

E. Iran and Iraq

The total strength of the Iranian armed forces is now over 213,000 with the possibility of further increases. Its navy consists of three destroyers, eight frigates and corvettes, and ten patrol boats--to which are to be added six new FPBs armed with the French Execet ship-to-ship missile and four 35mm Oerlikon air defense guns. The navy is supported by six Orion P3C maritime aircraft and about 150 helicopters. This constitutes the most powerful naval force permanently in the Gulf and adjacent waters.

The army has three armored and two infantry divisions plus four brigades--two armored--to which a fifth is shortly to be added. The tank strength is to be increased from 900 to 1,660 (760 Chieftains), and the artillery strengthened by the addition of the U.S. long-range 175mm SP gun and heavy 203mm howitzers. It is well supplied with helicopters, including the CH47C medium-lift helicopters. Some of the 202 Bell AH1J general-purpose helicopters on order are to be converted to carry the Hughes TOW ATGW, of which a large number of the land version has already been acquired for the army. The Iranian air force is arming at a rapid pace with the most modern weapons systems available from all sources. To its existing squadrons of 64 Phantom F4D/Es, Iran plans to add at least 70 more. The Iranians are also considering placing an order for 50 F15 Eagle air-superiority fighters, the very latest the United States has to offer, to add to the 30 Grumman F14As already ordered. Iran already has six squadrons of F5A fighter bombers (84), to which it plans to add 140 F5Es. It is also currently considering acquiring more Grumman F14A fighter aircraft. An order has also been placed for 280 Bell 214 Utility helicopters to add to the 200 AH1Js already ordered, and in keeping with its desire for the most modern early warning equipment, Iran shows an interest in the Boeing E3A AWACS aircraft. Stabilized sights and laser marker equipment have also been acquired for the Phantoms, which will carry the Mark 84 laser guided "smart" bomb.

By comparison, Iraq is really not in the same league. With a total personnel strength of something over 100,000 (of whom about 90,000 are in the army), Iraq could not offer effective opposition to Iran in maritime operations in the Gulf, and would certainly be no match in the air for Iran's sophisticated aircraft and weapons systems. The Iraqi Army consists of one armored division, one mechanized brigade, and two infantry divisions equipped with 900 Soviet T54/55 tanks, 90 T34 and 45 PT76 tanks--no match for Iranian Chieftains. They are about to acquire Sagger ATGW and some additional PT76 tanks.

The Iraqi air force has 100 MIG 21s and 40 MIG 17s for air defense, supplemented by the usual Soviet mix of guns and missiles for surface-to-air defense, basically SA-2s and SA-3s.

For the support of ground forces it has 36 British Hunters and 60 SU 7s, to which 30 more are to be added. Iraq proposes to add 20 more MI 8 and Alouette helicopters to its present force of 70 MI 4s and MI 8s.

Now that the Egyptian and Syrian losses in the war have been replaced, it may well be that the Soviet Union will seek to improve the Iraqi armed forces; it is obvious that very substantial improvement in numbers and quality will be required to produce anything approaching parity with Iran.

F. The Persian Gulf

Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, together with the Union of Arab Emirates (which was formed in 1971 and which consists of seven small states with small populations--none more than 60,000--but with considerable revenue from oil) are all militarily weak. Tribal feuding has been a way of life with most of them for centuries, and over them Saudi Arabia, the richest and currently the most influential of all the oil-producing countries, casts its shadow. There is a never-ending conflict in Oman and Dhofar encouraged by Soviet and Chinese subversive organizations such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf. Any disturbance of the delicate balance of power which would lead to an intensification of the conflict would almost certainly involve Iraq and Iran on opposing sides.

These tiny states have armed forces of a sort, but what distinguishes them from the more powerful Arab countries is that their equipment and tactical training is almost entirely British. The most powerful of the Gulf States is Kuwait, with a population of about 950,000 and armed forces of more than 10,000, of whom about 8,000 are in the Army. Equipment includes 100 British Centurion and Vickers tanks; 250 Saladin, Saracen, and Ferret armored cars; 25-pounder guns; and 155mm howitzers. Their British-equipped air force of about 40 aircraft is more a status symbol than for real defense. These forces are entirely for internal security and an insurance against covetous advances by its immediate neighbors.

The armed forces of Bahrain and Qatar number less than 2,000 men and are armed with British armored cars and guns. All the smaller countries in the Union of Arab Emirates have similar army and air force equipment, but even collectively would be incapable of resisting aggression by Iraq or Saudi Arabia.

The discovery of massive new reserves of oil in most of these countries has had, however, a stabilizing influence. Instead of internal feuding, they are now devoting their energies to spending at least some of this new-found wealth on the improvement of the living standards of their people. Nevertheless the memories of old enmities, the temptation offered by weak states in possession of vast wealth and the rivalry of powerful neighbors make the Gulf an area of political instability and potentially an actual theater for conflict.

G. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India

Afghanistan, although strongly nationalist and fanatically Muslim, is in the Soviet camp. Its total armed forces number 85,000 (78,000 in the army) and are completely equipped with Soviet weapons. Its two armored divisions and four infantry divisions have a total of 200 medium and light tanks, mostly T34, T54, and PT76. The Afghans have some Soviet Snapper ATGW. The small air force of 110 combat aircraft is entirely Soviet equipped: 10 IL 28 bombers, 24 SU 7 fighter bombers, and a mixture of some 70 MIG 15s, 17s, and MIG 21s; 16 AN 2 and IL 14 transport aircraft;

and eight helicopters. It is also reputed to have some SA-2s. Afghanistan maintains some 200,000 reserves, mostly armed tribesmen, capable of troublesome guerrilla warfare against its neighbors.

Pakistan is a weak link in the political structure of the region, and as such constitutes a danger to the whole. The loss of Bangladesh was an economic blow, and the defeat of its army in the field and the complete loss of its force in East Pakistan was a severe jolt to national morale. The question of Kashmir remains to bedevil its relationship with India, and the Baluchi and Pathan problems continue to offer opportunities for mischief on the part of its neighbors.

The Pakistani armed forces are equipped with a mixture of French, British, U.S., and Soviet equipment, some of it obsolete (the artillery is mainly World War II British 25 pounders). The army is predominantly infantry (12 divisions) and is really only suited to internal and border security. The repatriation of the 75,000 prisoners of war may have a double-edged effect on the morale of the forces--improving it in one way but also possibly tending to depress it by revealing firsthand accounts of the defeat. In the long term, however, the contraction of Pakistan to a manageable size, the disposal of what was in fact a colony whose population was ethnically and linguistically different and was strategically impossible to defend, and the painful exposure of its traditional illusion of military invincibility vis a vis India can only do good. India's test of a nuclear weapon suddenly has made the merits of CENTO apparent once again, and it would have important and beneficial consequences if Pakistan resumes active membership and good relationships with Iran, Turkey, and Britain, especially in the Gulf and the northeastern end of the region.

India dominates the eastern part of the region and its coastal waters, possessing as it does not only the most powerful navy in the area but also armed forces whose higher direction and combat effectiveness have been proved regularly against Pakistan. India is a tough opponent whose troops are far superior to those of any of the Arab states. India's force structures are well suited to their strategic role which, with Bangladesh disposed of, is defensive and exploits its enormous reserves of military manpower. India has approximately one million men

under arms (if the Border Security Force is included), with no fewer than 27 equivalent infantry divisions (11 organized for mountain warfare), reflecting its long and difficult common frontier with China.

Dependent on advanced nations for weapons, India has avoided commitment to any one by acquiring a mixture of British, Soviet, U.S. and French equipment (which must present difficulties over spares and maintenance). Its current reequipment program calls for the expansion of its armored forces by a division with Soviet tanks and ATGW. India has a few SA-2s, but its economic and technological base is too small to support massive rearmament with advanced and expensive weapon systems. As it has not yet had to meet a major threat, it is wisely making do with what is well-tried and manageable. India alone among the regional states (except for Israel) has a useful native arms industry turning out aircraft, tanks, ammunition, and vehicles.

A startling development was India's decision to embark on a nuclear weapons program--possibly as much for reasons of status and political impact as for realistic strategic reasons, for a full development would be beyond its resources in terms of cost and technology, if it considers creating a true nuclear arm. Nevertheless, India could if it chose use a manned aircraft delivery system and eventually develop a MRBM capable of reaching targets in China, including China's nuclear test and development areas in Sinkiang.

II. Implications of the October War for the Local Military Balance

The stability of the Middle East area has so far depended upon the following policies and assumptions. First, the United States is determined not to see the state of Israel liquidated, and has underwritten Israel economically and assured its supply of modern arms. Whether or not the United States would resort to force of arms to prevent the final overrunning of Israel in the case of a sudden or unexpected defeat is something the United States has wisely left unspoken, leaving the guessing and the risk-taking to Israel's enemies.

Second, Israel is unlikely to be reduced by a direct attack, that is, by strategic or missile bombardment on its center of civilian population. It would be possible to inflict irreversible damage on Israel by this means, but its means of retaliation even in the process of defeat would mean equally intolerable damage on the Arab centers within its reach. This is what has restrained the Arabs, rather than any humanitarian considerations. Israel has always acted violently to threats of this nature, whether by ground guerrillas or, as occurred in the October War, in reply to the Syrian bombardment of some settlements using Soviet missiles. (One possibility is that the Israelis are in possession of their own nuclear weapon and means of delivery which they are prepared to use as a desperate last-ditch measure. The longer this question remains in doubt the more effective is its deterrent effect).

Third, the political situation in the Arab world is such that the full Arab military potential is never brought to bear on Israel. In the October War there were token detachments from Morocco, Iraq and Jordan, but the casualties and hard fighting were all borne by the Egyptians and Syrians.

Finally, Israeli military prowess, in terms of command planning and decisions, military skills such as are required to operate modern weapons, battle-craft, and sheer courage and determination in combat (as evidenced by the very few prisoners of war, wounded or unwounded, lost by them), is so far in advance of the Arab forces that, provided arms and munitions are forthcoming in sufficient quantity, the Israelis can beat off any possible threat without significant loss of territory.

Some of these assumptions appear to have been eroded by the events of the October War, but in fact this had been more in appearance than in reality. Israeli self-confidence has been shaken by the loss of captured territory in Sinai and the subsequent political search for a military scapegoat. This was due to naive references to the so-called Bar-Lev line, which gave public opinion the impression that it was an impregnable defense system of the Maginot type whereas it was, and could only be, a line of fortified outposts forming the forward edge of a defense system in depth. The troops in the Bar-Lev positions did in fact put up a fairly stout defense

after their initial surprise, but an absolutely rigid defense is impossible in modern warfare. The power of modern weapons is such that there must be some "give", and indeed the original object of holding as far forward as the east bank of the Canal was to allow space for a defensive battle in depth. (Reading between the lines, the glaring error on the part of the local Israeli commanders was in not ordering a permanent stand-to by the outpost garrisons when it became clear that the Egyptians were massing.)

The other, unmistakable and unpleasant surprise for the Israelis was the improvement in fighting skills on the part of the Egyptians. But this must be seen in perspective. In 1967 the Egyptians, with the exception of a few units, were so bad that most of them broke at the first shock. The Six-Day War was a rout. It revealed the sterility of a military aid policy which was limited to the donation of a mass of modern equipment to countries lacking technical training in its operation. Quite apart from the poor educational standard of the sectors of the population from which the rank and file are drawn, the leadership was defective and the officer class alienated from their troops. Quite obviously the entire command structure required overhaul and the leaders retrained and remotivated. The improvement was indeed remarkable, but it must be borne in mind that it was merely a move on the military scale of values from abysmally bad to moderately bad. On the credit side the Egyptians and Syrians proved able to take the offensive, to accept casualties without flinching, and also to face armored attack on the heaviest scale. (One can detect the Russian influence. Given an army of unskilled, half-educated peasantry, the best tactics are to teach them drills to be applied unthinkingly, equip them lavishly, supply maximum firepower, and use them en masse. This, if persisted in, can be relied on to wear down a less numerous if more skilled opponent.)

The deficiencies on the part of the Egyptian and Syrian commands were numerous and basic. They made no effective use of their air forces. This gives rise to the suspicion that both these countries are too backward to provide pilots with the necessary qualities to handle modern high-performance aircraft. Not the slightest attempt appears to have been made to ground the Israeli air force, on whose continued existence all Israeli

strategy turns. The Syrians with the advantage of surprise and enormous odds completely mismanaged their attempt to recapture the Golan territory and suffered heavy losses. (They might have concentrated on their infantry arm, which seems to have fought the Israelis in minor engagements on fairly even terms.) The Egyptians completely failed to exploit their successful crossing of the Canal. This really was the turning point of the war. Had there been a united, overall command, had there been some attempt to coordinate operations between the northern and southern fronts, and had the first Egyptian objective been the line of the passes in Sinai, the risks might have been greater but the problems for the Israeli command, with all the disadvantages of fighting on two fronts, might have been insoluble. We can conclude therefore that as far as qualitative assessments are concerned the improvement on the part of the Arabs (Egyptians) might be seen as ominous in the long term, but the present balance is still very much what it was, weighted heavily in favor of Israel.

One of the outstanding political lessons to be drawn from the Middle East War is that despite modern intelligence-gathering equipment, including a comprehensive ground organization and aircraft and satellite surveillance which can provide accurate information on military strengths commonly referred to as capability, it is possible to misread enemy intentions.

The Israelis nearly paid a heavy price for failing to assess correctly Egyptian and Syrian intentions prior to 6 October 1973. Europe must not make the same mistake. If such a catastrophe were to happen, there would be no possibility of recovering the initiative and no second chance. An intelligence organization, embracing every modern method of gathering information and presenting it instantly to those concerned with security in Europe, must be provided as a matter of urgency, and those responsible for assessing the information and advising the politicians must be highly trained not only in assessing the value of the information provided, but in their ability to communicate it to those who will have to make the ultimate decision on peace or war in the event of a crisis in Europe.

The attrition rate in the October war in expensive weapons systems was shown to be far in excess of what had been expected. The Arab countries are better placed financially to replace losses, provided they have access to guaranteed sources of supply--which means either the Soviet Union or the industrialized nations in the West--at least until the Arabs are able to provide their own industrial base and their own armaments industry.

Equally, Israel, despite its industrialization and a modest armaments industry, will only be able to match another Arab buildup if it continues to receive massive U.S. support. Even then, manpower will become a progressively more difficult problem for Israel, and perhaps one of the most critical factors of all will be Israel's access to energy supplies and particularly oil, which poses no problem for the Arabs.

In Europe, because of the unwillingness of European countries to increase the manpower element in their conventional forces, greater reliance will have to be placed on high-technology weapons systems, which today can greatly increase the volume of firepower available and direct it more accurately against enemy targets. The destruction of selected targets could be achieved more quickly, more effectively, and with much-reduced collateral damage by such weapons as laser-guided bombs, electro-optical missiles, antitank missiles, artillery with terminal guidance, surface-to-air missiles, both static and mobile, air defense suppression weapons, mines (nuclear and conventional), and small tactical nuclear weapons--to name only a few. But these new weapons systems, more modern communications, and warning and control systems will be very expensive. Nevertheless, the Western powers cannot have it both ways: they cannot disregard the disparity in conventional arms that exists today between the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO, and at the same time refuse to increase the effectiveness of their conventional forces, which would mean either increased manpower or, alternatively, the use of high-technology weapons, which would mean higher costs.

The Soviet Union believes in "mass" in conventional forces even when high-technology weapons are available, and having achieved parity (even superiority) in the nuclear field, the potential military threat to Europe and the West grows greater with each month that passes. In Soviet doctrine, numbers count; the West will disregard this concept at their peril. In the maritime field the situation is little better. The Soviet navy is rapidly overhauling the West, not merely in naval construction, but in their efforts to deploy naval forces on and under all the oceans of the world, while European naval forces are reluctant to venture outside NATO's maritime limits at the Tropic of Cancer.

There is a tendency in Europe to believe that the deployment of maritime forces outside the oceans immediately adjacent to the European coast line is no longer necessary, and in any case it can be left to the U.S. maritime forces to patrol the world's oceans. Occasional visits by British and French naval forces to the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean do nothing to offset the growing economic, diplomatic, and political influence which the Soviet Navy is attempting (with some success) to exert on the littorals of these vast ocean areas. Quite apart from the potential (but remote) threat which Soviet naval forces pose to the West, security of interests on and under the oceans, following the outcome of discussions on the law of the sea at the Caracas Conference, will become a matter of concern to all European countries.

There is one further lesson from the Middle East War which may have passed without attracting the attention it deserves, yet one which could seriously affect the conduct of operations in Europe if there should be another war. During the closing stages of the October 1973 war, massive airlifts of arms and equipment were provided by both the superpowers to their respective proteges. The U.S. air force had to fly their C-5s and C-141s across the Atlantic more than 5,000 miles to Israeli airfields. The Soviets, on the other hand, were able to operate over much shorter distances and with far more facilities than were available to the United States.

On the whole, both airlifts were successful, but it must be remembered that reception airfields in Egypt, Syria, and Israel were not subjected to attack during the course of the airlifts, either by manned aircraft or by surface-to-surface missiles. No such immunity would be permitted in a European conflict, and the advantage would almost certainly be on the side of the Warsaw Pact countries, with shorter internal lines of communication and more airfields at their disposal. The United States and Europe, in assessing the effectiveness of the airlift to Israel, must be careful not to draw the wrong conclusions about reinforcement and resupply across the Atlantic in the event of a war in Europe. Airlift reinforcement, unless backed by ample strategic warning, would be no substitute for forces on the ground if the Warsaw Pact should decide on a surprise attack. Rapid mobilization in accordance with a carefully worked out plan saved Israel in the Middle East War from a serious defeat within the first 48 hours of the launching of the Egyptian and Syrian offensives; but even though Israel had to fight on two fronts, it was able to stabilize the northern Golan front while holding the Sinai position until complete mobilization enabled it to launch counterattacks.

Mobility in any future war will be essential to Israeli forces, and Israel should take steps to provide its army with the means to achieve it. Similarly in NATO, whose forces are outnumbered by 1 1/2 to 1 in manpower, 3 to 1 in tanks, and 2 to 1 in tactical aircraft, increased mobility is an urgent requirement. Medium-lift helicopters are one means of providing it, but NATO armies are sadly deficient in these aircraft.

Finally, a question to be answered is whether the October War revealed one of the periodic swings in favor of the defense, which can sometimes be observed in military analysis. The answer is, tentatively, yes. The effect of the SAM systems on offensive air operations requires no reiteration; nor does that of the ATGW on the main tank, which nonetheless retains a residual utility as a powerful defensive weapon. Above all, modern intelligence-gathering systems, including satellites and the proper use of the information they provide, militate against strategic surprise and diminish the value to the aggressor of the initiative.

1. Arms Aid and the Export of Tactical Doctrine

It will be seen that every advance in weapon technology involves an increase in sophistication and therefore in costs. Any increase in sophistication requires--even if allowance is made for some degree of automation and the employment of equipment requiring minimum maintenance--an increase in the skill of the operators and also in the logistic backing. Guided missiles, obviously, cannot be handled in the same casual way as "iron" munitions. Even in advanced countries, one of the restraining factors in adopting ever more sophisticated weapon systems is the tendency to draw more men away from the limited pool of skilled and intelligent personnel into the infrastructure of radar operators, signalers, repairmen, engineers, etc., leaving fewer for the combat units. This can be crucial in the undeveloped Arab countries. In the West, high-pressure salesmanship on the one hand and an understandable desire to cut a good international military figure on the other have led to overloading the armed forces of African and Asian countries with equipment too sophisticated for them to handle, tactical doctrines requiring leaders with more experience than they have yet managed to train, and infrastructures and field organizations which they have not the managerial skill to operate.

The Soviets, on the whole, are no less sanguine about their client states. Their own weapons and their own tactical doctrine are simpler and more clear cut than those of the West. For although Russian education--and in particular the education of the Soviet service man--has advanced a great deal in recent years, Soviet ideas still derive from what was suitable for an army of ill-educated peasants who were not trained in any military qualities except discipline and blind obedience. Their basic equipment is simple and robust, and their tactical doctrine reduced to simple formulas suitable for such an army, although their aircraft, missiles, and electronic equipment are very advanced. They have the advantage, of course, of standardization with their Warsaw Pact partners, some of whom, particularly East Germany and Czechoslovakia, are advanced industrialized countries well able to cope with high-technology weapons. The introduction in 1970 of the "Coordination Committee for War Techniques" to include all the Warsaw Pact countries suggests closer collaboration between them and the Soviet Union, not only in weapons procurement but also in tactical doctrine, logistics, and technical maintenance.

The Soviet Union nevertheless seems to have foisted its own military ideas, tables of equipment, and even its habit of extreme secretiveness on to the Arabs lock, stock, and barrel without any consideration of what is best suited to the Arabs and their real needs. (They seem to have issued the Syrians a complete set of anti-chemical war equipment--a development which may have been less sinister than it appears. It probably was part of the standard T/O&E). The Russians seem to have no empathy with their Third World clients or appreciation of what they can and cannot achieve. One thing that both the 1967 and 1973 operations have made absolutely clear is that backward Third World countries cannot be made capable of sophisticated 20th century warfare simply by lavish arms aid and the loan of instructors and advisers.

Typically, the Israelis have always adopted a more realistic policy, in spite of the fact that they rank among the developed nations and can, financial considerations permitting, draw on the advanced technology of the United States. Israel's infrastructure is basically its civilian economy, and the bulk of its limited manpower is drawn from a part-time citizen defense force. Manpower must therefore be employed so as to achieve maximum utilization of the most alert and intelligent, with a strong bias in favor of the combat units, especially the elite air force, and training time must be confined to teaching the bare essentials. The choice of weapon systems, therefore, has so far excluded some of the most advanced weapons and includes a great degree of the most robust and simple: those which at best can be manufactured in Israel and maintained (for example, its inventory of heavy mortars) without imposing too severe a nonproductive industrial burden. They may have to modify this policy if Israel is to take advantage of the progress in weapons technology which holds out the prospect of offering an effective counter to invasion by massed armored formations, and also a means of countering the SAM systems which, deployed in mass, inhibited the preemptive and defensive use of the Israeli air arm.

Nevertheless, in the present state of development of the countries of the region, Israel is by far the best one for investment in the way of arms aid. The Soviet rulers should by now have become disillusioned with anything more than the transfer of token supplies. Bulk supplies, if they

continue, will be more for political influence and for economic or monetary reasons, being a means of acquiring currency from oil-rich states, than from a real hope of enabling the Arabs to make any real military progress against the Israelis. (The reasons for the current deliveries of Soviet arms to Libya may be manifold, but pending fuller information may be assessed in this light.)

If we attempt to sum up the strategic profit and loss of all the Soviet effort, it would appear that a very large capital expenditure has resulted, on the profit side, in the establishment of a limited Egyptian bridgehead in Sinai and a jolt to Israeli military self-confidence (which may do Israel no harm in the long run), and, on the debit side, loss of a significant part of Syrian territory and the unchallenged establishment of the United States as the arbiter of events in the area.

J. U.S. and West European Relationships in Light of the War

At the outset of this analysis it was suggested that the war has acted as a catalyst, accelerating existing reactions rather than creating new ones. One of the existing features of the Atlantic Alliance and the U.S./NATO relationship has always been the difficulties of consultation, policy formulation, and concerted, purposeful action. On the one hand, the United States has inevitably on occasion pursued an individual super-power policy taking initiatives as the situation on the superpower plane demanded. A classic instance of this was the strategic alert ordered on 25 October (curiously and ungratefully resented as a step likely to precipitate war). On the other, the NATO nations, admittedly originally set up to counter the massive Soviet threat in Europe, have taken a narrow and parochial view of what should be an appropriate strategy for the alliance. It excluded the Levant and Middle East from its purview as well as naval operations south of the Tropic of Cancer. This was, to say the least, short-sighted, for it has been obvious that the Arab-Israeli confrontation was by far the most dangerous to world peace, and that the bulk of energy requirements of the West European nations in peace and war originated in the region and were transported via a sea route most of which NATO proclaimed as being outside its strategic interests.

There was a certain lack of political will. Long familiarity with the Soviet threat, even though it was actually increasing, diminished its impact. The various conferences (SALT, CSCE, MFR) encouraged a euphoric feeling of detente. On the more practical side, the rising cost of defense coupled with inflation and an increasing distaste for conscript service diminished any enthusiasm that elected leaders, especially those operating on minority votes, felt for defense questions, except on how to reduce the defense burden. In addition, there had long been manifested some impatience with U.S. tutelage in defense matters, reinforced by a distinct element of anti-Americanism, manifesting itself as a fear that U.S. "hawkish" initiatives were likely to provoke conflict rather than damp it down (for example, the interpretations on certain proposals to retarget nuclear weapons by Defense Secretary Schlesinger in January 1974 and the reiterated description of the alert of 25 October as a "nuclear" alert, implying that the United States was about to plunge the world, unconsulted, into nuclear war). On their side the Americans were progressively exasperated with European indifference to defense questions, in which the Europeans seemed prepared to lean on the United States while at the same time criticizing its policies.

Policies for action cannot be hastily concocted after the emergency has occurred. The Cuban crisis was a different affair; no immediate sacrifice was required by Europe, only a general approval of President Kennedy's policy. The October War confronted Europe with an economic crisis--a crisis in the sense that policies devoted to material growth at all other cost might be temporarily imperiled--in which it was felt that any loss of "face" or the alienation of the United States was worthwhile if it warded off the use by the Arabs of the oil weapon. Nor was there merely a rift between European NATO and the United States. NATO itself was in disarray, with only the Netherlands standing firmly by Israel.

Concurrently with this, on the purely economic side, there has been trouble brewing in the EEC. This is not surprising, since the political and emotional readjustments required of sovereign states if the Community is to be more than a customs union are severe and unlikely to be made without trauma. The immediate future is uncertain, with a short-term government in Britain, the fall of Herr Brandt, and a new French president.

It is a gloomy prognosis, and it is possible to write a scenario in which Europe is fragmented into states incapable of cooperation, reluctant to defend themselves, or even face the unpleasant facts of the world situation; the U.S. withdrawn in disgust; and a Europe eventually "Finlandized" under Soviet hegemony.

It is, however, a mistake to take counsel of one's fears, as distinct from appreciating dangers. It may well prove that American steadiness in 1973 and American pursuit of peace in 1974 will not go unremarked; that European members of the Alliance will realize that if either Europe or NATO is to have any meaning, then it must have a concerted outward-looking policy and that it must make sacrifices, if only of comfort and convenience, for its defense; that its defense is global and indivisible; and above all that the citadel of Western defense is in the United States. On its side, the United States will have to show the patience and forbearance towards weaker and intransigent allies which is inseparable from the exercise of superpower.

K. A Future Strategy for the United States

The aim of all foreign policy and therefore the supporting military strategy in the region can be summed up in one word--stability. The region exemplifies two conditions which invariably attract Soviet interest: its international tensions make for instability and militarily it is relatively weak. In addition the distances from the Soviet Union are not great, and in certain areas there is a common frontier. What is of even greater significance is that from the eastern Mediterranean to the Bay of Bengal there is a continuous coastline interrupted only the the Isthmus of Suez. The whole sea region is an ideal area for the exercise of the forward naval policy of the Soviet Union so powerfully advocated by Admiral Gorshkov.

Briefly, therefore, the strategy of the United States must be directed at the following objectives: (1) reducing tensions and thereby the conditions favorable to Soviet meddling, (2) the strategic support of states which may feel themselves under Soviet pressure, and (3) control of the sea area. It is easy enough to adumbrate these aims; to formulate specific regional policies is another matter.

Taking the first objective, the key area is the central one of Israel. U.S. diplomacy has had a successful outcome in its efforts to achieve a cease-fire and disengagement on both fronts. The necessary compromises to enable a truce to come about have been made by the Egyptians, the Syrians, and the Israelis without Israel's having to give up any territory of strategic significance, such as the Jordan enclave on the West Bank. The maintenance of the truce depends on a number of largely unpredictable factors. The Arabs are notoriously volatile, opinions on both sides of the truce lines are highly inflammable; there is a constant temptation to indulge in harassment; and United Nations truce supervisory forces have proved in the past a weak agency. In addition, there are intractable elements on both sides. There are Israelis who from before the inception of the State of Israel believed that its "natural" frontiers are where they lie now, while on the Arab side, as exemplified by the extremists in the various Palestine movements, there are those who will be satisfied with nothing less than the liquidation of Israel as a national Jewish state.

A peculiar danger arises from the action of these extremists, at present based in a neutralist Lebanon which through fear is forced to tolerate semilegalized guerrilla or irregular armies on its soil close to the Israel frontier. These are deliberately and to some degree successfully intended to hinder any form of rapprochement by committing acts of inhuman terror as at Maalot and Qiryat Shmona whose real object is to provoke the Israelis into acts of counterterror. Lebanon's position is extremely equivocal with its mixed Christian and Muslim population. It is unlikely that its rulers will ever nerve themselves to deal with this parasitic guerrilla force in the way King Hussein did in the "Black September" of 1970. Until the Lebanon-based guerrillas can be neutralized they will provide an element of instability to the truce arrangements, whatever they may be.

One essential deduction from these factors is that the United States must continue to underwrite Israel's security. Quite apart from the purely military/strategic consequences of Israel's collapse, it has for so long been a fundamental plank in the foreign policy of the United States that to be forced to abandon it, or even appear to compromise over it, would very seriously affect the validity of the U.S. strategy worldwide. There remain the difficult negotiations which must soon begin to formulate a peace treaty between Israel and the Arab states. U.S. diplomacy will be needed in these negotiations.

Closely connected with this central point of regional tensions is the attitude of Egypt. Historically Egypt stands slightly apart from the rest of the Arab world and in fact was only involved in the Palestine question by President Nasser as a means of providing an external distraction. Egypt is not oil-rich, is xenophobic rather than anti-West or pro-Arab, and is still traditionally resentful of its imperial experience. Egyptians are more outward looking than other Arabs and with more experience of relations with Western peoples. Admittedly its experience of imperialism poisoned this to a large degree, but with the need to modernize the state politically and economically these anti-Western attitudes are being modified with the passage of time. Since complete independence the Soviet connection has proved utterly uncongenial not so much for political reasons or because Soviet military aid was inadequate, as for the simple reason that Soviet personnel were tactless and overbearing. The Egyptians as a whole and not merely those involved in deciding policy were in 1974 tired of the wasteful and worrying period of undecided hostility--the "no-peace-no-war" syndrome--and having had a moderately successful campaign are probably more in favor than ever before of some sort of permanent settlement (although it may prove difficult to make Israel disgorge all of Sinai, which may be rich in oil and other minerals). Finally, there is the all-important question of the opening of the Suez Canal which may bring Egypt back into its former profitable position on a world trade route (and which is being done, significantly, with Western aid, in particular the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy). Resumed and cordial Western relations with Egypt will be a diplomatic prize of great strategic consequence, and the United States, being free of former imperialistic associations, is peculiarly fitted to attempt its capture.

A fresh development in the eastern Mediterranean is the attempt by the Soviet Union, using the threadbare ploy of arms aid, to draw the previously hostile and fanatically Muslim Libya into the Soviet orbit. It would be premature to forecast the effects of this as Libya has no military tradition, has no practical military ambitions or objectives apart from a noisy pro-Palestinian stance, and in any case is unlikely to be able to make effective use of any sophisticated weapon system. It may well be that the Soviet Union's objective is purely commercial and it is disposing of arms which it can afford to part with in order to mop up some of the oil-won currency of which Libya, like the Arab states in general, seems unable to put to any more constructive use. In some ways this development may alarm Egypt as much as it does NATO, because if events followed their normal course it could lead to a Soviet foothold outflanking Egypt on its western side. In the long term this move could be turned to the disadvantage of the Russians.

While these diplomatic processes are working themselves out it is essential that the United States back them up by a restrained but unmistakable demonstration of its strength in the eastern Mediterranean. The Aegean is strategically part of the southern flank of NATO: this in reality, if not in name, is closely connected with affairs in the Levant as a whole. The neutrality, or at least the nonbelligerence, of the littoral states is equally essential. The most suitable agent for encouraging this is maritime power. It is therefore essential that both the United States and NATO maintain an unmistakable naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean, which to be effective must be combined with continuous surveillance.

No mention so far has been made of Turkey in this discussion. CENTO was reduced in value when Iraq decided to withdraw in 1959 and Pakistan became preoccupied with its quarrel with India and its entanglement in Bangladesh. Pakistan has also suffered from a degree of internal instability and from minor political distractions involving its frontier with Afghanistan and the future of the notional "Pushtunistan". As a counterweight, Iran is wealthy, internally stable, and building up its military strength with the aims of ensuring against any military adventurism on the part of its neighbors, especially the Soviet oriented Iraq, and the

control of the Persian Gulf. Clearly part of the essential strategy of the United States (and of course of the United Kingdom) is to persevere with the CENTO idea, more especially as President Bhutto has declared renewed interest in the Organization following India's nuclear test.

Turning to the eastern end of the region, there is India with armed forces which are probably the most effective in terms of experience, command and combat skills of any in the region with the exception of the Israelis. Its position with regard to materiel is less satisfactory as in an attempt to avoid dependence on a single arms supplier and also to create a link with the Soviet Union as a counter to its confrontation with China it has accepted arms from a variety of sources which must present considerable problems from both the operational and maintenance points of view. Much of its equipment is obsolete, but India does possess a useful navy with 21 seagoing ships exclusive of four old ex-Soviet submarines. India is sensitive about big-power intrusion into the Indian Ocean, or rather the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, but with a rapidly expanding population, a low GNP and an inadequate industrial base, a continuing quarrel with Pakistan, a debilitating guerrilla war in its northeast, and an increasingly unstable internal security situation, it is not in a position to do more than use its armed forces to maintain the status quo on its own land and sea borders. In short, the position is that none of the Indian Ocean states of the region can do more than use their military forces for their own security and to exercise a limited control of their coastal waters.

Thus for some time past the Indian Ocean area has constituted a strategic vacuum of the type which inevitably attracts Soviet attention, where a small investment by way of a naval presence could provide valuable dividends in the long run. It is also a good field in which to exercise the emergent--and efficient--Soviet oceangoing navy. A small but effective fleet averaging 22 vessels of various types regularly cruises there.

If, when the Suez Canal is again operational, it is open to transit by naval forces, the Soviet Navy will obviously gain great advantages in steaming time, gain the Red Sea as a transit cruising ground, and be able to shift forces conveniently from Mediterranean waters to the Indian Ocean. There are four key points in the region itself: the Levant, the actual Suez Canal, the Straits of Bab el Mandab, and the Persian Gulf. These constitute a strategic region which must be considered in connection with the routes through the Mediterranean, the Cape route and the trade routes which focus as the Sumatra Strait. The transcendent task for the United States is to maintain a credible military presence in the all-important seaward part of this region.

This alone is not enough. One mood out of which the other Atlantic powers must be persuaded--or jolted--is the complacent belief that this task can be shouldered by the United States alone. Everything that has been said about the strategic importance of the region to the United States applies equally or indeed even more strongly to the Atlantic Alliance, whose members must grasp the elementary strategic proposition that their defense must be based not on some arbitrary boundary but on those sea areas through which their vital trade routes travel.